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Cain as His Brother’s Keeper:
Property Rights and Christian Doctrine in
Locke’s Two Treatises of Government
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*

INTRODUCTION

In his Theories of Surplus Value, Karl Marx devotes a brief chapter
to John Locke’s disagreement with Sir Dudley North on the cause of
high interest rates. In it, Marx summarizes Locke’s labor theory of
property, and he concludes with an arresting aside: “Locke’s analysis
is all the more important since he is the classical exponent of bourgeois society’s ideas of right in opposition to the feudal, and his philosophy moreover served all subsequent English economists as the
1
foundation for all their ideas.” According to Marx, Locke’s theory of
property created the political economy of modern liberalism. Thus,
while “Cromwell and the English people dr[ew] from the Old Testament the language, passions and illusions for their own bourgeois
revolution,” Marx explains, “[w]hen the real goal was reached, when
the remodeling of English society was accomplished, Locke sup2
planted Habakuk.”
3
Locke’s labor theory of property sits at the root of modernity
4
and of the Anglo-American legal tradition. A Lockean conception of
*
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Thanks to Josh Blackman, Eric Claeys, Steven Lenzner, Michael W. McConnell, Jeremy Rabkin, James Stern, and Thomas G. West for helpful comments.
1
KARL MARX, THEORIES OF SURPLUS VALUE 29 (G.A. Bonner & Emile Burns
trans., Int’l Publishers 1952) (1863); see also id. at 26 (“[T]he ownership of a greater
quantity of means of production than one person can put to use with his own labor
is, according to Locke, a political device which contradicts the law of nature on which
property or the right to private property is founded.”). Harvey C. Mansfield points to
Marx’s comment in On the Political Character of Property in Locke, in POWERS,
POSSESSIONS, AND FREEDOM 23, 23 (Alkis Kontos ed., 1979).
2
KARL MARX, THE EIGHTEENTH BRUMAIRE OF LOUIS BONAPARTE 11 (Daniel De
Leon trans., C.H. Kerr 3d ed. 1914) (1852).
3
See MATTHEW H. KRAMER, JOHN LOCKE AND THE ORIGINS OF PRIVATE PROPERTY 3
(1997) (“Locke’s labor theory of ownership has helped to win a place for its formulator among the great thinkers in Western civilization.”); C.B. MACPHERSON, THE
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property animated the American Revolution and the U.S. Constitu5
tion. Thomas Jefferson ranked Locke, along with Sir Isaac Newton
and Francis Bacon, among “the three greatest men that have ever
lived, without any exception,” men distinguished for having “laid the
foundation of those superstructures which have been raised in the
6
Physical & Moral sciences.” Newton and Locke, wrote James Madison, “established immortal systems, the one in matter, the other in
7
mind.” Beyond law and politics, Locke’s ideas transformed Christian
8
doctrine.
POLITICAL THEORY OF POSSESSIVE INDIVIDUALISM 220–21 (1962) (arguing that Locke’s
“insistence that a man’s labour was his own . . . provides a moral foundation for
bourgeois appropriation” and “a positive moral basis for capitalist society”); JAMES
TULLY, A DISCOURSE ON PROPERTY: JOHN LOCKE AND HIS ADVERSARIES, at x (1980) (noting that “Locke’s theory of property has played a major and contradictory role in
western political thought,” alternately providing “the major philosophical foundation
of modern socialism” and a justification of private property); see also PETER C. MYERS,
OUR ONLY STAR AND COMPASS: LOCKE AND THE STRUGGLE FOR POLITICAL RATIONALITY 1
(1998) (locating “in Locke’s political philosophy the deepest, most philosophically
self-conscious expression of modern liberal thought”).
4
See Steven Cherensky, A Penny for Their Thoughts: Employee-Inventors, Preinvention
Assignment Agreements, Property, and Personhood, 81 CALIF. L. REV. 595, 633 (1993) (“The
labor theory is the predominant property justification articulated in Anglo-American
jurisprudence and philosophy . . . . The labor theory is generally attributed to John
Locke and the influential chapter on property in his Second Treatise of Government.”); Justin Hughes, The Philosophy of Intellectual Property, 77 GEO. L.J. 287, 296
(1988) (“Reference to Locke’s Two Treatises of Government is almost obligatory in
essays on the constitutional aspects of property.”); see also G. E. Aylmer, The Meaning
and Definition of “Property” in Seventeenth-Century England, 86 PAST & PRESENT 87, 95
(1980).
5
See STEVEN M. DWORETZ, THE UNVARNISHED DOCTRINE: LOCKE, LIBERALISM, AND
THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 70 (1990) (“Lockean theory . . . suppl[ied] the concepts
and categories in which the Revolutionists articulated their deepest concerns about
liberty and property.”); RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE
POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN 16 (1985) (“The Lockean system was dominant at the
time when the Constitution was adopted. His theory of the state was adopted in
Blackstone’s Commentaries, and the protection of private property was a central and
recurrent feature of the political thought of the day.”); JEROME HUYLER, LOCKE IN
AMERICA: THE MORAL PHILOSOPHY OF THE FOUNDING ERA 209 (1995) (“John Locke’s
moral philosophy was reflected in the aspirations, controversies, and daily way of life
of the American colonists.”); Michael W. McConnell, Contract Rights and Property
Rights, in LIBERTY, PROPERTY, AND THE FOUNDATIONS OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION
141, 142–43 (Ellen Frankel Paul & Howard Dickman eds., 1989) (“It is fair to conclude that the protection of private property was as nearly unanimous an intention
among the founding generation as any other element of a political creed.”).
6
Letter from Thomas Jefferson to John Trumbull (Feb. 15, 1789), in THOMAS
JEFFERSON: WRITINGS 939, 939–40 (1984).
7
James Madison, Spirit of Governments, NAT. GAZETTE, Feb. 20, 1792, available at
http://www.constitution.org/jm/17920220_spirit.htm.
8
See ALICE M. BALDWIN, THE NEW ENGLAND CLERGY AND THE AMERICAN
REVOLUTION 68 (1965) (noting “clear evidence of the transmission through the cler-
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The Supreme Court has recognized the importance of Locke’s
9
theory of property to American law. Legal scholars continue to debate Locke’s theory and apply it to new issues in the law of property,
10
11
12
such as regulatory takings, intellectual property, cyberproperty,
13
14
15
the right of publicity, environmental law, and family law. Americans are the “inheritors of the Lockean tradition” of property rights,
16
Yet despite the vast influence of
Richard Epstein has written.

gy of the theories of Locke”); DWORETZ, supra note 5, at 32 (“The clergy were demonstrably conversant with Locke’s writings, and they had similar ‘religious preoccupations.’”); MICHAEL P. ZUCKERT, THE NATURAL RIGHTS REPUBLIC: STUDIES IN THE
FOUNDATION OF THE AMERICAN POLITICAL TRADITION 148–201 (1996); cf. HENRY
LONGUEVILLE MANSEL, Freethinking—Its History and Tendencies, in LETTERS, LECTURES,
AND REVIEWS 291, 296 (Henry W. Chandler ed., 1873) (“In England, in the early part
of the last century, both the assailants and the defenders of Christianity borrowed
their weapons from the armoury of Locke.”).
9
See, e.g., Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 627–28 (2001) (rejecting the
government’s argument that post-enactment purchasers cannot challenge a regulation under the Takings Clause because “[t]he State may not put so potent a Hobbesian stick into the Lockean bundle”); Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986,
1003 (1984) (citing Locke’s Second Treatise and invoking the labor theory of property to establish that trade secret rights constitute “property” for the purpose of the
Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment).
10
See, e.g., EPSTEIN, supra note 5, at 162 (arguing that the “public use” language of
the Takings Clause “fits in with the Lockean conception of the state”).
11
See Susan Scafidi, Intellectual Property and Cultural Products, 81 B.U. L. REV. 793,
804 (2001) (“Expressed in terms of Lockean labor theory, the ethical justification
argues that when a creator deliberately combines her mental efforts with language,
images, techniques, or other ideas in the public domain, the resulting product
should be identified as her intellectual property.”); Wendy J. Gordon, A Property Right
in Self-Expression: Equality and Individualism in the Natural Law of Intellectual Property,
102 YALE L.J. 1533, 1540 (1993) (“Locke’s labor theory of property and allied approaches have been used so frequently as a justification for creators’ ownership
rights that Locke’s Two Treatises have been erroneously credited with having developed an explicit defense of intellectual property.”).
12
See Michael A. Carrier & Greg Lastowka, Against Cyberproperty, 22 BERKELEY
TECH. L.J. 1485, 1500 (2007) (noting that “[c]yberproperty proponents have invoked
Locke’s labor theory to justify the concept” but arguing that the labor theory does
not support cyberproperty).
13
See Sudakshina Sen, Fluency of the Flesh: Perils of an Expanding Right of Publicity, 59
ALB. L. REV. 739, 739 (1995) (“[T]he celebrity’s right of publicity is justified in terms
of John Locke’s labor theory of property.”).
14
See, e.g., Myrl L. Duncan, Property as a Public Conversation, Not a Lockean Soliloquy,
26 ENVTL. L. 1095, 1127 (1996) (arguing that “the traditional Lockean viewpoint”
promotes “ecological abuse” and urging its reconsideration).
15
See Shoshana L. Gillers, A Labor Theory of Legal Parenthood, 110 YALE L.J. 691, 693
(2001) (proposing “a normative model of legal parenthood based on a Lockean labor theory of property that awards parenthood to the gestational mother, or those
who commissioned her services”).
16
Richard A. Epstein, No New Property, 56 BROOK. L. REV. 747, 750 (1990).

MENASHI.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

188

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

2/7/2012 3:04 PM

[Vol. 42:185
17

Locke’s theory of property, many scholars question its coherence.
Some conclude that Locke’s theory rests upon theological assump18
tions without which it makes no logical sense.
Locke himself regarded his theory as a significant accomplish19
ment. Yet contemporary scholars do not agree. According to John
Dunn, the political doctrine of Locke’s Two Treatises of Government
20
“was merely the dignifying of the legal order of the English polity.”
Locke evinced “a considerable degree of acceptance of the conventional social pieties” and merely offered “principles of the most indu21
bitable and parochial political orthodoxy.” Under this view, however, the dramatic intellectual influence of Locke’s doctrine—not to
mention the controversy it created in its own time—seems almost inexplicable.
That an apparently conventional theological work had such influence offers a clue about Locke’s intention. Perhaps Locke meant
furtively to accomplish what Marx claims he actually did: to undermine feudal society and to supplant traditional religious ethics.
Against scholars who argue that Locke’s Two Treatises of Government is
logically incoherent or religiously dogmatic, this Article argues that
Locke’s theory of property aimed to supplant traditionalist Christian
22
ethics with a modern ethic of human autonomy. Through a close
examination of the discussion of property in Two Treatises, the Article
reveals that Locke’s reliance on the authority of scripture is more ap17

See Adam Mossoff, Locke’s Labor Lost, 9 U. CHI. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 155, 155
(2002) (“Despite its omnipresence in the lawyer’s understanding of property rights,
his theory of property has fallen prey to modern academic critiques . . . . They declare, in short, that Locke’s labor argument for property is a lousy justification for
property rights.”). For particular critiques, see, e.g., ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY,
STATE, AND UTOPIA 174–78 (1974); JEREMY WALDRON, THE RIGHT TO PRIVATE PROPERTY
184–91 (1988).
18
See infra Part II.A.
19
In a 1703 letter to Richard King, Locke assessed his contribution by writing,
“[P]roperty, I have found nowhere more clearly explained than in a book intitled,
Two Treatises of Government.” TULLY, supra note 3, at x. Locke presented himself as a
disinterested observer because Two Treatises had been published anonymously. See
infra note 95 and accompanying text.
20
JOHN DUNN, The Politics of Locke in England and America in the Eighteenth Century,
in POLITICAL OBLIGATION IN ITS HISTORICAL CONTEXT 53, 60 (1980).
21
Id. at 60, 63.
22
Locke’s theory of property is the heart of his political philosophy. See
MACPHERSON, supra note 3, at 197 (“Everyone sees that Locke’s assertion and justification of a natural individual right to property is central to his theory of civil society
and government.”); cf. WILLMOORE KENDALL, JOHN LOCKE AND THE DOCTRINE OF
MAJORITY RULE 69 (1918) (evaluating Locke’s theory in light of “the most crucial of
the ‘natural’ individual rights which he is thought to have defended,” the natural
right to property).
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parent than real. While Locke cites biblical teaching ostensibly to
support his theory of property, his argument in fact undermines the
biblical view.
After this Introduction, Part II introduces the “theological view”
of Locke and argues that while scholars are right to identify apparent
deficiencies in Locke’s prose, they fail to consider how those difficulties might proceed from a conscious rhetorical method. Locke avoids
the appearance of heterodoxy in order to gain wider acceptance of
his ideas. Part III explores Locke’s view of nature that forms the basis
of this theory of property. Locke’s vision of nature effects a break
from traditional notions of divine sovereignty in favor of human selfreliance. Part IV illustrates how Locke’s theory of property alters the
biblical ethic. Locke’s challenge to traditional Christianity becomes
clear when one compares Locke’s teaching with those of the Church
fathers, especially the biblical teaching on property to which Locke
alludes in Two Treatises. Locke’s theory supplants biblical morality by
justifying material acquisition and celebrating human industry. Part
V explains how Locke’s doctrine forms the moral core of a liberal society. What results is a redirection of social life from spiritual devotion to commercial development and a shift in allegiance from
church to self. Together, these Parts lead to a fuller understanding
of a theory that undergirds American constitutionalism, modern liberalism, and the law of property.
II. LOCKE’S RHETORIC
Before examining Locke’s articulation of his theory, it is worth
reviewing contemporary critiques of Locke and how his ostensible deficiencies might be explained by a conscious rhetorical method.
A. “A Series of Theological Commitments”
Given the strength of Marx’s assessment—and of Locke’s political achievement—one wonders how contemporary scholars can regard Locke’s treatise as a conventional text, judging “practically every
feature in Locke’s political system” to be “a commonplace of current
23
English political theory.” Or, worse, to regard Two Treatises of Government as an “incoherent and carelessly written work” that “appears

23

J.W. GOUGH, JOHN LOCKE’S POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 98 (1950); see also JONATHAN
I. ISRAEL, ENLIGHTENMENT CONTESTED: PHILOSOPHY, MODERNITY, AND THE
EMANCIPATION OF MAN 1670–1752, at 58 (2006) (identifying Locke as an “essentially
conservative thinker[]”).
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24

to be merely muddle.” Observing the apparent banality and incoherence of Locke’s argument, some scholars resort to “the standard
theological reading of Locke’s politics,” in which “[c]ommentators
assume that Locke, as a child of his times, must have believed” in prevailing Christian doctrines, and these complete his otherwise inade25
quate system.
John Dunn, citing “the theoretical centrality of
Locke’s religious preoccupations throughout the work,” concludes
that Locke’s arguments depend “for their very intelligibility, let alone
26
plausibility, on a series of theological commitments.” As Matthew
Kramer puts it, “Without explicit or tacit affirmations of God’s benevolent reign, the principles and arguments [of Locke’s theory of
27
property] would crumble under the slightest challenge.” Readers of
Locke’s work must accept his religious commitment “unless we presume that Locke deliberately ventured arguments which he almost
28
surely would have assessed as gravely flimsy.”
According to this view, Two Treatises is “saturated with Christian
assumptions” such that Dunn locates “the key to Locke’s moral vi29
sion” in the traditional Calvinist doctrine of the calling.
Steven
Dworetz concludes that “Locke is a sincere theist whose political
theory cannot be detached from his ‘religious preoccupations’ with30
out unhistorically secularizing, and thus distorting, its character.”
Similarly, Jeremy Waldron contends that “[t]o treat Locke’s argument as though it were a secular argument, and thus on a par with
31
our patterns of secular argumentation, is one sort of anachronism.”
According to Waldron, Locke founded his notions of human equality

24

JOHN DUNN, THE POLITICAL THOUGHT OF JOHN
OF THE TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 164 (1969).
25

LOCKE: AN HISTORICAL ACCOUNT

JEREMY WALDRON, GOD, LOCKE, AND EQUALITY: CHRISTIAN FOUNDATIONS IN
LOCKE’S POLITICAL THOUGHT 53 (2002); see also David Foster, The Bible and Natural
Freedom in John Locke’s Political Thought, in PIETY AND HUMANITY: ESSAYS ON RELIGION
AND EARLY MODERN POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 181, 181 (Douglas Kries ed., 1997) (“According to the prevailing view, Locke’s politics rest, whether he was aware of it or
not, on certain Christian or biblical premises . . . .”). See generally Eldon Eisenach,
Religion and Locke’s Two Treatises of Government, in JOHN LOCKE’S TWO TREATISES OF
GOVERNMENT: NEW INTERPRETATIONS 50 (Edward J. Harpham ed., 1992) (discussing
recent scholarship on the role of religion in Two Treatises).
26
DUNN, supra note 24, at ix–xiii.
27
KRAMER, supra note 3, at xi.
28
Id.
29
DUNN, supra note 24, at 99, 245.
30
DWORETZ, supra note 5, at 30.
31
WALDRON, supra note 25, at 15.
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32

and rights “on theological grounds.” Victor Nuovo calls Locke a
“Christian philosopher” whose work falls squarely “within the conven33
tions of biblical scholarship of his day.” For these scholars, “[a]ll the
roads of Lockean philosophy lead to the hallowed ground of Chris34
tianity.” It turns out, contra Marx, that Locke was just another Habakuk all along.
Yet the theological view of Locke’s Two Treatises fails to account
for certain realities. For one, scholars often consider Lockean political theory apart from Locke’s religious preoccupations, but his ideas,
though secularized, remain distinctly and recognizably Lockean.
Dworetz suggests that secular ideas cannot be authentically Lockean,
though Waldron—while he insists upon the Christian foundations of
Locke’s political thought—regards those religious foundations as in35
significant, “at most a genealogical point.”
If the theological
grounds of Locke’s political principles were so essential, it seems odd
that those principles hold sway not in Locke’s own time but in modern liberal societies that lack the same, or even any, theological
commitments. One faces the paradox of Lockean principles coming
to predominate just as their foundation decays. Such principles,
moreover, have been politically transformative. One naturally wonders how the author of an incoherent tract of familiar dogmas could
manage to transform Anglo-American law, inspire American inde36
pendence, and initiate liberal political economy.
And why was Two Treatises so controversial? Locke published the
book anonymously and would not allow his authorship to be ac37
knowledged until his death. In 1683—six years before Two Treatises
32

Id. at 151; see also HENNING GRAF REVENTLOW, THE AUTHORITY OF THE BIBLE AND
RISE OF THE MODERN WORLD 244 (John Bowden trans., Fortress Press 1985)
(“[T]he religious side in Locke’s thinking is in a particular way constitutive of his
whole philosophical system.”). Jonathan Israel also argues that Locke “abjured notions of a purely secular morality.” ISRAEL, supra note 23, at 52. To Israel, Locke was
a “Christian[] who believed passionately in Revelation, Christ’s miracles, and a providential God who sent His son.” JONATHAN I. ISRAEL, RADICAL ENLIGHTENMENT:
PHILOSOPHY AND THE MAKING OF MODERNITY 1650–1750, at 469 (2001).
33
Victor Nuovo, Locke’s Christology as a Key to Understanding His Philosophy, in THE
PHILOSOPHY OF JOHN LOCKE: NEW PERSPECTIVES 129, 148 (Peter R. Anstey ed., 2003).
Eldon Eisenach, summarizing recent scholarship, concludes that “Locke was a devout member of the Anglican confession” whose philosophy is “informed by a deep
faith in the efficacy of biblical revelation as a source of moral and political duties.”
Eisenach, supra note 25, at 61, 70.
34
Richard Ashcraft, Faith and Knowledge in Locke’s Philosophy, in JOHN LOCKE:
PROBLEMS AND PERSPECTIVES 194, 214 (John W. Yolton ed., 1969).
35
WALDRON, supra note 25, at 242.
36
See supra notes 3–16 and accompanying text.
37
See infra note 95 and accompanying text.
THE
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38

was published but perhaps five years after Locke started writing it —
Algernon Sidney was convicted of treason and executed for endorsing similar ideas. The court examined manuscript pages of Sidney’s
Discourses Concerning Government, a “most seditious and traitorous libel,” according to the Lord Chief Justice, that advocates “fixing the
39
power in the people.” Sidney’s Discourses argues against Sir Robert
Filmer’s Patriarcha—precisely the work against which Locke’s Treatises
is directed. Sidney’s and Locke’s arguments are similar in many re40
spects. In fact, Locke and Sidney had both been involved in the
41
same conspiracy to overthrow the monarchy. It made sense, then,
for Locke to worry about the reaction to his Two Treatises.
In 1690, Locke published his Essay Concerning Human Understand42
ing, which he had been writing since 1671. His friends and collaborators, the physicist Sir Isaac Newton and the Whig writer James Tyr43
rell, denounced him for promoting Hobbism.
Newton thought
Locke’s argument “struck at the root of morality,” as he explained to
44
his friend, and “I took you for a Hobbist.” The Bishop of Worcester,
meanwhile, alleged that Locke’s “‘new way of ideas’ undermined the
45
The charge of Hobbism was serious.
principles of Christianity.”
Opposition to Hobbes’s work had prompted repeated attempts to
46
make Christian heresy a criminal offense. And apart from the legal

38

J. Kemp, Book Review, 12 PHIL. Q. 356, 358 (1962) (reviewing JOHN LOCKE,
TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT (Peter Laslett ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1960)
(1690)).
39
The Trial of Algernon Sidney, in 1 ALGERNON SIDNEY, DISCOURSES ON GOVERNMENT
107, 157, 226 (Lawbook Exch. 2002).
40
Thomas G. West, Foreword to ALGERNON SIDNEY, DISCOURSES CONCERNING
GOVERNMENT, at XV, XXIV (Thomas G. West ed., rev. ed. 1996); see also id. at XXII
(“Sidney invokes the authority of divine revelation to vindicate conclusions reached
by reason.”).
41
Id. at XXXIV.
42
1 JOHN LOCKE, DRAFTS FOR THE ESSAY CONCERNING HUMAN UNDERSTANDING AND
OTHER PHILOSOPHICAL WRITINGS (Peter H. Nidditch & G.A.J. Rogers eds., Oxford Univ. Press 1990)(1690).
43
David Wootton, John Locke: Socinian or Natural Law Theorist?, in RELIGION,
SECULARIZATION AND POLITICAL THOUGHT: THOMAS HOBBES TO J.S. MILL 39, 41 (James
E. Crimmins ed., 1989).
44
HENRY RICHARD FOX BOURNE, THE LIFE OF JOHN LOCKE 226 (1876).
45
Ashcraft, supra note 34, at 198.
46
In 1866, the committee of the House of Commons considering such a bill “was
specifically empowered to gather information about the atheistical implications of
Leviathan.” RICHARD TUCK, HOBBES 42 (1989). The bill failed in the Lords but was
reintroduced in 1667, 1674, 1675, and 1680. Id. at 42–43; see also Noel Malcolm, General Introduction, in 1 THOMAS HOBBES, THE CORRESPONDENCE, at xxi, xxv (Noel Malcolm ed., 1994).
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threat, any work tarred with the Hobbist label would be denied a full
47
hearing in the public square. Locke’s work was susceptible to the
charge. The Two Treatises purported to refute not only Filmer’s Pa48
triarcha, but Filmer’s Observations upon Mr. Hobbes’s Leviathan as well.
Thus, Locke’s work refutes Filmer’s refutation of Hobbes and thereby
provides an indirect defense of Hobbes. When Two Treatises appeared, it was hailed “as a controversial work,” and even Whig leaders
49
“hesitated at first about accepting it.” Such a reaction would make
little sense had Locke simply reflected the commonly accepted ideas
of the time.
Contemporary observers must lack some awareness that was prevalent in 1690 if they do not believe that Locke offers anything novel.
Instead of the theological interpretation, it may be worth taking seriously the suggested alternative that Locke deliberately ventured
flimsy arguments—arguments that would be embraced by readers
with preexisting theological commitments—in order to make other,
50
more subversive arguments in the book more palatable. As Locke
47
See Jon Parkin, Hobbism in the Later 1660s: Daniel Scargill and Samuel Parker, 42
HIST. J. 85, 86 (1999) (noting “the kind of backlash that unwisely expressed Hobbesian views might face”).
48
JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT bk. I, ch. II, § 14 (Thomas Hollis
ed., London, A. Millar et al., 1764) (1690)[hereinafter LOCKE, TWO TREATISES], available at http://oll.libertyfund.org/title/222. I use the Hollis edition of Two Treatises
because it is the first to include the corrections and additions Locke made to the text
during his lifetime. Each of the first three editions of Two Treatises contained printer’s errors, and Locke made extensive corrections to a copy of the third edition,
which is now housed at Christ’s College, Cambridge. C.B. Macpherson reproduces
the Hollis edition in JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT (C.B. Macpherson ed., Hackett 1980) (1690), though the Macpherson edition does not include the
First Treatise. See A Note on the Text, in SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT, supra, at 1;
see also Peter Laslett, Introduction to JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 16,
22–23 (Peter Laslett ed., Mentor rev. ed. 1963) (1690) (noting that Locke “corrected
a copy of the printed version in minute detail, scrutinizing word-order, the italics, the
punctuation, even the spelling, as well as the general sense” and that Hollis acquired
the master copy and published it as the 1764 edition). Contemporary editors have
made some further alterations to Locke’s corrected text, see, e.g., Editorial Note, in
TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT, supra, at 162, 163–64, so I rely directly on the Hollis
edition. Further citations to Two Treatises will identify the book, chapter, and section
number. Italics have been omitted in some cases.
49
GOUGH, supra note 23, at 133.
50
Kramer offers this suggestion sarcastically. See supra note 28 and accompanying text. But a similar view was prevalent in Locke’s own time. Scholars and Anglican divines such as Edward Stillingfleet, George Hickes, and William Carroll accused
Locke of furtively promoting deism, atheism, and “Spinozism” concealed behind
“such shifts, tricks, stratagems and equivocations to conceal themselves and to set off
his doctrine under . . . a variety of disguises and abuse of words.” ISRAEL, supra note
32, at 606 (quoting WILLIAM CARROLL, SPINOZA REVIV’D 157–58 (1704)). See generally
Stuart Brown, Locke as Secret ‘Spinozist’: The Perspective of William Carroll, in DISGUISED
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explains at the beginning of Two Treatises, a writer may act “like a wary
physician, when he would have his patient swallow some harsh or corrosive liquor, he mingles it with a large quantity of that which may dilute it; that the scattered parts may go down with less feeling, and
51
cause less aversion.”
This Article suggests that Locke crafted Two Treatises in the
manner Locke himself identified. It argues that his sometimes opaque and seemingly contradictory language obscures a high ambition:
Locke aims, in his First Treatise, to refute Filmer’s argument for the
divine right of kings and, ultimately, biblical morality as a foundation
for political life. In the Second Treatise, Locke aims to replace biblical morality with an ethic founded on reason. Reason, which Locke
52
calls man’s “only star and compass,” should be what “he steers by.”
When reason is “laid aside,” men follow “the authority of example”
which is based not upon reason but upon custom and folly: “[W]hen
fashion hath once established what folly or craft began, custom makes
it sacred, and it will be thought impudence, or madness, to contradict
53
or question it.” According to Locke, many of the world’s “religions,
54
governments, and manners” persist in this way. Locke aims to supplant “the authority of example” with reason. He states this challenge
to the authority of revelation rather explicitly, but because it appears
in a work suffused with deference to religious authority, it fails to impress itself upon all readers. Locke does not want his work dismissed
as “impudence, or madness” because it questions regnant dogmas.

OVERT SPINOZISM AROUND 1700, at 213 (Wiep van Bunge & Wim Klever eds.,
1996); Rosalie L. Colie, Spinoza and the Early English Deists, 20 J. HIST. IDEAS 23, 31
n.32 (1959) (“Locke . . . was roundly attacked by Stillingfleet, Carroll, Witty and occasional minor critics for his ‘Spinozism.’”).
Carroll urged that the English, being a solid, decent Christian nation,
would have nothing to do with Spinoza’s philosophy when expounded
‘in plain, precise and determined terms’ but that Locke, by divesting
words of their usual connotations, had sought to smuggle in [Spinoza’s] ‘most absurd, impious and abominable hypothesis . . . covertly’,
arguing that had Locke ‘defin’d his names as Spinoza did, I mean his
chief terms . . . he would have quite ruin’d his design, especially in
these nations . . . .
ISRAEL, supra note 32, at 607. This perspective “was broadly in line with the interpretation of Locke that held sway in the eighteenth century.” Brown, supra, at 216 n.11;
see also Wim Klever, Locke’s Disguised Spinozism 2 (2009), available at
http://bit.ly/q3fJhe (defending “the correctness of Carroll’s judgment”).
51
LOCKE, TWO TREATISES, supra note 48, bk. I, ch. II, § 7.
52
Id. bk. I, ch. VI, § 58.
53
Id.
54
Id.
AND
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B. Locke’s Carelessness
Those scholars who adopt the theological view observe, with
some justification, that “Locke is full of illogical flaws and inconsis55
tencies.” Getting Locke’s message is “complicated by Locke’s failure
to commit himself unequivocally on several of the most crucial questions to be discussed. He frequently used imprecise language,
56
and . . . sometimes made plainly contradictory statements.” Locke
employs “evasive and incoherent formulations,” marked by “vacilla57
tions over strategies for convincing others.” “Locke’s carelessness,”
58
concludes one scholar, “vexes every attentive reader of his works.”
The inconsistencies in Locke’s teaching are many and easy to recount. He argues that nature furnishes the supports of life “richly”
and in abundance, but elsewhere writes that nature provides “almost
59
worthless materials” and a state of “penury.”
Locke insists that
people are the property of God, “sent into the world by his order and
60
about his business,” but also maintains that “every man has a proper61
ty in his own person,” which “nobody has any right to but himself.”
62
He teaches that God gave all of nature to mankind in common, but
also argues that men may appropriate elements of the common stock
63
at will, in varying amounts according to one’s degree of industry.
64
He describes the state of nature as “a state of perfect freedom” governed by a law of nature, but also “full of fears and continual dan65
gers.”
Beside the apparent inconsistencies, Locke is also imprecise. He
employs dissimilar terms synonymously, obscuring his meaning. For
example, he sometimes seems to treat interchangeably such terms as
66
67
“law of nature,” “law of reason,” “the law of nature, or the revealed
55

GOUGH, supra note 23, at 123.
Walter M. Simon, John Locke: Philosophy and Political Theory, 45 AM. POL. SCI. REV.
386, 386 (1951).
57
DUNN, supra note 24, at 134, 197.
58
C.B. Macpherson, Progress of the Locke Industry, 3 CAN. J. POL. SCI. 323, 324
(1970) (book review).
59
Compare LOCKE, TWO TREATISES, supra note 48, bk. II, ch. V, § 31, with id. bk. II,
ch. V, § 43.
60
Id. bk. II, ch. II, § 6.
61
Id. bk. II, ch. V, § 27.
62
Id. bk. II, ch. V, § 25.
63
Id. bk. II, ch. V, § 48.
64
Id. bk. II, ch. II, § 4.
65
LOCKE, TWO TREATISES, supra note 48, bk. II, ch. IX, § 123; see infra Part III.A.
66
LOCKE, TWO TREATISES, supra note 48, bk. II, ch. II, § 4.
67
Id. bk. II, ch. V, § 30.
56
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69

law of God,” “the positive law of God,” “the law of God and na70
71
72
ture,” “the laws of God and nature,” “the law of God, or nature,”
73
“reason, which was the voice of God” in man, and others. One
might either judge Locke a sloppy wordsmith or conclude he deliberately obscured the distinctions between the laws of reason, nature,
74
and God—even though he elsewhere insists upon such distinctions.
In a different sort of imprecision, Locke uses “property” to designate a range of phenomena, such as an attribute (“the property of
75
labor should be able to over-balance the community of land” ), a
right of ownership (“men might come to have a property in several
76
parts of” the common world ), the item owned (man removes a thing
77
from nature “and thereby makes it his property” ), ownership in general (“this original law of nature, for the beginning of property, in what
78
was before common, still takes place” ), one’s estate (parents provide
79
for “the descent of their property to their children” ), and the spectrum of individual rights (men join society “for the mutual preservation of their lives, liberties and estates, which I call by the general
80
name, property” ). The term “estate,” moreover, variously refers to
property (“his father’s estate”), political circumstances (“[m]en being
[naturally free], no one can be put out of this estate and subjected to
the political power of another”), wealth (“it would always be a sin, in
any man of estate, to let his brother perish”), and social structures
81
(“[s]lavery is so vile and miserable an estate of man”). One could go
on.
68

Id. bk. I, ch. XI, § 124.
Id. bk. II, ch. VI, § 52.
70
Id. bk. II, ch. VI, § 66.
71
Id. bk. II, ch. XVI, § 195.
72
LOCKE, TWO TREATISES, supra note 48, bk. I, ch. XI, § 116.
73
Id. bk. I, ch. IX, § 86.
74
Cf. Klever, supra note 50, at 13 (“Locke and Spinoza . . . accustom themselves
mostly to the normal, popular or ‘theological’, way of speaking about God as if he
would be a kind of superhuman person and spell his name with a capital. But they
incidentally deviate from this usage and write consciously in double language, alternating the words ‘God’, ‘creator’, ‘maker’ etc. with words like ‘universe’, ‘world’, ‘nature’.”).
75
LOCKE, TWO TREATISES, supra note 48, bk. II, ch. V, § 40.
76
Id. bk. II, ch. V, § 25.
77
Id. bk. II, ch. V, § 27.
78
Id. bk. II, ch. V, § 30.
79
Id. bk. II, ch. VII, § 89.
80
Id. bk. II, ch. IX, § 123.
81
LOCKE, TWO TREATISES, supra note 48, bk. II, ch. XVIII, § 202; bk. II, ch. VIII, §
95; bk. I, ch. IV, § 42; bk. I, ch. I, § 1.
69
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Locke also shifts and qualifies his arguments. In Chapter 2 of
the Second Treatise, for example, Locke advances the “very strange
doctrine” that every individual in the state of nature has the right to
82
enforce the natural law on behalf of mankind. In the absence of
such a power, Locke argues, a state could not punish a foreign visitor
who commits a crime. The civil laws of the country “speak not to
83
him, nor, if they did, is he bound to hearken to them.” Only the
power to enforce the natural law would allow a magistrate to punish a
84
foreigner. In Chapter 8, however, Locke acknowledges that a foreigner tacitly consents, by living under a government “and enjoying
the privileges and protection of it,” to be “obliged to comply with the
85
laws, and submit to the government he found there.” The foreigner
86
is subject to the civil law after all.
What makes Locke’s frustrating style especially notable is that he
attacks Sir Robert Filmer, his interlocutor in Two Treatises, for precisely the same textual faults. “I imagine I shall have neither the time nor
inclination to repeat my pains,” writes Locke, “by tracing Sir Robert
again through all the windings and obscurities.” Locke hopes readers
will lack the weakness
to be deceived with contradictions dressed up in a popular stile,
and well-turned periods: for if any one will be at the pains, himself, in those parts, which are here untouched, to strip Sir Robert’s discourses of the flourish of doubtful expressions, and endeavour to reduce his words to direct, positive, intelligible
propositions, and then compare them one with another, he will
quickly be satisfied, there was never so much glib nonsense put
together in well-sounding English. If he think it not worth while
to examine his works all thro’, let him make an experiment in
that part, where he treats of usurpation; and let him try, whether
he can, with all his skill, make Sir Robert intelligible, and consis87
tent with himself, or common sense.

It is difficult to believe a writer who so brazenly denounces his subject
for obscurities, contradictions, and inconsistencies would be unaware
of the same features in his own work, especially when they are so blatant. In fact, Locke tells his readers not to ascribe such contradictions or obscurities to the author’s carelessness. In response to Fil82

See infra Part II.A.
LOCKE, TWO TREATISES, supra note 48, bk. II, ch. II, § 9.
84
Id.
85
Id. bk. II, ch. VIII, § 122.
86
On the significance of Locke’s treatment of aliens, see LEE WARD, JOHN LOCKE
AND MODERN LIFE 81–83 (2010).
87
LOCKE, TWO TREATISES, supra note 48, Preface.
83
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mer, Locke writes, “I do not think our author so little skilled in the
way of writing discourses of this nature, nor so careless of the point in
hand, that he by oversight commits the fault that he himself, in his
88
[other writings], objects to.”
Locke’s objections to Filmer suggest that his readers should not
attribute his own contradictions and obscurities to carelessness.
“[O]bscurity cannot be imputed to want of language in so great a
master of style,” Locke writes of Filmer. Instead, an author may
“chose rather to content himself with doubtful and general terms,
which might make no ill sound in men’s ears who were willing to be
pleased with them” rather than specific terms that could cause dis89
ruption or outrage. Locke also identifies
our author’s way of writing, who, huddling several suppositions
together, and that in doubtful and general terms, makes such a
medley and confusion, that it is impossible to show his mistakes,
without examining the several senses wherein his words may be
taken, and without seeing how, in any of these various meanings,
90
they will consist together, and have any truth in them.

Locke thus invites readers to strip his own work of doubtful expressions and obscurities, to reduce his words to intelligible propositions
“and then compare them one with another” to see what argument
91
emerges.
C. Locke’s Caution
Locke elsewhere provides another standard by which to judge an
author. “I have always thought the actions of men the best interpreters of their thoughts,” Locke writes in An Essay Concerning Human
92
Understanding.
A look into his background reveals the common
93
opinion that “Locke was an inordinately cautious man.” In fact,
Locke “was able to preserve his life, liberty and estate, while completing his major works and extending his influence enormously only

88

Id. bk. I, ch. II, § 7 (citation omitted).
Id. bk. I, ch. XI, § 110.
90
Id. bk. I, ch. III, § 20.
91
See id. Preface.
92
JOHN LOCKE, AN ESSAY CONCERNING HUMAN UNDERSTANDING 27 (Prometheus
Books 1995) (1693) [hereinafter LOCKE, HUMAN UNDERSTANDING]. For a discussion
of Locke’s caution in light of this statement, see LEO STRAUSS, NATURAL RIGHT AND
HISTORY 206 (1953).
93
A.H. MacLean, George Lawson and John Locke, 9 CAMBRIDGE HIST. J. 69, 73
(1947); see also Brown, supra note 50, at 223 (“Locke’s reputation for secrecy was wellestablished.”).
89

MENASHI.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2012]

CAIN AS HIS BROTHER’S KEEPER

2/7/2012 3:04 PM

199
94

through the exercise of a unique and all-encompassing caution.”
Locke not only published Two Treatises anonymously; he took every
precaution to maintain secrecy. He “not only evaded his friends’ inquiries; the extant correspondence . . . suggests that he was at pains
to conceal his authorship from the publisher, Awnsham Churchill . . .
95
[who] was not to see a scrap of writing in Locke’s hand.” This caution makes sense, given the controversial character of the ideas Locke
96
propounded. There was not only the execution of Algernon Sidney.
As late as 1697, a university student named Thomas Aikenhead was
97
executed at Edinburgh for blasphemy.
As of 1703, Locke would not admit even to having read Sidney’s
Discourses Concerning Government—even though historians now know
98
he had purchased a copy for his library in 1698. When Stillingfleet
wrote to Locke accusing him of siding with Hobbes and Spinoza on
the question of the immortality of the soul, Locke replied that he had
not read the works of either. “I am not so well read in Hobbes or
Spinosa, as to be able to say what were their opinions in this matter,”
99
he wrote. “But possibly there be those, who will think your lordship’s authority of more use to them in the case than those justly de100
(For good measure, Locke included a vigorous decried names.”
fense of the immortality of the soul.) Historians now know that
Locke had Hobbes’s Leviathan as well as Spinoza’s works in his li101
“As a writer, Locke was not in the habit of revealing his
brary.
102
sources,” observes A.H. MacLean.
“He preferred to foster the impression of being guided by nothing save the dictates of individual
94

Robert H. Horwitz, 74 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 160, 160 (1980) (reviewing THE
CORRESPONDENCE OF JOHN LOCKE (E.S. de Beer ed., 1978–79)).
95
Esmond S. De Beer, Locke and English Liberalism: The Second Treatise of Government in Its Contemporary Setting, in JOHN LOCKE: PROBLEMS AND PERSPECTIVES, supra
note 34, at 34, 35.
96
See discussion supra Part II.A.
97
David M. Fahey, The Prudent Ambiguity of John Locke, 23 REV. POL. 410, 410
(1961) (reviewing RICHARD H. COX, LOCKE ON WAR AND PEACE (1960)).
98
MacLean, supra note 93, at 73 & n.28.
99
Mr. Locke’s Reply to the Bishop of Worcester’s Answer to His Second Letter, in 4 WORKS
OF JOHN LOCKE 193, 477 (Elibron Classics 2005) (1801).
100
Id.
101
Klever, supra note 50, at 1; MacLean, supra note 93, at 73 & n.29 (“Locke had a
first edition copy of Hobbes’ Leviathan in his own library.”); see also Wim Klever,
Slocke, Alias Locke in Spinozistic Profile, in DISGUISED AND OVERT SPINOZISM AROUND
1700, supra note 50, at 235, 260 (“I think, that our conclusion may be that he was better informed about Spinoza’s work and intentions than is suggested in this utterance,
which may be interpreted as slightly disingenuous on account of the ruling public
opinion.”).
102
MacLean, supra note 93, at 74.
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103

reason.” It made sense to remain guarded. Several of Locke’s con104
temporaries suspected Locke of Hobbism. Upon the publication of
Locke’s An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, the Third Earl of
Shaftesbury, Locke’s student and a longtime interlocutor, denounced
him as a menace to justice and virtue:
It was Mr. Locke that struck the home blow: for Mr. Hobbes’ character and base slavish principles in government took off the poison of his philosophy. ’Twas Mr. Locke that struck at all fundamentals, threw all order and virtue out of the world and made the
very ideas of these . . . unnatural and without foundation in our
105
minds.
106

Locke answered his critics “with public silence and private scorn.”
Given Locke’s cautious behavior, by his own standard one would
expect him to be an especially careful writer. “To avoid persecution,”
observes David Fahey, “the cautious Locke employed oblique literary
107
techniques which obscured the extent of his break with tradition.”
Locke was candid about this method at times. In his correspondence,
one finds William Molyneux writing to ask about an apparent contradiction in his Essay. In reply, Locke confirms that the contradiction
was intentional: “[T]he seeming contradiction between what is said
p. 147 and p. 341, is just as you take it, and I hope so clearly expressed, that it cannot be mistaken, but by a very unwary read108
er . . . .”
One might attribute such contradictions to carelessness,
but Locke seems to have anticipated that charge. One must, at least,
entertain the possibility that his style was as he described: its import
deliberately obscured in order to avoid outright disclosure of unpopular ideas.
III. LOCKE’S VIEW OF NATURE
Locke must have been concerned with the reception that his
ideas would have among the public. In the first half of the seventeenth century, “’[t]was held a Sin to make a Scrutinie into the Waies
109
of Nature,” wrote Locke’s contemporary John Aubrey.
Pious citizens regarded the scientific attempt to understand and to master na103

Id.
Fahey, supra note 97, at 410.
105
Jason Aronson, Shaftesbury on Locke, 53 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 1101, 1103 (1959).
106
Jonathan Barnes, Mr. Locke’s Darling Notion, 22 PHIL. Q. 193, 194 (1972).
107
Fahey, supra note 97, at 410.
108
Horwitz, supra note 94, at 160 (internal quotation marks omitted).
109
AUBREY’S BRIEF LIVES, at xxxiv (Oliver Lawson Dick ed., Univ. of Mich. Press
1962)(1813).
104
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ture as ingratitude for God’s benevolence—and a profane, hubristic
confidence in the capacities of fallen man to surpass revealed wis110
dom.
Deriding the natural world could be blasphemous, and au111
thors seen to promote Hobbism would attract public scorn.
A. The Rule of Men
For this reason, perhaps, Locke begins the Second Treatise by
insisting upon the distinction between his view of the state of nature
and the Hobbesian view of nature as a state of war. But Locke’s initial portrait of the state of nature is heavily qualified. At the beginning of his chapter on the state of nature, Locke describes it as “a
112
state of perfect freedom” and “[a] state also of equality.” He writes
that the state of nature is “not a state of license” because it “has a law
of nature to govern it, which obliges every one: and reason, which is
that law, teaches all mankind, who will but consult it, that being all
equal and independent, no one ought to harm another in his life,
113
health, liberty, or possessions.”
But having portrayed the state of
nature as peaceful, Locke does not indicate that the law of nature is
110

Id.
At the end of the century, “[h]eterodox books could still be burned and indeed this misfortune befell a book by another of Locke’s followers. The Blasphemy
Act of 1698 also posed a threat to the outspoken.” Brown, supra note 50, at 213.
112
LOCKE, TWO TREATISES, supra note 48, bk. II, ch. II, § 4. Men’s “perfect freedom” is only to “order their actions, and dispose of their possessions and persons, as
they think fit, within the bounds of the law of nature.” Id. The law of nature appears
to have narrow bounds: while man has an “uncontroulable liberty to dispose of his
person or possessions,” he “has not liberty to destroy himself, or so much as any creature in his possession, but where some nobler use than its bare preservation calls for
it.” Id. bk. II, ch. II, § 6. He must be sure to make practical use of the possessions he
accumulates: “Nothing was made by God for man to spoil or destroy.” Id. bk. II, ch.
V, § 31. And as he accumulates, there must be “enough, and as good, left in common for others.” Id. bk. II, ch. V, § 27.
Men’s “equality,” which in contrast to their freedom is conspicuously not “perfect,” is a state
wherein all the power and jurisdiction is reciprocal, no one having
more than another, there being nothing more evident than that creatures of the same species and rank, promiscuously born to all the same
advantages of Nature, and the use of the same faculties, should also be
equal one amongst another, without subordination or subjection, unless the lord and master of them all should . . . set one above another.
Id. bk. II, ch. II, § 4. Locke does not actually say that all men are born “to all the
same advantages of nature”; in fact, he says people are born to such advantages
“promiscuously” or by chance. Id. He says only that insofar as they are born to the
same advantages, they should be equal. Thus, the “perfect freedom” and the “equality” of men in the state of nature seem to describe the realities of uncontrollable liberty and the lack of political authority, neither of which seem desirable.
113
Id. bk. II, ch. II, § 6.
111
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realized peacefully or that men actually follow it. Instead, he immediately shifts to the importance of restraining men from harming
others. He devotes the rest of the chapter to “execution of the law of
nature,” the “right to punish transgressors,” “reparation and restraint,” “punishment,” “offender[s] dangerous to mankind,” “injury
and violence,” “mischief,” “trespass,” the “power to kill a murderer,”
“unjust violence and slaughter,” “war against all mankind,” “wild savage beasts,” and the right of every man to “punish the offender and
114
be executioner of the law of nature.” Locke’s state of nature turns
out not to be so peaceful after all. Rather, there must be enforcement of the natural law so “that all men may be restrained from invading others rights, and from doing hurt to one another,” which
115
they would do absent such enforcement. Because the enforcement
falls to each individual, meaning each person in the state of nature
must employ force to prevent harm to himself, Locke’s state of nature
looks like Hobbes’s vision of man’s natural state as “war, as is of every
116
man, against every man.”
Following this discussion, Locke seems unjustified in insisting, in
the next chapter, that there is a “plain difference between the state of
nature and the state of war, which . . . are as far distant as a state of
peace, goodwill, mutual assistance, and preservation; and a state of
enmity, malice, violence and mutual destruction are one from anoth117
er.” It turns out, however, that the state of nature and the state of
war are “far distant” only because of a semantic distinction Locke
draws between them:
Men living together according to reason without a common superior on earth, with authority to judge between them, is properly the
state of Nature. But force, or a declared design of force upon the
person of another, where there is no common superior on earth
to appeal to for relief, is the state of war; and it is the want of such
an appeal gives a man the right of war even against an aggressor,
118
though he be in society and a fellow-subject.

Thus, “state of nature” refers only to the lack of political authority
while “state of war” refers to the violent conflict between individuals

114

Id. bk. II, ch. II, §§ 7–12.
Id. bk. II, ch. II, § 7.
116
THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 100 (Michael Oakeshott ed., Collier Books 1962)
(1651).
117
LOCKE, TWO TREATISES, supra note 48, bk. II, ch. III, § 19.
118
Id.
115
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119

that typically results. Rather than reject the substance of Hobbes’s
teaching, Locke has redefined the terms.
As Locke conceives it, the state of war can exist either in the state
of nature or in civil society. According to Locke, “Want of a common
judge with authority, puts all men in a state of nature: force without
right, upon a man’s person, makes a state of war, both where there is,
120
and is not, a common judge.” But Locke has just said that the state of
war exists only “where there is no common superior on earth to ap121
peal to for relief.”
When does such a state exist in a civil society
under a government? Locke explains that sometimes within civil society it becomes impossible to appeal to the legal authorities, as when
one is directly attacked and needs to defend oneself immediately.
When “the aggressor allows not time to appeal to our common judge,
nor the decision of the law, for remedy in a case where the mischief
may be irreparable,” one regains his natural right to execute the law
122
of nature and kill the aggressor. But this is just a way of saying that
the state of nature can break out in civil society at times—that there
are situations, even in civil society, where no common judge is available to settle disputes. In this way, Locke emphasizes that the state of
nature is truly the “state all men are naturally in”; civil society is a
man-made device for keeping our natural condition at bay, though
nature (and the threat of war) is always lurking just below the sur123
face.
The state of nature is not coextensive with the state of war, but
the state of war exists only in the state of nature. The state of war is
possible only when there is no common earthly judge—which is the
definition of the state of nature. Thus, the state of nature and the
state of war may be distant in concept, but not in fact: the state of nature makes the state of war possible—even inevitable. The state of
nature is unstable because of “those evils, which necessarily follow
from men’s being judges in their own cases” and because “every one
124
has the executive power of the law of nature.”
In the exercise of
that authority, the law of nature constrains men very little. Although

119

Robert A. Goldwin points out Locke’s semantic distinction in John Locke, in
HISTORY OF POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 476, 478–80 (Leo Strauss & Joseph Cropsey eds.,
3d ed. 1987).
120
LOCKE, TWO TREATISES, supra note 48, bk. II, ch. III, § 19 (emphasis added).
121
Id.
122
Id.
123
Goldwin, supra note 119, at 481 (quoting LOCKE, TWO TREATISES, supra note 48,
bk. II, ch. II, § 13).
124
LOCKE, TWO TREATISES, supra note 48, bk. II, ch. II, § 13.
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that law “be plain and intelligible to all rational creatures; yet men,
being biassed by their interest, as well as ignorant for want of study of
it, are not apt to allow of it as a law binding to them in the application
125
of it to their particular cases.” What, then, is the law of nature that
126
men do follow, the law that is “writ in the hearts of all mankind”?
Only the “fundamental, sacred, and unalterable law of self127
preservation” —“[t]he first and strongest desire God planted in
men, and wrought into the very principles of their nature, being that
128
Locke concedes that in enforcing the law of
of self-preservation.”
nature, “self-love will make men partial to themselves and their
friends: and on the other side, that ill nature, passion and revenge
will carry them too far in punishing others; and hence nothing but
129
confusion and disorder will follow.”
In Locke’s telling, then, the
state of nature is ultimately marked by confusion, disorder, and easily
sown seeds of violence—which is not much different from Hobbes’s
130
account.
With everyone holding the executive power of the law of nature,
but moved only by the natural law of self-preservation, the state of na131
ture “is full of fears and continual dangers.”
Locke’s account of
natural equality shifts. Natural equality of persons no longer appears
to guarantee each person’s rights, but rather is precisely the condition that puts them in jeopardy: each person is “constantly exposed to
the invasion of others; for all being kings as much as he, every man
his equal, and the greater part no strict observers of equity and justice, the enjoyment of the property he has in this state is very unsafe,
132
very unsecure.”

125

Id. bk. II, ch. IX, § 124.
Id. bk. II, ch. II, § 11.
127
Id. bk. II, ch. XIII, § 149.
128
Id. bk. II, ch. VII, § 88.
129
Id. bk. II, ch. II, § 13.
130
Cf. HOBBES, supra note 116, at 129 (“[T]he laws of nature, as justice, equity, modesty, mercy, and, in sum, doing to others, as we would be done to, of themselves, without the
terror of some power, to cause them to be observed, are contrary to our natural passions, that carry us to partiality, pride, revenge, and the like.”).
131
LOCKE, TWO TREATISES, supra note 48, bk. II, ch. IX, § 123. Compare id., with
HOBBES, supra note 116, at 100 (noting that the state of nature is characterized by
“continual fear, and danger of violent death”).
132
LOCKE, TWO TREATISES, supra note 48, bk. II, ch. IX, § 123. Compare id., with
HOBBES, supra note 116, at 98 (locating the cause of the state of war in “equality of
ability”), and id. at 101 (“It is consequent also to the same condition, that there be no
propriety, no dominion, no mine and thine distinct; but only that to be every man’s,
that he can get: and for so long, as he can keep it.”).
126
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With this conclusion, it is possible to appreciate what Locke
means when he twice calls the vesting of executive power in each in133
dividual a “strange doctrine.” In arguing that each individual may
execute the law of nature, Locke breaks with the Christian tradition.
In the Summa Theologica, Thomas Aquinas writes:
[I]t is lawful to kill an evildoer in so far as it is directed to the welfare of the whole community, so that it belongs to him alone who
has charge of the community’s welfare. Thus it belongs to a physician to cut off a decayed limb, when he has been entrusted with
the care of the health of the whole body. Now the care of the
common good is entrusted to persons of rank having public authority: wherefore they alone, and not private individuals, can law134
fully put evildoers to death.

In his state-of-nature teaching, however, Locke assigns the authority
of killing evildoers to private individuals, who have no public authori135
ty because they exist outside civil society.
The “state of nature”
136
prior to civil society has no place in the biblical tradition. The Bible
takes for granted the existence of political societies immediately after

133

LOCKE, TWO TREATISES, supra note 48, bk. II, ch. II, §§ 9, 13.
THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGICA pt. II–II, q. 64, art. 3 (2d rev. ed. 1920)
(1265–74) (emphasis added), available at http://www.newadvent.org/summa.
135
Richard Hooker writes that even in “those times wherein there was as yet no
manner of public regiment established,” while men had a right to act in self-defense,
“they knew that no man might in reason take upon him to determine his own right,
and according to his own determination proceed in maintenance thereof.” 1
RICHARD HOOKER, OF THE LAWS OF ECCLESIASTICAL POLITY 50 (John W. Parker 1851)
(1593), available at http://books.google.com/books?id=pssCAAAAQAAJ. Hooker
thereby distinguishes the right of self-defense from the right to punish; the latter requires the authority to act on behalf of the community that only government possesses. In the Christian natural law tradition, “punishment is the sole purview of government inasmuch as the power of government inheres in the social nature of
community and does not derive from any purported natural right of individuals.”
WARD, supra note 86, at 73.
136
See REVENTLOW, supra note 32, at 276 (“[T]he natural state which Locke postulates . . . in no way rests on a biblical basis.”); STRAUSS, supra note 92, at 215 (“From
the biblical point of view, the important distinction is the distinction, not between
the state of nature and the state of civil society, but between the state of innocence
and the state after the Fall.”); cf. 1 GEORGE HICKES, TWO TREATISES, ON THE CHRISTIAN
PRIESTHOOD, AND ON THE DIGNITY OF THE EPISCOPAL ORDER 182 (John Henry Parker
4th ed. 1847) (1707), available at http://books.google.com/books?id=28PiIvISyIUC
(“[H]e supposes there was an antecedent ‘state of nature’ in which men lived before
political government was erected, though this wild notion hath been so many times
unanswerably confuted by the writers against Hobbes, and of late by the Rehearsal
against Mr. Locke.”). David Foster observes that in Locke’s account the state of nature displaces the biblical teaching of the Fall because “if, as Locke suggests, the original human condition was very imperfect, our present distress cannot be explained as
a falling away from perfection.” Foster, supra note 25, at 201–02.
134
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137

the Fall and after the Flood. The Christian tradition held that “God
hath certainly appointed government to restrain the partiality and vi138
olence of men.”
Paul expresses this view in his epistle to the Romans: “Let every person be subject to the governing authorities; for
there is no authority except from God, and those authorities that ex139
ist have been instituted by God.” While the Christian tradition recognized a natural law, its dictates were to be enforced by divine
140
By contrast, Locke
judgment through the individual conscience.
appoints private individuals to be the enforcers of the natural law and
the source of public authority. Discounting the efficacy of divine
judgment, he argues that “the law of nature would, as all other laws
that concern men in this world, be in vain, if there were no body that
141
in the state of nature had a power to execute that law.” Establishing
the law of nature as an actual law that governs worldly affairs and investing the natural executive power in individuals challenges the Pauline view of submission to governing authority. The natural law provides a standard of justice for individuals to demand of their
government—because the “municipal laws of countries . . . are only
so far right, as they are founded on the law of nature, by which they

137

See Genesis 4:16–17 (King James) (“[Cain] dwelt in the land of Nod . . . . and he
builded a city.”); id. 10:32 (“ [By] the families of the sons of Noah . . . were the nations divided in the earth after the flood.”).
138
LOCKE, TWO TREATISES, supra note 48, bk. II, ch. II, § 13.
139
Romans 13:1 (New Revised Standard); Romans 13:1 (King James) (“Let every
soul be subject unto the higher powers. For there is no power but of God: the powers that be are ordained of God.”); see also 1 HOOKER, supra note 135, at 96 (“The
public power of all societies is above every soul contained in the same societies.”); cf.
AQUINAS, supra note 134, pt. II–II, q. 42, art. 2 (“[S]edition is opposed to justice and
the common good. Therefore by reason of its genus it is a mortal sin.”).
140
See 1 HOOKER, supra note 134, at 46 (“He is the only rewarder and revenger of
all such actions; although not of such actions only, but of all whereby the Law of Nature is broken, whereof Himself is Author.”); see also 1 HUGO GROTIUS, THE RIGHTS OF
WAR AND PEACE 96 (Richard Tuck ed., Liberty Fund 2005) (1625) (“Justice brings
Peace to the Conscience; Injustice, Racks and Torments . . . . [T]o this God is an
Enemy, to the other a Patron, who does not so wholly reserve his Judgments for a future Life, but that he often makes the Rigour of them to be perceived in this.”).
Locke puts little stock in conscience. See LOCKE, HUMAN UNDERSTANDING, supra note
92, at 30 (noting that conscience is “nothing else but our own opinion or judgment
of the moral rectitude or pravity of our own actions” and that men “with the same
bent of conscience” reach inconsistent conclusions).
141
LOCKE, TWO TREATISES, supra note 48, bk. II, ch. II, § 7. But see James 4:12 (King
James) (“There is one lawgiver, who is able to save and to destroy: who art thou that
judgest another?”).
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142

are to be regulated and interpreted” —and a limit to their duty of
143
obedience.
In addition to shifting the character of the natural law in this
way, Locke also challenges its substance. According to Aquinas:
A beast is by nature distinct from man, wherefore in the case of a
wild beast there is no need for an authority to kill it; whereas, in
the case of domestic animals, such authority is required, not for
their sake, but on account of the owner’s loss. On the other hand
a man who has sinned is not by nature distinct from good men;
hence a public authority is requisite in order to condemn him to
144
death for the common good.

Locke rejects this line of argument. For Locke, a man who threatens
others is by nature distinct from good men:
[A]nd thus it is, that every man, in the state of nature, has a power
to kill a murderer . . . to secure men from the attempts of a criminal, who having renounced reason, the common rule and measure God hath given to mankind, hath, by the unjust violence and
slaughter he hath committed upon one, declared war against all
mankind, and therefore may be destroyed as a lion or a tyger, one
of those wild savage beasts, with whom men can have no society
nor security: and upon this is grounded that great law of nature,
145
Whoso sheddeth man’s blood, by man shall his blood be shed.

Aquinas insists that a murderer is not, like a beast, distinct from other
men, so only a public official may condemn him. Locke, meanwhile,
explicitly compares the murderer to a savage beast and argues that
any person may treat him accordingly, at least in the state of nature.

142
LOCKE, TWO TREATISES, supra note 48, bk. II, ch. II, § 12. Compare id., with
AQUINAS, supra note 134, pt. II–II, q. 96, art. 6 (“[I]t is not competent for everyone to
expound what is useful and what is not useful to the state: those alone can do this
who are in authority, and who, on account of such like cases, have the power to dispense from the laws.”).
143
See, e.g., LOCKE, TWO TREATISES, supra note 48, bk. II, ch. XIV, § 163 (noting
that when the people limit government power “they have not pulled from the prince
any thing that of right belonged to him, but only declared, that that power which
they indefinitely left in his or his ancestors hands, to be exercised for their good, was
not a thing which they intended him when he used it otherwise”). Even though
Locke agrees on the importance of civil government, changing the character of natural law alters the sort of government that may justly rule. See id. bk. II, ch. II, § 13
(“[I]f government is to be the remedy of those evils, which necessarily follow from
men’s being judges in their own cases, and the state of nature is therefore not to be
endured, I desire to know what kind of government that is, and how much better it is
than the state of nature.”). For this reason, Hobbes does not recognize a natural
right to punish. See WARD, supra note 86, at 74–75.
144
AQUINAS, supra note 134, pt. II–II, q. 64, art. 3.
145
LOCKE, TWO TREATISES, supra note 48, bk. II, ch. II, § 11.
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In the course of this discussion, moreover, Locke misrepresents
the biblical tradition. The “great law of nature” he cites is God’s
statement of his moral law, spoken to Noah in Genesis 9:6: “Whoso
sheddeth man’s blood, by man shall his blood be shed: for in the image
146
of God made He man.” Locke abridges the text, however, leaving out
the rationale provided in Genesis. In disagreement with the biblical
view, Locke rejects the notion that all men are made in the image of
God. Rather, Locke replaces the divine image in man with the capacity of reason. To Locke, reason—not divine creation—is the mark of
humanity. This has the consequence that a person may abandon his
reason and thereby expel himself from mankind. As Locke maintains, a criminal who has “renounced reason” has the status of those
147
“wild savage beasts, with whom men can have no society.”
As an expression of divine will, Genesis 9:6 is a description of
moral justice reserved to God’s judgment, but Locke implies that the
148
passage authorizes a vigilante “right to destroy such a criminal.”
Moreover, Locke distorts the example he marshals in support of such a
right: “And Cain was so fully convinced, that every one had a right to
destroy such a criminal,” writes Locke, “that after the murder of his
brother, he cries out, Every one that findeth me, shall slay me; so plain was
149
it writ in the hearts of all mankind.”
Yet Cain states this as a com150
plaint, not a license. He was not “fully convinced” that others had a
right to destroy him. Significantly, neither was God. God decreed that
151
Cain should not be executed. Locke’s discussion implies that to execute Cain for committing murder would be an act of natural justice;
he fails to mention, however, that to slay Cain would violate a divine
command. Killing Cain, whether “writ on people’s hearts” or not,
would contravene the rule of heaven. The biblical message is that
judgment is reserved to the Lord, that men should resist the impulse

146

Genesis 9:6 (King James) (emphasis added).
LOCKE, TWO TREATISES, supra note 48, bk. II, ch. II, § 11.
148
Id.
149
Id.
150
See Genesis 4:13–14 (King James) (“And Cain said unto the Lord, my punishment
is greater than I can bear. Behold, thou hast driven me out this day from the face of
the earth; and from thy face shall I be hid; and I shall be a fugitive and a vagabond in
the earth; and it shall come to pass, that every one that findeth me shall slay me.”). Indeed, Locke later writes that “he who was so unjust as to do his brother an injury, will
scarce be so just as to condemn himself for it.” LOCKE, TWO TREATISES, supra note 48,
bk. II, ch. II, § 13.
151
Genesis 4:15 (King James) (“And the Lord said unto him, Therefore whosoever
slayeth Cain, vengeance shall be taken on him sevenfold. And the Lord set a mark
upon Cain, lest any finding him should kill him.”).
147
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152

to vengeance, but Locke takes Cain’s initial statement to be a law of
nature and the Bible to endorse individual retribution. Faced with
the conflict between biblical revelation and his view of reason, Locke
supplants the divine command with “laws of nature” and the rule of
heaven with the rule of men.
B. The Appeal to Heaven
Locke’s theory of the state of nature, bound up as it is with the
natural executive power vested in individuals, overturns the rule of
heaven. In the same section of the Summa Theologica quoted above,
Aquinas cites the opinion of Augustine that if one kills pursuant to
someone else’s legitimate authority, acting as an agent of that author153
ity, then one is not culpable for the death.
Therefore, explains
Aquinas, one could kill “at the Lord’s command,” in the same way
that “a soldier slays the foe by the authority of his sovereign, and the
154
executioner slays the robber by the authority of the judge.”
Locke, by contrast, claims the power of an individual to kill a
thief—not by the authority of a judge but because the thief has in155
itiated a state of war.
The state of war, by definition, lacks the
earthly authority of a sovereign or judge: “for where there is an authority, a power on earth, from which relief can be had by appeal,
there the continuance of the state of war is excluded, and the contro156
versy is decided by that power.”
To accord with the traditional
teaching, Locke would need to ground the individual’s power in divine authority. As Augustine elaborates in The City of God, “they who
have waged war in obedience to the divine command, or in conformity with His laws, have represented in their persons the public justice
157
or the wisdom of government” and cannot be held guilty. If Locke
can show that individuals enforce the law of nature in the state of war
152

See Romans 12:14–19 (King James) (“Bless them which persecute you: bless, and
curse not. . . . Recompense to no man evil for evil. . . . Dearly beloved, avenge not
yourselves, but rather give place unto wrath: for it is written, Vengeance is mine; I will
repay, saith the Lord.”).
153
AQUINAS, supra note 134, pt. II–II, q. 64, art. 3; see also SAINT AUGUSTINE, THE
CITY OF GOD 27 (Marcus D.D. Dods trans., Modern Library 1950) (5th cent.) (“[H]e
to whom authority is delegated, and who is but the sword in the hand of him who
uses it, is not himself responsible for the death he deals.”).
154
AQUINAS, supra note 134, pt. II–II, q. 64, art. 3.
155
LOCKE, TWO TREATISES, supra note 48, bk. II, ch. III, § 18 (“[I]t is lawful for me
to treat him as one who has put himself into a state of war with me, i.e. kill him if I
can; for to that hazard does he justly expose himself, whoever introduces a state of
war, and is aggressor in it.”). But see Matthew 5:39–41 (King James).
156
LOCKE, TWO TREATISES, supra note 48, bk. II, ch. III, § 21.
157
AUGUSTINE, supra note 153, at 27.
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in conformity with God’s laws, he could ground his system upon
Christian teaching.
Locke appears to submit the state of war to divine authority.
Where there is no earthly judge, he writes, “the only remedy” is “an
158
appeal to heaven.”
Locke says that when no earthly authority can
settle disputes, God will act as judge. He explains this by reference to
the biblical story of Jephtha, a judge of Israel who conquered the
Ammonites. Locke writes:
Had there been any such court, any superior jurisdiction on
earth, to determine the right between Jephtha and the Ammonites, they had never come to a state of war: but we see he was
forced to appeal to heaven. The Lord the Judge (says he) be judge
this day between the children of Israel and the children of Ammon, Judg.
xi. 27. and then prosecuting, and relying on his appeal, he leads
159
out his army to battle.

The story of Jephtha, which concerns a right of conquest between two
nations, seems out of place in Chapter 3 of the Second Treatise,
which is Locke’s discussion of the state of war that emerges between
individuals who have no common judge to decide their disputes. But
it is relevant because Jephtha is the paradigmatic example of an individual who kills with divine authority. In fact, Augustine’s discussion
in The City of God establishes the principle that one may kill “in ob160
edience to the divine command” by reference to Jephtha.
The Book of Judges recounts that Jephtha was a judge in Israel,
161
called to fight the Ammonites.
In the midst of battle, Jephtha
makes a vow to God: if God provides him a victory in the war, then
“whatever comes out of the door of my house to meet me when I return in triumph from the Ammonites will be the Lord’s, and I will sa162
crifice it as a burnt offering.”
God does deliver victory over the
Ammonites to Jephtha; Israel under his command devastates twenty
163
towns and subdues Ammon.
Upon his return home, however,
164
Jephtha’s daughter comes to meet him at the door of his house.
165
His daughter is therefore subject to the vow and must be sacrificed.

158

LOCKE, TWO TREATISES, supra note 48, bk. II, ch. III, § 20.
Id. bk. II, ch. III, § 21.
160
AUGUSTINE, supra note 153, at 27.
161
Judges 12:7 (King James); see also id. 12:2; LOCKE, TWO TREATISES, supra note 48,
bk. I, ch. XI, § 163.
162
Judges 11:30–31 (New International).
163
Judges 11:32–33 (King James).
164
Id. 11:34.
165
Id. 11:35–36.
159
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Jephtha says he is “miserable and wretched, because I have made a
166
vow to the Lord that I cannot break.” His daughter submits willingly, only asking for a two-month mourning period—at the end of
167
which Jephtha sacrifices his daughter.
Augustine holds Jephtha blameless for killing his daughter be168
cause God is “the fountain of all justice.” Jephtha’s vow indemnifies
169
him against punishment. In the First Treatise, however, Locke has
already condemned parental killing of children as “the most shameful action, and most unnatural murder, human nature is capable of”
and an “act more contrary to nature than the wild and most untamed
170
part of the creation.” In refuting Filmer’s argument that the divine
right of kings rests upon fatherly dominion, Locke denies the authority of fathers to slay or to sell their children, and he writes that when
parents do so in the name of religion they violate reason and exhibit
171
“a brutality below the level of beasts.”
Jephtha illustrates what Locke opposes in Filmer and in the biblical view: the equation of the good with the ancestral—that is, with
the father and ultimately with God the creator. In refuting Filmer’s
argument for the “monarchical power of the father,” Locke notes

166

Judges 11:35 (New International).
Judges 11:36–39 (King James).
168
AUGUSTINE, supra note 153, at 27.
169
Hobbes, in Leviathan, also holds Jephtha blameless, but for the distinct reason
that Jephtha was the earthly sovereign power. Still, in the Hobbesian system, divine
authority works to indemnify an authoritarian state:
[N]othing the sovereign representative can do to a subject . . . can
properly be called injustice, or injury; because every subject is author of
every act the sovereign doth; so that he never wanteth right to any
thing, otherwise, than as he himself is the subject of God . . . . And
therefore it may, and doth often happen in commonwealths, that a
subject may be put to death, by the command of the sovereign power;
and yet neither do the other wrong: as when Jephtha caused his daughter to be sacrificed: in which, and the like cases, he that so dieth, had
liberty to do the action, for which he is nevertheless, without injury put
to death. And the same holdeth also in a sovereign prince, that putteth
to death an innocent subject. For though the action be against the law
of nature, as being contrary to equity, as was the killing of Uriah, by
David; yet it was not an injury to Uriah, but to God.
HOBBES, supra note 116, at 161. Of course, if the state threatens the life of a citizen,
the citizen is entitled to resist even if the state acts legitimately. Id. at 164 (“Subjects
have liberty to defend their own bodies, even against them that lawfully invade
them.”) (italics omitted).
170
LOCKE, TWO TREATISES, supra note 48, bk. I, ch. VI, § 56.
171
Id. bk. I, ch. VI, § 58. But see HOBBES, supra note 116, at 251 (noting that children should be taught “that originally the father of every man was also his sovereign
lord, with power over him of life and death”).
167
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that in the Bible the father shares authority with the mother. It is
173
“[h]onor thy father and thy mother,” Locke points out. Locke then
quotes the repeated biblical injunctions that those children who fail
to honor their parents should be put to death, ostensibly to point out
that in each case the mother appears alongside the father: “he that
curseth his father, or his mother, shall surely be put to death,” for ex174
ample.
Yet because this discussion immediately follows Locke’s
condemnation of the killing of children by parents, it is difficult not
to notice that in each case the Bible calls for the killing of children.
175
Locke cites Deuteronomy 21:18–21, though he fails to quote it fully.
What Locke omits from his quotation reveals that the passage contains a biblical injunction for parents to kill their disobedient children:
If a man have a stubborn and rebellious son, which will not obey
the voice of his father, or the voice of his mother, and that, when
they have chastened him, will not hearken unto them: Then shall
his father and his mother lay hold on him, and bring him out unto the elders of his city, and unto the gate of his place; And they
shall say unto the elders of his city, This our son is stubborn and
rebellious, he will not obey our voice; he is a glutton, and a drunkard. And all the men of his city shall stone him with stones, that
he die: so shalt thou put evil away from among you; and all Israel
176
shall hear, and fear.

Locke goes on to quote from Zechariah 13:3: “And it shall come to
pass, that when any shall yet prophesy, then his father and his mother
that begat him shall say unto him, Thou shalt not live; and his father
and his mother that begat him shall thrust him through when he
177
prophesieth.” These passages reveal that Filmer’s argument for patriarchal monarchical authority has support in scripture.
Locke’s other biblical references in the same passage suggest
that Filmer’s argument is consistent with the biblical teaching. Locke
quotes the prophet Isaiah, for example, as saying, “Woe unto him,

172

LOCKE, TWO TREATISES, supra note 48, bk. I, ch. VI, § 61.
Id. (quoting Exodus 20:12 (King James)) (emphasis added).
174
Exodus 21:17 (King James).
175
Locke’s abridged quotation reads: “If a man have a rebellious son, which will
not obey the voice of his father, or the voice of his mother; then shall his father and
his mother lay hold on him, and say, This our son is stubborn and rebellious, he will
not obey our voice.” LOCKE, TWO TREATISES, supra note 48, bk. I, ch. VI, § 61.
176
Deuteronomy 21:18–21 (King James).
177
LOCKE, TWO TREATISES, supra note 48, bk. I, ch. VI, § 61. Locke omits the words
“for thou speakest lies in the name of the Lord,” which follow “Thou shalt not live” in
Zechariah 13:3 (King James).
173
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that sayeth unto his father, What begettest thou, or to the woman,
178
What hast thou brought forth?”
Locke attributes the quotation to
Isaiah 11:10, but it actually appears at 45:10, where it occurs as a
statement in which God explicitly analogizes his authority over man—
exercised through his “anointed” political leader Cyrus in order to
subdue other nations—to the authority of parents over their child179
ren.
Given this scriptural evidence, which Locke manipulates, the
accusation Locke directs to Filmer seems to apply to himself: had he
set forth the biblical text “without garbling, as God gave it, and joined
mother to father, every reader would have seen, that it had made di180
rectly against him.” While Locke argues that the Bible does not establish monarchical authority in the father alone because the mother
shares in his authority, had Locke “joined mother to father,” it would
become clear that the Bible does indicate a monarchical authority in
the father and mother together and that the biblical text Locke quotes
actually supports Filmer’s ultimate position. Later, in the Second
Treatise, Locke even writes that the paternal power would more
properly be called the “parental power” because it belongs to both
181
parents; scripture “every where joins them together.”
Thus, Filmer’s argument for parental dominion, modified to include the
mother, has support in scripture. But Locke argues that the parental
killing of children is contrary not to scripture but to nature, which
suggests that the biblical teaching contradicts natural justice.
The figure of Jephtha, then, evokes the image of religious authority that acts contrary to natural justice. By placing the story of
Jephtha in his chapter on the state of war, Locke signals his disagreement with Augustine’s position. In Section 20 of the Second
Treatise—immediately prior to the paragraph in which he references
Jephtha—Locke reveals the full importance of his distinction between the states of nature and of war; the state of war can emerge

178

LOCKE, TWO TREATISES, supra note 48, bk. I, ch. VI, § 61.
See Isaiah 45:1–14 (King James). Chapter 11 of Isaiah contains an image of
universal peace, so the citation to Isaiah 11:10 contrasts sharply with the quotation in
Locke’s text.
180
LOCKE, TWO TREATISES, supra note 48, bk. I, ch. VI, § 61; cf. id. bk. I, ch. VI, § 60
(noting that “to warp the sacred rule of the word of God, to make it comply with [an
author’s] present occasion” is “a way of proceeding not unusual to those, who embrace not truths because reason and revelation offer them, but espouse tenets and
parties for ends different from truth, and then resolve at any rate to defend them”).
181
Id. bk. II, ch. VI, § 52; see also id. bk. I, ch. VI, § 66 (“[F]ather and mother [are]
joined all along in the Old and New Testament where-ever honour or obedience is
injoined children.”).
179
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when the prevailing authority, the earthly judge of law or religion, violates the law of reason:
[W]here an appeal to the law, and constituted judges, lies open,
but the remedy is denied by a manifest perverting of justice, and a
barefaced wresting of the laws to protect or indemnify the violence or injuries of some men, or party of men, there it is hard
to imagine any thing but a state of war: for wherever violence is
used, and injury done, though by hands appointed to administer
justice, it is still violence and injury, however coloured with the
name, pretences, or forms of law, the end whereof being to protect and redress the innocent, by an unbiassed application of it, to
all who are under it; wherever that is not bona fide done, war is
made upon the sufferers, who having no appeal on earth to right
them, they are left to the only remedy in such cases, an appeal to
182
heaven.

Locke’s view that the purpose of law is “to protect and redress the innocent” clashes with the legitimacy of Jephtha’s appeal to God, which
clearly victimized an innocent, his daughter. In Locke’s account, a
sovereign authority who fails to protect the innocent is himself an
183
outlaw. Yet as soon as Locke introduces the notion of “an appeal to
heaven,” its inadequacies appear in the following paragraph, where
184
185
he invokes Jephtha. Jephtha was the earthly sovereign, but an appeal to heaven would not save Jephtha’s daughter. Jephtha’s indemnity for killing his daughter came from heaven. The contradiction between the two paragraphs raises the question: To whom could
Jephtha’s daughter appeal? By scriptural reference, Locke highlights
186
the problem of collusion between political and religious authorities.
Locke answers the problem of political and religious collusion by
recasting the notions of God as judge and the “appeal to heaven.” After he introduces Jephtha, he writes:
[A]nd therefore in such controversies, where the question is put,
who shall be judge? It cannot be meant, who shall decide the controversy; every one knows what Jephtha here tells us, that the Lord
the Judge shall judge. Where there is no judge on earth, the appeal lies to God in heaven. That question then cannot mean who
shall judge, whether another hath put himself in a state of war
182

Id. bk. II, ch. III, § 20.
See infra Part V.B.
184
LOCKE, TWO TREATISES, supra note 48, bk. II, ch. III, § 21.
185
Locke highlights elsewhere that Jephtha was made “head and captain” and
“judged Israel.” Id. bk. II, ch. VIII, § 109.
186
Jephtha is referenced five times in Two Treatises. See id. bk. I, ch. XI, § 163; id.
bk. II, ch. III, § 21; id. bk. II, ch. VIII, § 109; id. bk. II, ch. XVI, § 176; id. bk. II, ch.
XIX, § 241.
183
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with me, and whether I may, as Jephtha did, appeal to heaven in
it? of that I myself can only judge in my own conscience, as I will
187
answer it, at the great day, to the supreme judge of all men.

In Locke’s telling, Jephtha is “forced to appeal to heaven.” He already
faces war with the Ammonites and has no earthly authority to appeal
to. When Jephtha says, “the Lord the Judge be judge this day between
188
the children of Israel and the children of Ammon,” he is not calling
for God to settle their dispute; he is announcing his intention to engage in combat. The outcome of the battle will represent God’s judgment. This is the meaning that “appeal to heaven” takes on in Locke’s
189
work: a call to arms. “[W]hether another hath put himself in a state
of war with me, and whether I may, as Jephtha did, appeal to heaven in
it,” he writes, is something “I myself can only be judge in my own con190
science.” People must judge for themselves whether the earthly authority has violated its responsibilities, entering a state of war with its
subjects such that they must “appeal to heaven”—that is, to engage in
war or rebellion:
Who shall be judge, whether the prince or legislative act contrary to
their trust? . . . To this I reply, The people shall be judge; for who
shall be judge whether his trustee or deputy acts well, and according to the trust reposed in him, but he who deputes him, and
must, by having deputed him, have still a power to discard him,
191
when he fails in his trust?

In this act of judgment, God does not decide whether the revolution is
legitimate or just. It rests with the people, holding the executive power
of the law of nature, to decide whether the government has abused its
192
delegated authority and must be resisted.
God’s “judgment” becomes manifest in whether they are successful.

187

Id. bk. II, ch. III, § 21.
Judges 11:27 (King James).
189
See Michael W. McConnell, The Origins and Historical Understanding of Free Exercise of Religion, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1409, 1434 n.134 (1990) (noting that by “appeal to
heaven” Locke “meant revolution—‘state of war’ between government and the
people”).
190
LOCKE, TWO TREATISES, supra note 48, bk. II, ch. III, § 21.
191
Id. bk. II, ch. XIX, § 240; cf. DAVID HUME, Of the Original Contract, in POLITICAL
ESSAYS 186, 198 (Knud Haakonssen ed., Cambridge 1994) (1741) (noting that cases
“which admit of no determination from the laws of justice and equity . . . could be
decided only by an appeal to heaven, that is, by war and violence”).
192
Id. bk. II, ch. XIX, § 241 (“[W]here there is no judicature on earth, to decide
controversies amongst men, God in heaven is judge. He alone, it is true, is judge of
the right. But every man is judge for himself, as in all other cases, so in this, whether
another hath put himself into a state of war with him, and whether he should appeal
to the Supreme Judge, as Jeptha did.”).
188

MENASHI.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

216

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

2/7/2012 3:04 PM

[Vol. 42:185

With this doctrine, Locke effects a profound alteration of the
biblical view. In the Bible, it is significant that Jephtha was a sovereign fighting another sovereign power. Where the Bible employs
the phrase “the Lord be judge” in reference to rulers and subjects, it
193
counsels submission and restraint. Consider, for example, the confrontation between David and King Saul:
David also arose afterward, and went out of the cave, and cried after Saul, saying, My lord the king. And when Saul looked behind
him, David stooped with his face to the earth, and bowed himself.
And David said to Saul . . . . Behold, this day thine eyes have seen
how that the Lord had delivered thee to day into mine hand in
the cave: and some bade me kill thee: but mine eye spared thee;
and I said, I will not put forth mine hand against my lord; for he is
the Lord’s anointed. . . . The Lord therefore be judge, and judge
between me and thee, and see, and plead my cause, and deliver
194
me out of thine hand.

In the biblical tradition, to have the Lord judge between ruler and
subject is to have the subject submit to earthly authority and “wait
195
upon God’s providence” to change the conditions of political rule.
The Apostle Paul, likewise, taught submission to rulers:
Let every person be subject to the governing authorities; for there
is no authority except from God, and those authorities that exist
have been instituted by God. Therefore whoever resists authority
resists what God has appointed, and those who resist will incur
196
judgment.

“[T]here is no man who can judge the deeds of a king,” according to
the tradition, and Aquinas explains that “none is competent to pass
197
sentence on [the sovereign], if he acts against the law.”
Even in
In A Letter Concerning Toleration, Locke raises the possibility of a magistrate assuming religious authority that his subjects think illegitimate. “Who shall be judge between them?,” he asks. JOHN LOCKE, A LETTER CONCERNING TOLERATION 61 (Prometheus Books 1990) (1689). “I answer, God alone; for there is no judge upon earth
between the supreme magistrate and the people.” Id. Locke cautions, however, that
violence “usually happens where controversies arise, without a judge to determine
them.” Id.
193
NATHAN TARCOV, LOCKE’S EDUCATION FOR LIBERTY 66 (1984).
194
1 Samuel 24:8–15 (King James).
195
LOCKE, TWO TREATISES, supra note 48, bk. I, ch. XI, § 121 (quoting ROBERT
FILMER, OBSERVATIONS UPON MR. HOBBES’S LEVIATHAN (1652)).
196
Romans 13:1–2 (New Revised Standard); see also 1 Peter 2:13–14 (King James)
(“Submit yourselves to every ordinance of man for the Lord’s sake: whether it be to
the king, as supreme; Or unto governors, as unto them that are sent by him for the
punishment of evildoers, and for the praise of them that do well.”).
197
AQUINAS, supra note 134, pt. II–II, q. 96, art. 5. “When a man is condemned,”
writes Aquinas, “he may not resist those who lead him to death.” Id. q. 69, art. 4.
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cases of tyranny, Aquinas notes that “Peter teaches us to be subject
with all fear not only to good and gentle masters, but also to those
198
who are ill disposed.” The Christian answer to someone living under an oppressive regime was to pray—to appeal to heaven in a more
199
literal way.
The tradition was more concerned with order and virtue than with freedom, duties than with rights, and one’s immortal
200
soul rather than worldly joys.
Locke changes this orientation by treating individuals as the Bi201
ble treats sovereigns. Man is sovereign in the Lockean order, so it is
not incongruous to compare the rights of individuals in the state of
war with those of sovereign nations. Thus, individuals faced with unjust rulers may “appeal to heaven” as Jephtha did against the Ammonites and seek to triumph over them. Locke takes an appeal once reserved for sovereigns and instills it in each individual as a natural
inheritance. Moreover, Jephtha’s association with the appeal reminds one that religious teaching may not be a reliable guide to natural justice. Rather than look to priestly authority, “every man is
202
judge for himself.” Jephtha serves also as a reminder of the perils
of resistance—of appealing to heaven too rashly. Because the appeal

198

THOMAS AQUINAS, De Regimine Principum (On the Government of Rulers), in
POLITICAL WRITINGS 5, 19 (R.W. Dyson ed., 2002) (1267).
199
Aquinas writes that
steps are to be taken against the scourge of tyranny not by the private
presumption of any persons, but through public authority. . . . If, however, there can be no human aid at all against a tyrant, recourse must
be had to God, the King of all, who is ‘a refuge in time of trouble’
(Psalm 9:9). For it is within His power to turn the heart of the cruel tyrant towards gentleness . . . .
AQUINAS, supra note 198, at 19–21. But see AQUINAS, supra note 134, pt. II–II, q. 42,
art. 2 (arguing “there is no sedition in disturbing a government” that is tyrannical).
See generally Peter Josephson, The Law of Nature in the Age of Consent, 12 GOOD SOC. 58,
58 (2003) (noting that according to Augustine and Aquinas “subjects must give up
the ‘right to disobey’”).
200
See infra Part V.A.
201
See M. SELIGER, THE LIBERAL POLITICS OF JOHN LOCKE 64 (1968) (“Through paralleling external and internal relations any contradiction is removed between the
traditional Christian view which restricted the appeal to heaven of the governed to
mere prayer, and the justification of active resistance derived from natural law.”).
202
LOCKE, TWO TREATISES, supra note 48, bk. II, ch. XIX, § 241; see also id. bk. II,
ch. XIV, § 168 (“[Individuals] have, by a law antecedent and paramount to all positive laws of men, reserved that ultimate determination to themselves which belongs
to all mankind, where there lies no appeal on earth, viz. to judge, whether they have
just cause to make their appeal to heaven. And this judgment they cannot part with,
it being out of a man’s power so to submit himself to another, as to give him a liberty
to destroy him; God and nature never allowing a man so to abandon himself, as to
neglect his own preservation.”).
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to heaven is the assertion of man’s own efforts, there is no guarantee
of success:
[H]e that appeals to heaven must be sure he has right on his side;
and a right too that is worth the trouble and cost of the appeal, as
he will answer at a tribunal that cannot be deceived, and will be
sure to retribute to every one according to the mischiefs he hath
203
created to his fellow-subjects; that is, any part of mankind.

Locke counsels caution in making an appeal to heaven; it involves
harsh real-world consequences. Locke’s story of the origins of civil
society—the reality that a state of nature or of war is an ever-present
possibility and that the ultimate power of enforcing the natural law
rests with the people—effects a profound change in orientation. Divine judgment is enforced through individual conscience and human
action rather than the dictates of priests and kings. Understanding
self-preservation as a natural right emboldens the citizen to confront
governors armed with a pretense to divine authority.
C. The Fatherly and the Divine
Placing responsibility in the people for ensuring that rulers act
justly, Locke suggests, overturns the biblical worldview. In making his
case for monarchy, Filmer argues that a father may transfer his patriarchal authority over his family to an heir; such heirs thereby become “not only lords of their own children, but also of their breth204
ren, and all others that were subject to their fathers.” That a father
“may have a natural right to some kind of power over his children, is
easily granted,” Locke writes, but he disputes that such authority may
205
be inherited. Specifically, Locke argues that the Bible does not vest
a right of dominion in first-born sons and that a son’s “birthright” is a
206
solely financial inheritance.
This is not a complete answer to Filmer, however. Filmer does not argue that the heir is necessarily the

203

Id. bk. II, ch. XVI, § 176.
ROBERT FILMER, Patriarcha, in PATRIARCHA AND OTHER WRITINGS 1, 10 (Johann
P. Sommerville ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1991) (1680) [hereinafter FILMER, Patriarcha]; see also ROBERT FILMER, Observations Upon Aristotles Politiques, in PATRIARCHA
AND OTHER WRITINGS, supra, at 235, 282 (1652) [hereinafter FILMER, Observations]
(“God also hath given to the father a right or liberty to alien his power over his children to any other, whence we find the sale and gift of children to have been much in
use in the beginning of the world.”).
205
LOCKE, TWO TREATISES, supra note 48, bk. I, ch. XI, § 111.
206
Id.
204
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first-born son, as Locke acknowledges.
1 Chronicles 5:1 to prove his points:

207

219

Still, Locke points to

Reuben . . . was the firstborn; but forasmuch as he defiled his father’s bed, his birthright was given unto the sons of Joseph the
son of Israel: and the genealogy is not to be reckoned after the
birthright. For Judah prevailed above his brethren, and of him
208
came the chief ruler; but the birthright was Joseph’s.

Based on this text, Locke argues that rule is not due to the first-born
son because Judah became the chief ruler instead of Reuben, the
first-born. Moreover, Locke notes, because “Joseph had the birthright, but Judah the dominion,” the birthright could not have in209
cluded the right of dominion.
Yet what is most notable about the
passage is not whether it was the first-born who received dominion
over his brethren, but that one brother actually did inherit dominion.
Filmer’s argument does not depend upon the heir being the firstborn son; he argues that a father may transfer his authority to anyone
210
he chooses.
Locke acknowledges that Judah received dominion through a
blessing from his father Jacob: “Judah, thou art he whom thy brethren shall praise . . . thy father’s children shall bow down before
211
thee.” Thus, while the biblical text supports Locke’s immediate argument that dominion does not automatically vest in the first-born, it
also supports Filmer’s ultimate position “that dominion belongs to
212
the heir over his brethren.” Locke posits that reason cannot “find
207
Id. bk. I, ch. XI, § 119 (“[Filmer] leaves us to guess, that by heir, he means the
eldest son; though I do not remember he any where mentions expresly the title of
the first-born, but all along keeps himself under the shelter of the indefinite term
heir.”); cf. id. bk. I, ch. XI, § 111 (“[H]e seems to insinuate, that the eldest son is heir;
but he no where, that I know, says it in direct words.”). In fact, Filmer argues that
the inheritance does not go automatically to the first-born, but that fathers choose
their own heirs:
[T]he wisdom of all or most princes hath thought fit to adopt many
times those for heads of families and princes of provinces whose merits,
abilities, or fortunes have enabled them, or made them fit and capable
of such royal favours. All such prime heads and fathers have power to
consent in the uniting or conferring of their fatherly right of sovereign
authority on whom they please.
FILMER, Patriarcha, supra note 204, at 11.
208
1 Chronicles 5:1–2 (King James). Locke quotes the passage in the First Treatise,
Section 115, though he cites “1 Chron. v. 12.” LOCKE, TWO TREATISES, supra note 48,
bk. I., ch. XI, § 115.
209
LOCKE, TWO TREATISES, supra note 48, bk. I, ch. XI, § 115.
210
See supra notes 204 and 207 and accompanying text.
211
Genesis 49:8 (King James). Locke cites the blessing in LOCKE, TWO TREATISES,
supra note 48, bk. I, ch. XI, § 118.
212
LOCKE, TWO TREATISES, supra note 48, bk. I, ch. XI, § 115.
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213

any such natural superiority amongst brethren.” But given the heritability of paternal authority in the Bible, it seems that scripture does
not follow Locke’s view of reason on this point.
To bolster his argument, Locke cites the example of Esau. Esau
could not have understood a connection between the birthright and
his father’s blessing (which gave dominion), Locke argues, because
Esau complains that his brother Jacob cheated him twice: first by taking his birthright and second by taking his blessing. “[H]ad the blessing, which was to be lord over his brethren, belonged to the birthright,” writes Locke, Esau could not have counted it as a second, sep214
arate theft. Again, Locke supports his limited point (that the birthright does not entail a right of dominion) while lending even more
support to Filmer’s ultimate position (that fathers did transfer a right
to be lord over one’s brethren). Just as it does not depend upon a
right of first-born sons, Filmer’s argument also does not depend
upon the inclusion of fatherly authority in the biblical “birthright”; a
father may distribute authority as he pleases, according to Filmer.
Locke further argues that that the blessings of dominion given
by Isaac to Jacob and by Jacob to Judah were “only predictions of
what should long after happen to their posterities, and not any decla215
ration of the right of inheritance to dominion in either.” According to Locke, Jacob’s blessing signified only the promise of God to
Rebecca about her sons Jacob and Esau: “Two nations are in thy
womb, and two manner of people shall be separated from thy bowels;
and the one people shall be stronger than the other people; and the
216
elder shall serve the younger.” In the same way, writes Locke, “Ja217
cob blessed Judah . . . and gave him the scepter and dominion.”
The “scepter” refers to the leadership of Judah’s descendants over
218
the descendants of his brothers, the other tribes of Israel. It could
represent a prediction regarding Judah’s posterity. It seems that
“dominion,” however, is a different concept; the express language of
the blessing seems to confer on Judah a direct lordship over his

213

Id. bk. I, ch. XI, § 111.
Id. bk. I, ch. XI, § 113; see also Genesis 27:29 (King James) (“Let people serve
thee, and nations bow down to thee: be lord over thy brethren, and let thy mother’s
sons bow down to thee.”).
215
LOCKE, TWO TREATISES, supra note 48, bk. I, ch. XI, § 118.
216
Genesis 25:23 (King James).
217
LOCKE, TWO TREATISES, supra note 48, bk. I, ch. XI, § 118.
218
See Genesis 49:10 (King James) (“The sceptre shall not depart from Judah, nor a
lawgiver from between his feet, until Shiloh come; and unto him shall the gathering
of the people be.”).
214
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219

brothers. Even accepting Locke’s interpretation, however, does not
undermine the idea that the Bible places monarchical authority in
the father. It would seem to be an even greater endorsement of fatherly authority to say that, based on the initial vesting of Jacob’s paternal authority in Judah, Judah’s posterity should enjoy political rule
in Israel throughout the generations. Or, that “the elder shall serve the
younger” denotes not simply the subservience of Esau to Jacob, but
that, because Jacob was heir to Isaac’s authority, for generations “the
Israelites, the posterity of Jacob, should have dominion over the
220
Edomites, the posterity of Esau,” as Locke puts it.
Thus, Locke
again supports his limited claim (that the blessing might not confer
an individual right of dominion) while lending even more support to
Filmer’s ultimate position (that the Bible identifies political authority
with ancestral paternal power).
In support of his related argument that the birthright was only a
financial inheritance, Locke notes that “[w]hat this birth-right was”
appears in Genesis 48:22, in which Jacob gives Joseph an extra por221
tion of his spoils.
But, in the same paragraph, Locke quotes the
Book of Chronicles to the effect that the birthright was given not to
222
Joseph himself but to the “sons of Joseph.” Following Locke’s reference to Genesis 48, one finds that the birthright was not only an extra portion. Rather, Jacob adopts Joseph’s two sons, Ephraim and
Manasseh, and passes onto them God’s promise to Abraham, Isaac,
and Jacob to “make of thee a multitude of people” and to “give this
223
land to thy seed after thee for an everlasting possession.”
Says Jacob: “[L]et my name be named on them, and the name of my fathers
Abraham and Isaac; and let them grow into a multitude in the midst
224
of the earth.” Jacob declares that Manasseh shall become a people
and be great, but “his younger brother shall be greater than he, and
225
his seed shall become a multitude of nations.” Locke cites the example of Joseph’s birthright to show that the birthright “was nothing
226
But further inspection reveals that the
but a double portion.”

219

See supra notes 211 and 214 and accompanying text.
LOCKE, TWO TREATISES, supra note 48, bk. I, ch. XI, § 118.
221
Id. bk. I, ch. XI, § 115; Genesis 48:22 (King James) (“Moreover I have given to
thee one portion above thy brethren, which I took out of the hand of the Amorite
with my sword and with my bow.”).
222
LOCKE, TWO TREATISES, supra note 48, bk. I, ch. XI, § 115.
223
Genesis 48:4–5 (King James).
224
Id. 48:16.
225
Id. 48:19. Therefore Jacob “set Ephraim before Manasseh.” Id. 48:20.
226
LOCKE, TWO TREATISES, supra note 48, bk. I, ch. XI, § 115.
220
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birthright entailed the inheritance of God’s promise to the biblical
patriarchs to elevate their posterity and to deliver their land—and
that Jacob, transferring this divine promise, could set the rank and
destiny of each son and his posterity. Thus, monarchical authority
passed from God through the patriarchs to generations of their posterity.
In discussing the birthright inheritance, Locke focuses on who
receives the paternal authority, arguing that Filmer’s examples pro227
vide no reliable guide to identify the proper heir. Yet the real dispute between Locke and Filmer is not who holds the authority, but
how that authority is established—whether political power is fatherly,
extending from God through natural fathers to the rulers of nations,
or popular, extending from people to the government through a social compact. According to Filmer, fathers may confer their authority
“on whom they please,” by whatever criteria they prefer; the important point is that “he that is so elected claims not his power as a donative from the people, but as being substituted properly by God” acting
228
through the earthly fathers.
Locke’s argument from scripture, ostensibly directed against Filmer, not only fails to confront this argument but illustrates that the nature of power in the Bible is as Filmer
229
describes it.
227

See, e.g., id. bk. I, ch. XI, § 129 (“[I]f our author’s own proof be to be taken, a
younger brother may, in the life of his father and elder brothers, by right of descent,
enjoy Adam’s monarchical power; and if one so qualified may be monarch by descent, why may not every man?”).
228
FILMER, Patriarcha, supra note 204, at 11. Indeed, Filmer argues that whatever
the form of government, political power rests upon the fatherly authority of God:
[W]hether the prince be the supreme father of the people or but the
true heir of such a father, or whether he come to the crown by usurpation, or by election of the nobles or of the people, or by any other way
whatsoever, or whether some few or a multitude govern the commonwealth, yet still the authority that is in any one, or in many, or in all
these, is the only right and natural authority of a supreme father.
Id. (editorial mark omitted).
229
See J.W. Allen, Sir Robert Filmer, in THE SOCIAL AND POLITICAL IDEAS OF SOME
ENGLISH THINKERS OF THE AUGUSTAN AGE 27, 27 (F.J.C. Hearnshaw ed., 1928) (“Either
Locke had failed to understand Filmer, or he misrepresented him deliberately.”); id.
at 45 (“Locke’s criticisms simply do not touch [Filmer’s] contention.”).
In another revealing example, Locke disputes Filmer’s argument that the patriarchs “numbered their sons or subjects amongst their possessions, and disposed of
them with as absolute a dominion, as they did their other goods.” LOCKE, TWO
TREATISES, supra note 48, bk. I, ch. XI, § 154. In the next paragraph, as evidence for
his own argument, Locke cites the example of Reuben offering his two sons as
pledges to Jacob for the safe return of Benjamin. Id. bk. I, ch. XI, § 155. Reuben in
fact treats his sons as possessions in just the way Filmer describes. See Genesis 42:37
(King James) (“And Reuben spake unto his father, saying, Slay my two sons, if I bring
him not to thee.”). Locke argues that the pledge would be superfluous if Jacob al-
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Locke’s argument nevertheless challenges the view of both Filmer
and the Bible that right authority is paternal, ancestral, and ultimately divine. Because the rightful heir is never apparent, according to
230
Locke, the biblical view fosters arbitrary and abusive government.
While revelation may endorse patriarchal government, reason counsels otherwise. To illustrate the folly of looking to the authority of
Adam, Locke poses a rhetorical question:
In the state the world is now, it is irrecoverably ignorant, who is
Adam’s heir. This fatherhood, this monarchical power of Adam,
descending to his heirs, would be of no more use to the government of mankind, than it would be to the quieting of mens consciences, or securing their healths, if our author had assured
them, that Adam had a power to forgive sins, or cure diseases,
which by divine institution descended to his heir, whilst this heir
is impossible to be known. And should not he do as rationally,
who upon this assurance of our author went and confessed his
sins, and expected a good absolution; or took physic with expectation of health, from any one who had taken on himself the name
of priest or physician, or thrust himself into those employments,
saying, I acquiesce in the absolving power descending from Adam,
or I shall be cured by the medicinal power descending from
Adam; as he who says, I submit to and obey the paternal power
descending from Adam, when it is confessed all these powers des231
cend only to his single heir, and that heir is unknown?

The answer to Locke’s question cannot be yes. One might trust that
a priest possesses “the absolving power of Adam” and assume one’s
sins to be absolved after confession, but one cannot similarly trust
that a physician holds “the medicinal power descending from Adam”
and assume one’s disease to be cured. The illness will either respond
to treatment or it will not. A pretender cannot assume the role of
physician without being found out. But a pretender may assume the
ready had dominion over Reuben’s sons, “as if a man should take two lambs out of
his lord’s flock, and offer one as security, that he will safely restore the other.”
LOCKE, TWO TREATISES, supra note 48, bk. I, ch. XI, § 155. But this argument assumes
that Jacob values all his descendants equally, and Reuben still has an independent
interest in the survival of his own line, making the pledge a strong commitment on
his part. What is most striking about the example is what Locke glosses over: the
readiness with which Reuben exercises dominion over the lives of his sons.
230
See, e.g., LOCKE, TWO TREATISES, supra note 48, bk. I, ch. XI, § 121 (“And hence
not being able to make out any prince’s title to government, as heir to Adam . . . he is
fain to resolve all into present possession, and makes civil obedience as due to an
usurper, as to a lawful king; and thereby the usurper’s title as good.”); id. bk. I, ch.
XI, § 161 (“[W]hat a brave right of lineal succession, to his paternal or regal government, our author has re-established, for the securing the rights and inheritance
of crowns, where every one may have it, let the world consider.”).
231
Id. bk. I, ch. XI, § 125.
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role of priest, Locke suggests, without any confirmation of or check
on his authority. One may “acquiesce” to priestly power, just as one
may “submit” to kingly power, and thereby make it real. Priestly or
kingly powers exist only to the extent that parishioners or subjects
acquiesce, Locke implies, but one cannot similarly will oneself
“cured.” Medicine shows whether it has power in the actual curing of
disease; it does not depend upon the acquiescence of subjects.
Because Locke has argued that submission to rulers based on
their claims of paternal power is irrational, his equation of that submission with acquiescence to priests’ claims of absolving power implies that churchly authority is similarly unfounded and the submission of believers is similarly irrational. Believers do confess their sins
and expect absolution based on the “assurance” and authority of
those who have “taken on . . . the name of priest.” In a similar way,
the biblical doctrine of paternal power may encourage submission to
government. But Locke aims for political rule to resemble medicine
more than religion: to be governed by an appreciable rational standard rather than irrational faith. It is in this sense that Locke regards
Filmer’s doctrine as of no use to the government of mankind.
Locke indicates that the biblical perspective provides no rational
guide to political life, highlighting that even God in the Bible commits the same mistake as Filmer. He criticizes Filmer for using the
vague term “heir” to describe the recipient of paternal power, but he
also notes that when God gave the land of Canaan to Abraham, he
232
specified that it was to go to “his seed” after him. “Seed” does not
seem more precise than “heir,” and indeed Locke later criticizes Filmer for using the term “issue” as well. “[I]f God give any thing to a
man and his issue in general, the claim cannot be to any one of that
issue in particular; every one that is of his race will have an equal
233
right,” Locke writes. “[F]or if the regal power be given by God to a
man and his issue, as the land of Canaan was to Abraham and his
234
seed, must they not all have a title to it, all share in it?” If the an-

232

Id. bk. I, ch. XI, § 128 (“If God had given the land of Canaan to Abraham, and
in general terms to some body after him, without naming his seed, whereby it might
be known who that somebody was, it would have been as good and useful an assignment, to determine the right to the land of Canaan, as it would be the determining
the right of crowns, to give empire to Adam and his successive heirs after him, without telling who his heir is: for the word heir, without a rule to know who it is, signifies
no more than some body, I know not whom.”); cf. Genesis 15:18 (King James) (“Unto
thy seed have I given this land.”); id. 13:15 (“For all the land which thou seest, to
thee will I give it, and to thy seed for ever.”).
233
LOCKE, TWO TREATISES, supra note 48, bk. I, ch. XI, § 162.
234
Id.
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swer were yes, it would imply a fairly expansive title to Canaan. But
Locke knows that this is not consistent with the biblical text because
236
he also observes that Isaac was Abraham’s sole heir. Locke recounts
that Isaac became sole heir because his mother Sarah urged Abraham
to cast out his first-born son Ishmael, and Abraham sent away Ishmael
237
and his other sons and “gave all he had unto Isaac.” Locke leaves
238
out God’s role in the choice of Isaac as Abraham’s heir. In Locke’s
account, the inheritance is decided not by divine will but by human
239
intrigue.
Filmer may not offer clear rules of inheritance, but Locke reveals
that this is because God does not offer such rules either. Locke offers
examples from the Bible—of Jacob stealing his older brother’s birthright, of Reuben’s disqualification and the younger Judah’s appointment as chief ruler, of the favoritism shown to Isaac and to Joseph,
and of conspiracies and revolts in the Kingdoms of Israel and Judah—to show that Filmer cannot make out a clear rule of inheritance, but in the course of doing so he makes out a critique of the Bible itself. The examples do not undermine Filmer’s insistence that,
according to the Bible, God rather than the people decides who is to
rule, but the examples do show that God’s will proceeds through arbitrary and unjust human events.
Filmer acknowledges the same point, arguing that in the Bible
unjust acts by individuals are part of God’s larger design: “God doth
but use and turn men’s unrighteous acts to the performance of His
240
righteous decrees.”
Locke, not acknowledging Filmer’s explana-

235

Cf. Genesis 13:16 (King James) (“And I will make thy seed as the dust of the
earth: so that if a man can number the dust of the earth, then shall thy seed also be
numbered.”); id. 25:2–4 (noting many sons of Abraham and their descendants).
236
LOCKE, TWO TREATISES, supra note 48, bk. I, ch. XI, § 114.
237
Id.; see also Genesis 21:10–14 (King James) (recounting the expulsion of Ishmael); Genesis 25:5–6 (King James) (“And Abraham gave all that he had unto Isaac.
But unto the sons of the concubines, which Abraham had, Abraham gave gifts, and
sent them away from Isaac his son, while he yet lived, eastward, unto the east country.”).
238
God tells Abraham to listen to Sarah “for in Isaac shall thy seed be called.” Genesis 21:12 (King James).
239
Compare, e.g., LOCKE, TWO TREATISES, supra note 48, bk. I, ch. XI, § 167 (noting
that God gave the crown to David and “his seed”), with id. bk. I, ch. XI, § 162 (“Solomon, who succeeded David in the throne, [was] no more his heir than Jeroboham,
who succeeded him in the government of the ten tribes, was his issue.”).
240
FILMER, Patriarcha, supra note 204, at 11. Filmer also acknowledges that the
identity of the true heir is uncertain but obedience is nevertheless due to a ruler: “No
child naturally and infallibly knows who are his true parents, yet he must obey those
that are in common reputation are so, otherwise the commandment of ‘honour thy
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tion, condemns Filmer’s doctrine on the basis of its arbitrariness.
Anyone can claim the fatherly power of Adam, Locke argues, all with
241
the same degree of legitimacy.
In Locke’s account, the fatherly
power as Jephtha wields it is tyrannical, and its descent through the
patriarchs is arbitrary. Locke therefore replaces the descent of power
from God through the patriarchs to sovereign kings with the ascent
of power from individuals through compact to civil society.
At the same time, Locke indicates that there can be a rational
check on that power. If government power resembled medicinal rather than priestly power, it would be judged and constrained by actual standards. In the First Treatise, Locke suggests that if a “power
rising from property” were considered the foundation of govern242
ment, it would supplant fatherly power. Property, then, has the potential to replace fatherly power—the inherited authority emanating
from the God of the Bible.
IV. PROPERTY
At first blush, Locke’s state of nature appears distinct from the
Hobbesian one, but further inspection reveals similarities to the
Hobbesian system. First, while Locke makes a conceptual distinction
between the state of nature and the state of war, the dynamics of the
state of nature lead to a state of war inevitably and constantly. “[T]he
nature of war,” writes Hobbes, “consisteth not in actual fighting; but
in the known disposition thereto, during all the time there is no as243
surance to the contrary.” That sounds like the Lockean state of nature, in which coequal sovereigns—no greater part the observers of
law and justice—wield coercive authority over each other. Second,
the law of nature for Locke as well as for Hobbes consists in the dynamics of individual self-preservation. Third, the state of nature induces people to form civil society.

father and thy mother’ were in vain, and no child bound to the obedience of it.”
FILMER, Observations, supra note 204, at 192.
241
Locke writes: “[I]f one so qualified may be monarch by descent, why may not
every man? if Judah, his father and elder brother living, were one of Adam’s heirs, I
know not who can be excluded from this inheritance; all men by inheritance may be
monarchs as well as Judah.” LOCKE, TWO TREATISES, supra note 48, bk. I, ch. XI, § 129.
Judah actually did hold monarchical power, see supra notes 208–11 and accompanying text, so this passage reads as a criticism of the Bible as well as Filmer.
242
Locke quotes a passage from Filmer explaining that the fatherly power cannot
coexist with a power in the people, except he replaces “power of the people” with
“power rising from property.” See LOCKE, TWO TREATISES, supra note 48, bk. I, ch. VII,
§ 77 (quoting FILMER, supra note 195, at 158).
243
HOBBES, supra note 116, at 100.
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But the civil societies that result from Hobbes’s and Locke’s accounts are not identical. Hobbes aims to suppress those human passions, especially pride, which he takes to be the root of human conflict: “The passion, whose violence, or continuance, maketh madness,
is either great vain-glory; which is commonly called pride, and self244
conceit; or great dejection of mind,” Hobbes writes.
Hobbes and
Locke aim to counter dejection of mind by replacing piety with human self-reliance. To control pride, Hobbes advocates an absolutist
form of government as well as a state religion that will moderate its
245
subjects.
According to Hobbes, “The passions that incline men to
peace, are fear of death; desire of such things as are necessary to
246
commodious living; and a hope by their industry to obtain them.”
Hobbes relies primarily upon the first mechanism for promoting
peace, the fear of death: Hobbesian man submits to government to
247
control his passions; Leviathan keeps him in check through force.
Locke places greater emphasis upon men’s desires for material
things and commodious living, and the hope by their industry to obtain them, as a way to channel the passions toward social peace.
Lockean man submits to government in order to preserve and ac248
quire property. By making property the foundation of civil society,
Locke aims to channel the passions away from factional strife and toward human industry. Legitimizing the desire for material gain—
against religious teachings that condemn it—redirects human energies and transforms social attitudes. In doing so, Locke’s theory of
property entails a significant challenge to the biblical tradition.

244

Id. at 63; see also id. at 120 (“[F]or the ninth law of nature, I put this, that every
man acknowledge another for his equal by nature. The breach of this precept is pride.”).
245
Hobbes calls his government “Leviathan” after the great sea monster that the
Bible calls “a king over all the children of pride.” See id. at 235–36 (“Hitherto I have
set forth the nature of man, whose pride and other passions have compelled him to
submit himself to government: together with the great power of his governor, whom
I compared to Leviathan, taking that comparison out of the two last verses of the oneand-fortieth of Job; where God having set forth the great power of Leviathan, calleth
him king of the proud.”); see also Job 41:33–34 (King James) (“Upon earth there is not
his like, who is made without fear. He beholdeth all high things: he is a king over all
the children of pride.”).
246
HOBBES, supra note 116, at 102.
247
Id.
248
See LOCKE, TWO TREATISES, supra note 48, bk. II, ch. IX, § 124 (“The great and
chief end, therefore, of men’s uniting into common-wealths, and putting themselves
under government, is the preservation of their property.”).
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A. The Status of Locke’s Theory of Property
Close attention to Locke’s text reveals this purpose. The opening statement of Locke’s chapter on property, for example, includes a
revealing inaccuracy:
Whether we consider natural reason, which tells us that men, being once born, have a right to their preservation, and consequently to meat and drink and such other things as Nature affords for
their subsistence, or revelation, which gives us an account of those
grants God made of the world to Adam, and to Noah and his
sons, it is very clear that God, as king David says, Psal. cxv. 16. has
given the earth to the children of men, given it to mankind in com249
mon.

Locke begins the chapter by insisting upon the agreement of reason
and revelation. Whether we consult one or the other, he says, we
have an account of men’s right to “meat and drink” and everything
250
that sustains life. But this is demonstrably false; in this case, the account provided by reason and that provided by revelation diverge. In
251
Genesis 3:18, God grants to Adam “the plants of the field” to eat. It
is not until after the Flood, in God’s grant to Noah, that God permits
mankind to eat meat: “Every moving thing that lives shall be food for
252
you; and just as I gave you the green plants, I give you everything.”
Locke is well aware of the discrepancy between the grants to Adam
and to Noah. He discusses the discrepancy in the First Treatise,
where he implicitly criticizes God’s arbitrary rule:
Adam . . . could not make bold with a lark or rabbit to satisfy his
hunger, and had the herbs but in common with the beasts . . . .
Should any one, who is absolute lord of a country, have bidden
our author subdue the earth, and given him dominion over the
creatures in it, but not have permitted him to have taken a kid or
a lamb out of the flock to satisfy his hunger, I guess he would
scarce leave thought himself lord or proprietor of that land, or
the cattle on it; but would have found the difference between
“having dominion,” which a shepherd may have, and having full
253
property as an owner.

By specifying “meat” as well as Adam and Noah in his opening sentence, Locke highlights the discrepancy between the law of reason
and the law of God. According to Locke, the law of reason says that
249
250
251
252
253

§ 27.

Id. bk. II, ch. V, § 25.
Id.
Genesis 3:18 (King James).
Genesis 9:3 (New Revised Standard).
LOCKE, TWO TREATISES, supra note 48, bk. I, ch. IV, § 39; see also id. bk. I, ch. IV,
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men, upon birth, have a right to preservation and therefore to those
254
things “nature affords for their subsistence.” If this right of property is founded upon the right of preservation, it cannot be a collective
right of all men in common because the inability to appropriate food
for oneself would make self-preservation impossible. Thus, contrary
to what Locke says, when we consult natural reason, it is not “very
clear” that God has given the earth to mankind in common. According to natural reason, all individuals have a right to meat and drink in
accordance with self-preservation. If God has vested title to the earth
in mankind in common, then God has acted contrary to natural reason.
Locke makes this argument explicit in the First Treatise when he
discusses man’s dominion over the animals. Irrespective of any explicit grant by God, Locke explains, man had the right to use the creatures for his own preservation because reason dictated that by “pursuing that natural inclination he had to preserve his being, he
followed the will of his maker, and therefore had a right to make use
of those creatures, which by his reason or senses he could discover
255
would be serviceable thereunto.”
That natural instinct for selfpreservation made the animals his property: “And thus man’s property in the creatures was founded upon the right he had to make use of
256
those things that were necessary or useful to his being.”
This dic257
tate of reason makes God’s explicit instructions to man irrelevant.
Strictly speaking, therefore, the task Locke sets for Chapter 5, his
chapter on property in the Second Treatise—namely, to derive an
individual right to property from God’s grant to mankind in common—is unnecessary. Having already established a natural right to
self-preservation, Locke has established the right to individual appropriation from nature, and he announces it up front.
Considering the other side of Locke’s statement—that is, taking
the perspective of revelation—it is similarly not “very clear” that God
has given the earth to mankind in common. The revelation here, the
biblical “account of those grants God made of the world to Adam and
to Noah and his sons,” is the subject of Locke’s debate with Filmer in
Chapter 4 of the First Treatise, in which Locke purports to refute
Filmer’s argument that those grants entitled Adam’s and Noah’s des254

Id. bk. II, ch. V, § 25.
Id. bk. I, ch. IX, § 86.
256
Id.
257
Id. (“I doubt not, but before these words were pronounced, i. Gen. 28, 29. (if
they must be understood literally to have been spoken) and without any such verbal
donation, man had a right to an use of the creatures, by the will and grant of God.”).
255
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cendants to monarchical rule. There, Locke considers whether the
donation of God to Adam in Genesis 1:28 could have given him pow258
er over other men.
Because “all positive grants convey no more
than the express words they are made in will carry,” Locke examines
259
the precise words of God’s grant.
Specifically, Locke considers
whether the words “every living thing that moveth” could include
mankind, giving Adam dominion over other men.
Filmer, however, never argues that mankind is included in those
260
words.
Locke quotes Filmer as arguing that Adam “having here
dominion given him over all creatures, was thereby the monarch of
261
the whole world.”
In context and without the modifications in
Locke’s quotation, that passage from Filmer’s Observations upon Aristotle’s Politics distinguishes between people and creatures, and it treats
Adam’s dominion over the creatures as a right of ownership or control. That exclusive control, Filmer argues, establishes Adam’s monarchical power because his posterity could not possess anything “but
262
by his grant or permission, or by succession from him.” Nevertheless, Locke insists that Filmer is best understood to mean that the
grant of dominion itself made Adam the sovereign ruler of all men by
263
giving him direct dominion over mankind. Locke is aware that this
is a misrepresentation of Filmer’s argument; in an earlier chapter,
Locke quotes the same passage in full and without modifications, and
he explains that Filmer intends “monarch of the whole world” to sig-

258
See Genesis 1:28 (King James) (“And God blessed them, and God said unto
them, Be fruitful, and multiply, and replenish the earth, and subdue it: and have
dominion over the fish of the sea, and over the fowl of the air, and over every living
thing that moveth upon the earth.”).
259
LOCKE, TWO TREATISES, supra note 48, bk. I, ch. IV, § 25.
260
The words do not even appear in Patriarcha. See FILMER, Patriarcha, supra note
204.
261
LOCKE, TWO TREATISES, supra note 48, bk. I, ch. IV, § 23.
262
Filmer writes:
Adam, being commanded to multiply, and people the earth, and to
subdue it, and having dominion given him over all creatures, was thereby the monarch of the whole world. None of his posterity had any
right to possess anything but by his grant or permission, or by succession from him.
FILMER, Observations, supra note 204, at 236.
263
LOCKE, TWO TREATISES, supra note 48, bk. I, ch. IV, § 23 (“[O]ur author says,
Adam was hereby monarch of the world, which, properly speaking, signifies sovereign ruler of all the men in the world; and so Adam, by this grant, must be constituted such
a ruler. If our author means otherwise, he might with much clearness have said, that
Adam was hereby proprietor of the whole world.”).
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264

nify “proprietor of all the world exclusive of the rest of mankind.”
By shifting his understanding of the passage, Locke enters into a refutation of an opinion Filmer does not hold. Yet his textual study of
the grants to Adam and to Noah allows Locke to criticize the Bible in
the guise of defending it.
First, Locke examines what the Bible means by “every living
thing that moveth.” He finds that God divides the animals into three
kinds: the fishes of the sea, the fowls of the air, and the living crea265
tures of the earth. In Genesis 1:24, Locke explains, God further divides the living creatures of the earth into three ranks: cattle, wild
266
beasts, and the “creeping animals” or reptiles. Locke explains this
subdivision as ranking the animals from most to least useful to man,
but the biblical text actually lists the creatures in a different order
267
than Locke does, without any hint of ranking.
Moreover, Genesis
268
1:25 lists them in a still different order. Locke quotes both of these
biblical verses in the same paragraph in which he explains the ranking. While it may be sensible to rank the creatures as he does,
Locke’s own textual evidence shows that he has no biblical founda269
tion for the ranking. Instead, the Bible catalogues the creatures in
an inconsistent manner.
Locke notes that in Genesis 1:26, where God announces his intention to give Adam dominion over the creatures, God identifies cattle and reptiles as terrestrial creatures but leaves out the second rank,
270
wild beasts.
In the actual grant of dominion to Adam in Genesis
264

Id. bk. I, ch. III, § 16. (“Monarch of the world is also differently used by our author; for sometimes he means by it a proprietor of all the world exclusive of the rest
of mankind, and thus he does in the same page of his preface before cited: Adam,
says he, being commanded to multiply and people the earth, and to subdue it, and having dominion given him over all creatures, was thereby the monarch of the whole world; none of his
posterity had any right to possess any thing but by his grant or permission, or by succession from
him.”); cf. id. bk. I, ch. IV, § 38 (quoting FILMER, supra note 195) (noting Filmer’s view
of “dominion” as a “title to a property of all things”).
265
Id. bk. I, ch. IV, § 26.
266
Id. bk. I, ch. IV, § 25.
267
See Genesis 1:24 (King James) (“And God said, Let the earth bring forth the living creature after his kind, cattle, and creeping thing, and beast of the earth after his
kind: and it was so.”).
268
See id. 1:25 (“And God made the beast of the earth after his kind, and cattle
after their kind, and every thing that creepeth upon the earth after his kind: and
God saw that it was good.”).
269
LOCKE, TWO TREATISES, supra note 48, bk. I, ch. IV, § 25.
270
Id. bk. I, ch. IV, § 26; see also Genesis 1:26 (King James) (“And God said, Let us
make man in our image, after our likeness: and let them have dominion over the fish
of the sea, and over the fowl of the air, and over the cattle, and over all the earth,
and over every creeping thing that creepeth upon the earth.”).
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1:28, Locke further explains, the Hebrew term for terrestrial crea271
tures signifies only beasts and reptiles, leaving out cattle. The same
term appears in God’s grant to Noah in Genesis 9:12, Locke observes—though Locke neglects to mention that the biblical verse includes not only that term, signifying beasts and reptiles, but also
272
“every beast of the earth.” If Locke is correct, therefore, God mentions beasts twice but excludes cattle from Noah’s dominion. The
express language of the grants to Adam and to Noah, then, do not
include all the types of animals: “[A]ll the words, whereby they are
expressed in the history of their creation, are no where used in any of
the following grants, but some of them omitted in one, and some in
273
another.”
Nevertheless, Locke concludes that the grants to Adam
and to Noah must include all the species of irrational animals because “since God certainly executed in one place, what he declares he
designed in the other, we cannot but understand the same in both
274
places.”
But this conclusion violates the standard Locke set at the
start—that positive grants convey no more than the express words will
carry. Thus, if one does not abandon that standard in evaluating
God’s donation—that is, if one expects of God at least as much as
would be expected of a man—it becomes clear that God’s grants to
Adam and to Noah are arbitrary: God’s accounts of the living creatures are inconsistent, and the express terms of the grants do not include cattle, those creatures most useful to man, which Locke describes as “such creatures as were or might be tame, and so be the
275
private possession of particular men.” In other words, God has given man possession of only those creatures of which man cannot take
possession.
Locke concludes that the grants do not include dominion over
human beings: “[W]hether we understand the Hebrew words right or
no, they cannot be supposed to comprehend man,” especially because the term for “every living thing that moveth” is used in contra276
distinction to man elsewhere in Genesis.
This conclusion reveals
271

LOCKE, TWO TREATISES, supra note 48, bk. I, ch. IV, §§ 25–26.
Id. bk. I, ch. IV, § 27; see also Genesis 9:2 (King James) (“And the fear of you and
the dread of you shall be upon every beast of the earth, and upon every fowl of the
air, upon all that moveth upon the earth, and upon all the fishes of the sea; into your
hand are they delivered.”).
273
LOCKE, TWO TREATISES, supra note 48, bk. I, ch. IV, § 27.
274
Id. bk. I, ch. IV, § 26.
275
Id. bk. I, ch. IV, § 25. In Locke’s view, the express terms are binding even in
the case of a divine grant. See id. bk. II, ch. XVI, § 195 (“Grants, promises, and oaths
are bonds that hold the Almighty.”).
276
Id. bk. I, ch. IV, § 27.
272
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that the textual analysis regarding the subdivisions of irrational animals was not relevant to Locke’s argument about Adam’s dominion
over men. Man was not included in God’s grants to Adam and to
Noah regardless of which particular animals were comprehended in
the language. The only purpose of Locke’s textual analysis is to show
that God’s grants do not withstand rational scrutiny.
In the end, Locke discounts the positive grants, arguing instead
that it is man’s “intellectual nature” that allows him to have dominion
277
over the inferior creatures. According to Locke, this is the meaning
of God’s declaration that he will make man “in our image, after our
278
likeness.” Locke recasts Genesis 1:26 from a statement of God’s intention to create the first man in the divine image to God’s creation
279
of a whole species of intellectual creatures. In this way, Filmer’s argument that a “natural freedom of mankind cannot be supposed
280
without the denial of the creation of Adam,” which Locke dismisses,
has some merit. To defend the natural freedom of mankind, Locke
argues that the “man” created and blessed by God in Genesis 1:26–28
281
is not Adam but “the species of mankind.”
In a similar way, Locke recasts the grant to Noah. Though
Noah’s sons are mentioned in the biblical text, Filmer argues that the
blessing is best understood as including the sons in subordination or
282
succession to Noah.
Locke argues that this interpretation, while
possible, is not the best understanding of the text. Yet in Genesis
6:18, God says individually to Noah, “with thee will I establish my covenant; and thou shalt come into the ark, thou, and thy sons, and thy
283
wife, and thy sons’ wives with thee.” Given this statement of God’s

277
Id. bk. I, ch. IV, § 30. Locke also argues that men had a right to eat animals
despite God’s admonition to the contrary. See supra notes 255–57 and accompanying
text.
278
LOCKE, TWO TREATISES, supra note 48, bk. I, ch. IV, § 30 (quoting Genesis 1:26
(King James)).
279
Id. (“In the 26th verse, where God declares his intention to give this dominion,
it is plain he meant, that he would make a species of creatures, that should have dominion over the other species of this terrestrial globe.”). Locke sees that Genesis refers to man as “them” and concludes that it cannot thereby signify Adam alone—
even though God also refers to himself in the plural in the same verse.
280
Id. bk. I, ch. III, § 15 (quoting FILMER, supra note 195).
281
See id. bk. I, ch. IV, § 40 (“I think it is impossible for any sober reader, to find
any other but the setting of mankind above the other kinds of creatures, in this habitable earth of ours. It is nothing but the giving to man, the whole species of man,
as the chief inhabitant, who is the image of his Maker, the dominion over the other
creatures.”).
282
See id. bk. I, ch. IV, § 32.
283
Genesis 6:18 (King James).
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intention, one need only recall Locke’s own admonition that “since
God certainly executed in one place, what he declares he designed in
284
the other, we cannot but understand the same in both places.” To
make God’s design consistent with his execution, it would be necessary to read the grant as including Noah’s sons in subordination or
succession. Moreover, because God makes his covenant not only with
285
Noah and his sons but also with “your seed after you” and “every liv286
ing creature that is with you, for perpetual generations,” it is not
possible for the covenant to be executed in any other fashion but
successively. Yet Locke insists that one cannot depart from the express words of the grant to Noah, even though if he were to apply the
same contextual method he applies to Adam’s grant, the meaning
287
would be more consistent with the biblical text as a whole.
That
reading, however, would also be consistent with Filmer’s argument
for monarchical rule and the biblical association of the right with the
ancestral.
In Locke’s vision, man has a right to “meat and drink” and to the
use of inferior creation not because of God’s explicit grant, but because the strong desire for self-preservation was “planted in him as a
principle of action by God himself” and reason, “which was the voice
of God in him, could not but teach him and assure him, that pursuing that natural inclination he had to preserve his being, he fol288
lowed the will of his maker.”
In other words, God’s will is not revealed in the biblical account of his word, but in the instinct and
reason he placed in mankind.
While Locke’s view of natural reason makes his labor theory logically unnecessary to establish individual rights to property, the view
he addresses—that the world was given to mankind in common—was
289
one conventionally held in his day.
As Locke writes, “this being
supposed, it seems to some a very great difficulty how any one should
284

LOCKE, TWO TREATISES, supra note 48, bk. I, ch. IV, § 26.
Genesis 9:9 (King James).
286
Id. 9:12.
287
Compare LOCKE, TWO TREATISES, supra note 48, bk. I, ch. IV, § 32 (invoking “the
express words of the scripture” and “the plain express words of scripture” and arguing that the “express words [of the grant to Noah and his sons] give a joint title in
present”), with supra note 274 and accompanying text. In the same way, Locke writes
that “we may well suppose” that Adam had “more sons” than those recounted in
scripture, LOCKE, TWO TREATISES, supra note 48, bk. I, ch. XI, § 112, but does not allow a similar assumption for Noah, see id. bk. I, ch. IV, § 33 (“[W]e read not of any
children he had after the flood.”).
288
LOCKE, TWO TREATISES, supra note 48, bk. I, ch. IX, § 86.
289
See, e.g., HUGO GROTIUS, THE FREE SEA 15 (David Armitage ed., Richard Hakluyt
trans., Liberty Fund 2004) (1609).
285
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ever come to have a property in anything.” Locke himself does not
hold such a supposition, nor is he among those “some” to whom private property poses “a very great difficulty.” But Locke “will not content myself to answer” that if one concedes the supposition, private
291
property is impossible. In other words, Locke proceeds to make an
argument based on the suppositions of others; he engages with the
conventional, commonly held view rather than his own.
B. The Theory of Property
As with his teaching on the state of nature, Locke at first appears
to be situated within the conventional view—Hugo Grotius, for example, also argued that property could be removed from the com292
mon through labor —but Locke’s argument pushes the idea toward
novel implications. In Locke’s hands, the argument for private property becomes a refutation of religious authority and an emancipation
of human industry.
Locke begins the argument by (once again) painting a rosy picture of man’s natural state: “God has given us all things richly, 1 Tim. vi.
293
By
12. is the voice of reason confirmed by inspiration,” he writes.
employing the phrase “reason confirmed by inspiration,” Locke calls
attention to the deep disagreement between reason and revelation
that he has already noted. The phrase also sets a hierarchy between
reason and inspiration: reason is the primary ground of knowledge,
and it seeks only “confirmation” from inspiration.
Locke’s quotation of scripture is inexact. The King James Bible
294
refers to “God, who giveth us richly all things to enjoy.”
Locke’s
295
rendition entails a change of tense and emphasis. Additionally, his
290

LOCKE, TWO TREATISES, supra note 48, bk. II, ch. V, § 25 (emphases added).
Id.
292
GROTIUS, supra note 289, at 15 (“[O]f those things which nature had brought
forth for the use of man she would that some of them should remain common and
others through every one’s labor and industry to become proper.”).
293
LOCKE, TWO TREATISES, supra note 48, bk. II, ch. V, § 31. The citation to the
First Book of Timothy is in Locke’s text.
294
1 Timothy 6:17 (King James).
295
Locke quotes the same verse in the First Treatise but there he uses the present
tense. See LOCKE, TWO TREATISES, supra note 48, bk. I, ch. IV, § 40 (“God gives us all
things richly to enjoy”). In his chapter on property, however, Locke treats God’s donation of “all things” as having occurred in the past. “God gave the world to men in
common” after which men were required to labor “to draw from it” the conveniences
of life. Id. bk. II, ch. V, § 34 (emphasis added); see also id. bk. II, ch. V, § 32 (“God,
when he gave the world in common to all mankind, commanded man also to labour,
and the penury of his condition required it of him.”). The biblical teaching, however, evokes God’s ongoing beneficence to man while emphasizing the relative unim291
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citation to the Book of Timothy is incorrect. The verse appears at 1
Timothy 6:17, but Locke cites to 6:12, leaving the reader to search 1
296
Timothy 6. As it happens, Chapter 6 of the First Book of Timothy
contains the Christian teaching on property. When read in parallel,
Locke’s own chapter on property engages with the biblical text.
Locke’s disagreement with the Pauline teaching can be seen
most starkly in the fact that Paul begins 1 Timothy 6 with a defense of
slavery:
Let as many servants as are under the yoke count their own masters worthy of all honour, that the name of God and his doctrine
be not blasphemed. And they that have believing masters, let
them not despise them, because they are brethren; but rather do
them service, because they are faithful and beloved, partakers of
297
the benefit. These things teach and exhort.

It may fairly be said that Locke’s goal in Two Treatises is to “teach and
exhort” the opposite notion. He opens the work with a denunciation
of slavery: “Slavery is so vile and miserable an estate of man, and so
directly opposite to the generous temper and courage of our nation,
that it is hardly to be conceived that an Englishman, much less a gen298
tleman, should plead for it.”
Under this view, the apostle Paul is
neither an Englishman nor a gentleman. Paul teaches Timothy that
slavery should not be questioned in order to protect “the name of
God and his doctrine.” Like Locke, Paul suggests that human autonomy is a threat to divine sovereignty.

portance of material comforts: “Charge them that are rich in this world, that they be
not highminded, nor trust in uncertain riches, but in the living God, who giveth us richly
all things to enjoy.” 1 Timothy 6:17 (King James) (emphasis added). Paul encourages
the rich to “be rich in good works,” a kind of wealth that provides “a good foundation against the time to come, that they may lay hold on eternal life.” Id. 6:18–19; cf.
Romans 11:33 (King James) (“O the depth of the riches both of the wisdom and
knowledge of God!”).
The placement of “richly” in the verse may affect whether the verse implies that
God provides material abundance for individuals or that God “hath made all things
for his own sake: . . . for him to shew beneficence and grace in them.” 1 HOOKER,
supra note 135, at 7. (internal quotation mark omitted); cf. On the Misquotation of
Scripture, in 7 THE CHRISTIAN EXAMINER AND CHURCH OF IRELAND MAGAZINE 402, 403
(1828), available at http://books.google.com/books?id=khUEAAAAQAAJ (“[In the
King James Bible] we find the word richly connected with the Author and giver of
every good and perfect gift . . . and not with the creature or his enjoyments.”).
296
Some contemporary editions of the Second Treatise change the citation to
6:17, but this may violate Locke’s injunction “not [to] think our author so little
skilled in the way of writing discourses of this nature . . . that he by over-sight commits the fault.” LOCKE, TWO TREATISES, supra note 48, bk. I, ch. II, § 7.
297
1 Timothy 6:1–2 (King James).
298
LOCKE, TWO TREATISES, supra note 48, bk. I, ch. I, § 1.
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Significantly, Paul sees the threat to divine authority coming not
only from a desire for liberty but also from a desire for material gain.
After he tells Timothy to urge the willful submission of slaves to masters, he says:
If any man teach otherwise . . . [h]e is proud, knowing nothing,
but doting about questions and strifes of words, whereof cometh
envy, strife, railings, evil surmisings, Perverse disputings of men
of corrupt minds, and destitute of the truth, supposing that gain
is godliness: from such withdraw thyself. But godliness with con299
tentment is great gain.

Those who are godly and contented, Paul argues, will gain more than
those who promote disputes and contention for the sake of gain.
The contrast between these rival camps corresponds to a central
teaching in Locke’s chapter on property—that the earth belongs “to
the use of the industrious and rational . . . not to the fancy or cove300
tousness of the quarrelsome and contentious.”
Both Paul and Locke
301
oppose promoters of quarrels and contention. For Locke, however,
the quarrelsome and contentious are not those who lack contentment but those who lack industry—those who do not labor for ma302
terial gain.
Against Paul’s ideal of “godliness with contentment,” Locke
303
praises the “industrious and rational.” Locke exalts industry rather
299

1 Timothy 6:3–6 (King James).
LOCKE, TWO TREATISES, supra note 48, bk. II, ch. V, § 34 (emphasis added).
301
Locke condemns the “quarrelsome and contentious” while Paul condemns
those with “an unhealthy interest in controversies and quarrels,” 1 Timothy 6:4 (New
International), or “a morbid craving for controversy and for disputes,” 1 Timothy 6:4
(New Revised Standard).
302
In his chapter on property, Locke writes that when labor entitled one to property, “there could be then little room for quarrels or contentions about property so established.” LOCKE, TWO TREATISES, supra note 48, bk. II, ch. V, § 31 (emphasis added). Where labor provided title to land, “there could be no doubt of right, no room
for quarrel.” Id. bk. II, ch. V, § 39. Where labor began a title to property in the
common things of nature, “there could then be no reason of quarrelling about title.”
Id. bk. II, ch. V, § 51. Locke suggests that quarrelsomeness does not arise from the
acquisition of property, at least where it is acquired through labor. In the Second
Treatise, Locke uses the word “contend” exclusively in relation to those who seek
power over others. See id. bk. II, ch. III, § 21 (“contenders” in a state of war); id. bk.
II, ch. VI, § 53 (men “who contend so much for the absolute power and authority of
the fatherhood” and “contend for” monarchy); id. bk. II, ch. VI, § 61 (“blinded contenders for monarchy”); id. bk. II, ch. VIII, § 103 (referring to “contenders for paternal empire” who will not find in history “such a power as they contend for”). Locke
uses the word “quarrel” once outside Chapter 5, where he describes one who “joins
with” a contender in the state of war “and espouses his quarrel.” Id. bk. II, ch. III, §
16. The quarrelsome justify the use of force by the contentious—as religious authority might justify the abuses of a king.
303
LOCKE, TWO TREATISES, supra note 48, bk. II, ch. V, § 34.
300
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than contentment, and reason rather than godliness. In Locke’s vision, industry and reason represent “great gain”—one gains title to
the earth. Locke’s chapter on property attacks Paul’s rationale for
“godliness with contentment” and supplants it with an ethic of industry and reason. Paul teaches:
For we brought nothing into this world, and it is certain we can
carry nothing out. And having food and raiment let us be therewith
content. But they that will be rich fall into temptation and a
snare, and into many foolish and hurtful lusts, which drown men
304
in destruction and perdition.

Locke also mentions “food and raiment” in his teaching on property,
where he derides it as the relatively worthless product of unassisted
nature:
[F]or whatever bread is more worth than acorns, wine than water,
and cloth or silk, than leaves, skins or moss, that is wholly owing
to labour and industry; the one of these being the food and raiment
which unassisted nature furnishes us with; the other, provisions
which our industry and pains prepare for us, which how much
they exceed the other in value, when any one hath computed, he
will then see how much labour makes the far greatest part of the
value of things we enjoy in this world: and the ground which produces the materials, is scarce to be reckoned in, as any, or at most,
but a very small part of it; so little, that even amongst us, land that
is left wholly to nature, that hath no improvement of pasturage,
tillage, or planting, is called, as indeed it is, waste; and we shall
305
find the benefit of it amount to little more than nothing.

Locke is not content with “food and raiment,” as according to Paul
one ought to be. To Locke, “the far greatest part of the value of
things we enjoy in this world” comes from “our industry and pains.”
So he urges the promotion of productive labor against the penury of
306
“the food and raiment which unassisted nature furnishes us with.”
Locke disputes Paul’s contention that “we brought nothing into
307
this world.” Rather, he maintains that we own the labor we carry in
ourselves and that this labor creates virtually all the value in the
world. Before the introduction of human labor, the world was barren. “[T]he extent of ground is of so little value, without labour,” ac308
cording to Locke. “It is labour then which puts the greatest part of
value upon land, without which it would scarcely be worth any
304
305
306
307
308

1 Timothy 6:7–9 (King James) (emphasis added).
LOCKE, TWO TREATISES, supra note 48, bk. II, ch. V, § 42 (emphasis added).
Id.
1 Timothy 6:7 (King James).
Id. bk. II, ch. V, § 36.
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thing . . . . [N]ature and the earth furnish[] only the almost worthless
309
materials, as in themselves.”
The uncultivated earth is “to be
310
looked on as waste.” Locke teaches the opposite of what Paul tells
Timothy: the world was empty when we got here; man brings practically everything into this world.
Locke also reverses Paul’s teaching that the temptation of riches
leads to ruin. For Locke, it is idleness that “drown[s] men in destruc311
tion and perdition,” while the desire to be rich (“the desire of having more than man needed,” as Locke puts it) is what increases the
312
common stock of mankind and supports human life. The desire to
313
be rich thereby benefits one’s neighbors, who react with gratitude.
For Locke, it is the desire to be rich that spurs men to labor, and it is
314
labor that creates virtually everything of value.
Locke turns the Pauline teaching about money on its head. Paul
315
preaches to Timothy that “the love of money is the root of all evil.”
Locke argues the opposite: love of money drives human industry
beyond mere subsistence production. “Find out something that hath
the use and value of money amongst his neighbours, you shall see the
same man will begin presently to enlarge his possessions,” writes
316
Locke.
“[F]or as a man had a right to all he could employ his labour upon, so he had no temptation to labour for more than he could
317
make use of.” As long as man had no temptation to labor for more
than he could make use of, he refrained from laboring on the earth
except to gather whatever provision would sustain him at the given
moment, before it spoiled. Because man could not benefit from anything beyond what he could immediately consume, men “contented
318
themselves with what unassisted nature offered to their necessities.”
Locke teaches that man’s contentment is not gainful but wasteful because the vast global common—all the resources beyond individual
immediate need—went undeveloped. Money, however, liberated
people from the penurious conditions of nature because it created a
309

Id. bk. II, ch. V, § 43.
Id. bk. II, ch. V, § 38.
311
1 Timothy 6:9 (King James).
312
LOCKE, TWO TREATISES, supra note 48, bk. II, ch. V, § 37.
313
Id. bk. II, ch. V, § 36.
314
Id. bk. II, ch. V, § 42 (“[L]abour makes the far greatest part of the value of
things we enjoy in this world.”).
315
1 Timothy 6:10 (King James).
316
LOCKE, TWO TREATISES, supra note 48, bk. II, ch. V, § 49.
317
Id. bk. II, ch. V, § 51 (emphasis added).
318
Id. bk. II, ch. V, § 45 (emphasis added). The language contrasts with Paul’s
invocation of contentment as a virtue.
310
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storehouse of value that enabled individuals to labor for more than
their immediate consumption. “[W]ant of people and money gave
319
men no temptation to enlarge their possessions of land,” but with
the introduction of money people had an incentive to develop the
global common that had been lying in waste:
Thus labour, in the beginning, gave a right of property, wherever
any one was pleased to employ it upon what was common, which
remained a long while the far greater part, and is yet more than
mankind makes use of. Men, at first, for the most part, contented
themselves with what unassisted nature offered to their necessities: and though afterwards, in some parts of the world, (where
the increase of people and stock, with the use of money, had made
land scarce, and so of some value) the several communities settled
the bounds of their distinct territories, and by laws within themselves regulated the properties of the private men of their society,
and so, by compact and agreement, settled the property which la320
bour and industry began.

In Locke’s telling, the introduction of money was the crucial step in
the transition from the penurious state of nature to the creation of
human civilization. Before money, the benefit of one’s labor redounded only to oneself, so no one had any incentive to labor for
more than his own needs. With money, which places a permanent
and transferable value upon individual labor, people could work for
something beyond their individual needs and still realize a benefit.
Money enabled people, for the first time, to work in common. Thus,
according to Locke, the founding of cities and countries comes only
after money is introduced. Money is the essential precondition of
321
common human action. Locke’s earlier discussion established that
the state of nature preceding civil society is full of various evils: strife
and fear, violence and continual dangers. Only the coming together
in civil society, formed “by compact and agreement,” allows mankind
to escape those evils. Money enables man to form civil society, and
therefore to end the evil state in which man first finds himself.
In the Lockean view, the desire for money generates human industry, which provides comfort above the meager provisions of nature
and creates a common stock. The desire for money also generates
civil society, which enables common human action and provides security from the strife of the state of nature. In sum, money produces
319

Id. bk. II, ch. VIII, § 108.
Id. bk. II, ch. V, § 45 (emphasis added).
321
Cf. HOBBES, supra note 116, at 189 (“[M]oney . . . . passeth from man to man,
within the commonwealth; and goes round about, nourishing, as it passeth, every
part thereof.”).
320
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comfort, community, and peace. Locke reverses the Pauline teaching: in Locke’s account, the love of money is the root of all good.
Without the love of money, neither human comfort nor a peaceful
society would be possible. Locke challenges the Bible: the gospel, by
preaching against the love of money, leads not only to poverty but to
strife—to quarrels and contentions.
In Locke’s vision, God left the world to the “use of the industrious and rational,” not to the “fancy or covetousness of the quarrel322
some and contentious.”
The labor of individuals, rather than the
323
doctrines of priests or the greed of kings, entitles one to it. Returning to Locke’s original, misnumbered citation to the Book of Timo324
thy, one finds Paul’s instruction to “[f]ight the good fight of faith.”
Paul appropriates the phrase “good fight” from classical philosophy,
325
but he alters its meaning in the service of Christian faith. Citing the
verse as the “voice of reason,” Locke evokes the original meaning and
thereby makes his own “good confession”: Locke fights the “good
326
fight of faith” against faith on behalf of reason.
Locke’s rejection of biblical morality emerges in a particularly
remarkable fashion in the middle of his chapter on property. In Section 37, Locke explains:
[H]e who appropriates land to himself by his labour, does not lessen, but increase the common stock of mankind: for the provisions serving to the support of human life, produced by one acre
322

LOCKE, TWO TREATISES, supra note 48, bk. II, ch. V, § 34.
See supra note 302 and accompanying text.
324
1 Timothy 6:12 (King James) (“Fight the good fight of faith, lay hold on eternal
life, whereunto thou art also called, and hast professed a good profession before
many witnesses.”).
325
Victor Pfitzner explains that “in assimilating the metaphor to his purposes,”
Paul “fit this image which typifies the Greek spirit of self assertion, of human
achievement and endeavor, into his own theological system of thought with its emphasis on human impotence and divine grace.” VICTOR C. PFITZNER, PAUL AND THE
AGON MOTIF 6–7 (1967). Paul’s use of the phrase contains “little of the Greek spirit
of moral idealism.” Id. at 6. According to Pfitzner, “references to the typically hellenistic tone . . . (containing the idea of the good and the beautiful) are beside the
mark.” Id. at 185. For Paul, the fight is good and noble because it seeks God’s glory.
Id.; see also id. at 166 (“The original polemic contained in the adjective ‘good’ is
completely lost in I Tim 6:12 . . . .”); cf. HARPER COLLINS STUDY BIBLE 2232 n.1.18
(1993) (noting that “good fight” is “a traditional phrase in Hellenistic moral philosophy”); RAYMOND F. COLLINS, I & II TIMOTHY AND TITUS: A COMMENTARY 274 (2002)
(“The moralists used the images to speak of the struggle for the truth and the struggle of the moral life.”).
326
LOCKE, TWO TREATISES, supra note 48, bk. II, ch. V, § 37 (citing 1 Timothy 6:12).
The construction “professed a good confession,” which also appears in 1 Timothy
6:12, is likewise “common in Hellenistic uses of the agon motif.” COLLINS, supra note
325, at 163.
323
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of inclosed and cultivated land, are (to speak much within compass) ten times more than those which are yielded by an acre of
327
land of an equal richness lying waste in common.

Locke previously noted that he who “subdued, tilled, and sowed any
part of it, thereby annexed to it something that was his property,
which another had no title to, nor could without injury take from
328
him.” He proceeds, in Section 37, to contrast this individual with a
second human type: “Before the appropriation of land, he who gathered as much of the wild fruit, killed, caught, or tamed, as many of
329
the beasts, as he could” remained under the old “rule of propriety.”
Locke explains:
[I]f [the goods] perished, in his possession, without their due use;
if the fruits rotted, or the venison putrified, before he could
spend it, he offended against the common law of nature, and was
liable to be punished; he invaded his neighbour’s share, for he
330
had no right, farther than his use called for any of them.

Thus, “in the beginning” (Locke begins Section 37 with that phrase),
there were two human types: a laborer on the land, who increases the
common stock of mankind, and a gatherer of fruit or beasts, who
merely collects “the spontaneous products of nature” and thereby les331
sens the common stock.
The full implications of Locke’s theory of property come to light
in the following paragraph (Section 38), where Locke introduces the
biblical figures of Cain and Abel: “Thus, at the beginning, Cain might
take as much ground as he could till, and make it his own land, and
yet leave enough to Abel’s sheep to feed on; a few acres would serve
332
for both their possessions.”
The phrase “at the beginning” links
Cain and Abel to the two human types Locke introduced in the previous paragraph, the tiller of land and the gatherer of beasts. Note
that Cain tills the land and makes it “his own” while Abel’s sheep
333
simply feed. Abel has only propriety, not property, in them. Thus,
“in the beginning”—when the first appropriation of land created the
right of property and saved mankind from the penury of nature—

327

LOCKE, TWO TREATISES, supra note 48, bk. II, ch. V, § 37.
Id. bk. II, ch. V, § 32.
329
Id. bk. II, ch. V, § 37.
330
Id.
331
Id.; see also Genesis 1:1 (King James).
332
LOCKE, TWO TREATISES, supra note 48, bk. II, ch. V, § 38. Thanks to Steven
Lenzner for calling my attention to the significance of this passage.
333
Cf. id. bk. I, ch. IV, § 39 (noting “the difference between having dominion,
which a shepherd may have, and having full property as an owner”).
328
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Cain emerged as the great benefactor of mankind. Abel was his beneficiary. Locke continues:
[A]s families increased, and industry inlarged their stocks, their
possessions inlarged with the need of them; but yet it was commonly without any fixed property in the ground they made use of,
till they incorporated, settled themselves together, and built cities;
and then, by consent, they came in time, to set out the bounds of
their distinct territories, and agree on limits between them and
their neighbours; and by laws within themselves, settled the prop334
erties of those of the same society.

This other advance, the building of cities, humanity owes to Cain.
335
Cain, according to Genesis, was the founder of the first city. Cain’s
descendants, moreover, initiated those advances in the arts and
sciences that are for Locke the mark of human civilization, including
336
337
338
the raising of cattle, music, and metallurgy. The Bible treats the
progress of the arts and sciences with moral skepticism by attributing
339
these advances to Cain and his descendants. The biblical tradition
elevates piety over science, but Locke reverses this judgment. He
creates an alternative biblical narrative in which God commands hu340
man industry.
Locke does not mention Cain’s killing of Abel—
which the Bible takes to be the crucial moral point of the story—in
his chapter on property. In Locke’s retelling of the story, Cain is the
hero. While the Bible celebrates the line of Adam through Seth,
Locke’s theory provides a new foundation myth that celebrates Cain
341
as the founder of civilization and his line as mankind’s benefactors.
334

Id. bk. II, ch. V, § 38 (emphasis added).
Genesis 4:17 (King James) (“And Cain knew his wife; and she conceived, and
bare Enoch: and he builded a city, and called the name of the city, after the name of
his son, Enoch.”).
336
Id. 4:20.
337
Id. 4:21.
338
Id. 4:22.
339
See Leo Strauss, Progress or Return? The Contemporary Crisis in Western Civilization,
1 MOD. JUDAISM 17, 38 (1981).
340
Locke even recasts the biblical injunction to “[b]e fruitful, and multiply, and
replenish the earth, and subdue it,” Genesis 1:28 (King James), as a mandate for
scientific improvement. LOCKE, TWO TREATISES, supra note 48, bk. I, ch. IV, § 33
(identifying “this great and primary blessing of God Almighty, Be fruitful, and multiply,
and replenish the earth, which contains in it the improvement too of arts and sciences,
and the conveniences of life”); see THOMAS L. PANGLE, THE SPIRIT OF MODERN
REPUBLICANISM 142 (1988).
341
Locke writes that Cain had a right of property in his land “which another had
no title to, nor could without injury take from him,” LOCKE, TWO TREATISES, supra
note 48, bk. II, ch. V, § 32, while Abel had no rights of property, but was at risk of violating “the common law of nature, and was liable to be punished.” LOCKE, TWO
TREATISES, supra note 48, bk. II, ch. V, § 37. One might suspect that the killing, when
335
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The actual theory of property Locke provides has few direct implications for anyone now alive—that is, those who live in civil society
under a government. “[I]n governments, the laws regulate the right
of property, and the possession of land is determined by positive con342
stitutions,” according to Locke. One cannot, therefore, appropriate
343
from nature in civil society. Even outside of governments, if anyone
were to find themselves in the state of nature today, the “rule of propriety” does not act as much of a constraint after land has been appropriated and money implemented. The rule cannot be enforced
absent natural spoilage, and money does not spoil.
It is unclear whether anyone besides Adam, Eve, Cain, and Abel
ever lived under the “rule of propriety,” as they were the only ones to
live before the appropriation of land. Not only the enclosure of land
but also the introduction of money appears to have occurred early in
human history. The invention of money was a natural step following
the first appropriation:
He that gathered a hundred bushels of acorns or apples, had thereby a property in them, they were his goods as soon as gathered.
He was only to look, that he used them before they spoiled, else
he took more than his share . . . . And if he also bartered away
plums, that would have rotted in a week, for nuts that would last
good for his eating a whole year, he did no injury; he wasted not
the common stock; destroyed no part of the portion of goods that
belonged to others, so long as nothing perished uselesly in his
hands. Again, if he would give his nuts for a piece of metal,
pleased with its colour; or exchange his sheep for shells, or wool
for a sparkling pebble or a diamond, and keep those by him all
his life, he invaded not the right of others, he might heap up as
much of these durable things as he pleased; the exceeding of the

the brothers “were in the field,” Genesis 4:8 (King James)—that is, Cain’s field—was
an act of natural justice. Abel was a shepherd who offered of his flock in sacrifice to
God. Since this was before mankind was allowed to eat meat, see supra notes 249–53
and accompanying text, the meat surely spoiled without being consumed, which was
a violation of “the common law of nature” for which Abel “was liable to be punished.” In fact, the whole of Abel’s flock was liable to spoil before being consumed
because the consumption of meat was not permitted until after the Flood. Abel
made no “use” of any of his flock. Abel’s raising of sheep was an act of pure piety—
the sheep were sacrificed to God but not consumed by man—whereas Cain’s efforts
supported human life. See LOCKE, TWO TREATISES, supra note 48, bk. I, ch. XI, § 112.
342
LOCKE, TWO TREATISES, supra note 48, bk. II, ch. V, § 50.
343
Id. bk. II, ch. V, § 35 (“[I]n land that is common in England or any other country, where there is plenty of people under government, who have money and commerce, no one can inclose or appropriate any part, without the consent of all his fellow-commoners; because this is left common by compact, i.e. by the law of the land,
which is not to be violated.”).
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bounds of his just property not lying in the largeness of his pos344
session, but the perishing of anything uselesly in it.

It makes sense that people would seek to exchange their produce for
more durable goods, but Locke cannot be serious that people would
345
collect gold (“a little piece of yellow metal” ) only because of its
pleasing color—or diamonds because they sparkle—and not soon
346
realize that it could be used as a medium of exchange.
In addition to Cain and Abel, Locke cites other biblical figures
347
who lived “in that part of the world which was first inhabited.” Following Locke’s citations to Genesis, a reader learns that Abraham was
348
His nephew Lot “had flocks, and
“rich” in cattle, gold, and silver.
349
350
herds, and tents” and lived “in the cities of the plain.” Esau “took
his wives, and his sons, and his daughters, and all the persons of his
house, and his cattle, and all his beasts, and all his substance, which
351
he had got in the land of Canaan; and went into the country.”
There he founded a nation, Edom, and “kings . . . reigned in the land
352
of Edom, before there reigned any king over the children of Israel.”
In other words, from the beginning of human habitation, people
hoarded large stocks of durable goods. The early chapters of Genesis
also recount the use of money, trade between communities, and the
353
purchase of land. It would seem that money and “the desire of having more than man needed” are more permanent fixtures of human
life than Locke’s narrative initially suggests.
Yet Locke’s naturalistic account of the evolution of money provides a story whereby rights of ownership grow out of a natural law of
equality and an equitable distribution of property. This allows Locke
to ground his case for private property in Christian moral commitments to egalitarianism and charity, despite the inequality that re344

Id. bk. II, ch. V, § 46.
Id. bk. II, ch. V, § 37.
346
Compare id. bk. II, ch. V, § 46 (“[G]old, silver and diamonds, are things that
fancy or agreement hath put the value on, more than real use, and the necessary
support of life.”), with HOBBES, supra note 116, at 189 (“[S]ilver and gold have their
value from the matter itself.”).
347
LOCKE, TWO TREATISES, supra note 48, bk. II, ch. V, § 38.
348
Genesis 13:2 (King James).
349
Id. 13:5.
350
Id. 13:12.
351
Id. 36:6.
352
Id. 36:31.
353
E.g., id. 23:15–16 (“[T]he land is worth four hundred shekels of silver . . . .
[A]nd Abraham weighed to Ephron the silver, which he had named in the audience
of the sons of Heth, four hundred shekels of silver, current money with the merchant.”).
345
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sults. “[I]t is plain that men have agreed to a disproportionate and
354
unequal possession of the earth,” Locke concludes. In this way, unequal material accumulation becomes a matter not simply of efficien355
cy or necessity but of morals and justice. A natural individual right
to property thereby displaces the traditional Christian natural-law
356
view that property was held in stewardship for the common good.
In the Lockean story, few if any people lived under the original
natural law of distribution, which in any event was less an ethical
357
mandate to be followed than a harsh condition to be overcome.
Locke writes straightforwardly that his theory is about the origin of
property, how “labour, in the beginning, gave a right of property” ra358
ther than anything relevant to property today. This is on the order
of a creation myth. Locke’s theory establishes that
man, by being master of himself, and proprietor of his own person, and the actions or labour of it, had still in himself the great

354
LOCKE, TWO TREATISES, supra note 48, bk. II, ch. V, § 50 (“[They have] by a tacit
and voluntary consent, found out a way how a man may fairly possess more land than
he himself can use the product of, by receiving in exchange for the overplus gold
and silver, which may be hoarded up without injury to any one.”).
355
WARD, supra note 86, at 11 (“Locke transforms the idea of property, traditionally one of the key grounds for natural and civil inequality, into a basis for an understanding of moral relations rooted in equality.”); cf. THE FEDERALIST No. 10 (James
Madison) (arguing that “the first object of government” is “[t]he diversity in the faculties of men, from which the rights of property originate” and recognizing that
“[f]rom the protection of different and unequal faculties of acquiring property, the
possession of different degrees and kinds of property immediately results”).
356
According to Aquinas, “whatever certain people have in superabundance is
due, by natural law, to the purpose of succoring the poor . . . . [E]ach one is entrusted with the stewardship of his own things, so that out of them he may come to
the aid of those who are in need.” AQUINAS, supra note 134, pt. II–II, q. 66, art. 7; see
also MARY ANN GLENDON, RIGHTS TALK 34 (1991) (“The ideas of stewardship, of property as inherently entailing obligations, and of subsistence needs as taking precedence over property rights, became major themes of Christian ethics.”).
357
In the state of nature, a full share of property was available to all only because
man was too primitive to develop property in large amounts. See LOCKE, TWO
TREATISES, supra note 48, bk. II, ch. V, § 36 (“[N]o man’s labour could subdue, or
appropriate all; nor could his enjoyment consume more than a small part; so that it
was impossible for any man, this way, to intrench upon the right of another, or acquire to himself a property, to the prejudice of his neighbor.”). While Locke writes
that “the desire of having more than man needed . . . altered the intrinsic value of
things,” that value always “depend[ed] only on their usefulness to the life of man.”
Id. bk. II, ch. V, § 37. The introduction of money did not affect men’s natural desires
but simply made the accumulation of more things useful, and hence “desired.”
358
Id., bk. II, ch. V, § 45. This intention may help explain why “the moves by
which Locke extends his justification of property past its supposed beginnings are, as
many commentators have pointed out, less convincing than those beginnings themselves.” Kenneth R. Minogue, The Concept of Property and Its Significance, in NOMOS
XXII: PROPERTY 3, 10 (J. Ronald Pennock & John W. Chapman eds., 1980).
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foundation of property; and that, which made up the great part of
what he applied to the support or comfort of his being, when invention and arts had improved the conveniences of life, was per359
fectly his own, and did not belong in common to others.

Locke’s theory of property, which is ostensibly grounded upon the
Christian doctrine that God gave the earth to man in common, requires one to accept that man owns himself and the product of his
labor, that everything of value we enjoy comes from human invention, and that human ingenuity established the right to property in
the first place. Accepting Locke’s theory helps a Christian explain
private property without abandoning the belief that God gave the
world to man in common. But it also leads him to abandon a posture
of selfless devotion and to assert his individual self-interest in worldly
pursuits. Instead of pious reverence for divine creation, the Lockean
God commands industrious mastery over it. Instead of godliness and
glory, and their attendant quarrels and contentions, society’s mission
becomes the progress of industry and the arts.
C. Property and Autonomy
360

As noted above, Locke uses the word “property” imprecisely,
often employing the term to refer generally to a person’s “life, liberty
361
He does so advisedly, however, because the right to
and estate.”
property formalizes an individual’s sovereignty over his own person
and mind. By creating an inviolate sphere around each individual,
the innate right to hold material goods creates a “fence” to freedom,
362
just as freedom is a fence to life.
One cannot be enslaved before

359

LOCKE, TWO TREATISES, supra note 48, bk. II, ch. V, § 44.
See supra notes 75–80 and accompanying text.
361
E.g., LOCKE, TWO TREATISES, supra note 48, bk. II, ch. VII, § 87 (“[Man] hath by
nature a power, not only to preserve his property, that is, his life, liberty and estate,
against the injuries and attempts of other men; but to judge of, and punish the
breaches of that law in others.”); id. bk. II, ch. IX, § 123 (arguing that people form
society “for the mutual preservation of their lives, liberties and estates, which I call by
the general name, property”); id. bk. II, ch. XV, §173 (“By property I must be understood here, as in other places, to mean that property which men have in their persons
as well as goods.”).
362
See id. bk. II, ch. III, § 17 (noting that freedom is “the only security of my preservation; and reason bids me look on him, as an enemy to my preservation, who
would take away that freedom which is the fence to it”); id. bk. II, ch. VII, § 93
(“[W]hat security, what fence is there, in such a state, against the violence and oppression of this absolute ruler?”); cf. CHARLES FRIED, MODERN LIBERTY AND THE LIMITS
OF GOVERNMENT 94 (2007) (“[O]nly in a regime of secure entitlements can there be
liberty.”); Minogue, supra note 358, at 15–17 (arguing that the abolition of property
“requires the abolition of the will”).
360
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363

being dispossessed.
Moreover, because property cannot be taken
without consent, the right to property instantiates the requirement of
364
popular consent. An inviolate right of property ensures that no authority, religious or governmental, can have total sway over a person’s
life or liberty.
Moreover, the societal focus upon material gain will limit the inclination of governments to infringe those rights. In discussing his
labor theory of value, Locke digresses:
This shews how much numbers of men are to be preferred to
largeness of dominions; and that the increase of lands, and the
right employing of them, is the great art of government: and that
prince, who shall be so wise and godlike, as by established laws of
liberty to secure protection and encouragement to the honest industry of mankind, against the oppression of power and narrow365
ness of party, will quickly be too hard for his neighbors.

363

See LOCKE, TWO TREATISES, supra note 48, bk. II, ch. XV, § 174 (noting the inconsistency of slavery with property and distinguishing between political power, under which “men have property in their own disposal” and “despotical, over such as
have no property at all”); cf. RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, SUPREME NEGLECT: HOW TO REVIVE
CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTION FOR PRIVATE PROPERTY 1 (2008) (“The right to exclude
protects against both conscious aggression and accidental entry.”).
364
See LOCKE, TWO TREATISES, supra note 48, bk. II, ch. XI, § 138 (“The supreme
power cannot take from any man any part of his property without his own consent.”);
id. bk. II, ch. XI, § 139 (“[T]he prince, or senate, however it may have power to make
laws, for the regulating of property between the subjects one amongst another, yet
can never have a power to take to themselves the whole, or any part of the subjects[’]
property, without their own consent.”); id. bk. II, ch. XI, § 140 (“[G]overnments
cannot be supported without great charge, and it is fit every one who enjoys his share
of the protection, should pay out of his estate his proportion for the maintenance of
it. But still it must be with his own consent, i.e. the consent of the majority, giving it
either by themselves, or their representatives chosen by them.”); Harvey C. Mansfield, The Forms of Liberty, in DEMOCRATIC CAPITALISM? 1, 19 (Fred E. Baumann ed.,
1986) (“[T]he right to property becomes the visible, formal protection of the right to
consent.”).
365
LOCKE, TWO TREATISES, supra note 48, bk. II, ch. V, § 42; see also HOBBES, supra
note 116, at 185 (“[T]here have been commonwealths that having no more territory,
than hath served them for habitation, have nevertheless . . . increased their power,
partly by the labour of trading from one place to another, and partly by selling the
manufactures whereof the materials were brought in from other places.”). The advice to a prince echoes Machiavelli. According to Carnes Lord:
Machiavelli’s argument—the message that is intended to improve on
and eventually supplant the Christian message—may be summarized as
follows. Men’s natural desire to acquire must be respected as the premise of all political action. This desire cannot and should not be repressed. But it must be regulated so as to promote the common
good. . . . For Machiavelli, men freed from religious passions are
bound to love a prince who respects the necessities their own nature
imposes on them; yet they require an authority that is more immediate-
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A society oriented toward producing wealth through industry will not
be interested in warring against other peoples, nor will its government seek to oppress its people in the service of a religious doctrine
or factional interest. Property, like Locke’s theory of nature, limits
passions rooted in pride, honor, or glory and replaces the passionate
devotion to abstract ideals with the rational pursuit of material self366
interest.
Constraining political authority is also necessary because removing religious authority carries the risk of augmenting earthly power.
A prepolitical, natural right to property serves a key political purpose:
an “appeal to heaven” when neither earthly nor heavenly authority
can be trusted. Moreover, a public ideology of respect for rights of
private property orients political life to the interests of the citizenry
and the facilitation of commerce. If the purpose of government is
the protection of property, the state has no business risking blood
and treasure for the glory of the nation or of the church. Just as the
pursuit of material wealth channels public passions in a more benign
(but assertive) direction, so too does the state focus upon the more
mundane (but profitable) task of facilitating the industry of its citizens.
As Paul recognized, the desire for material gain undermines religious piety and loyalty to the higher powers. The pursuit of property promotes self-interest at the expense of passionate, selfless participation in public life. Locke makes it the central organizing principle
of society. Paul instructs Timothy to counsel the wealthy not to “trust
367
in uncertain riches, but in the living God,” while Locke reverses this
advice.
V. THE PROPERTY RIGHTS REGIME
To appreciate the change that Locke’s theory effected, one
might consider the understanding of ownership and the model of social life it displaced. Locke treats as self-evident the principle that the
individual and his capacity for ownership precedes civil society, but
such an idea could not have been obvious to someone familiar with

ly and visibly fearful than the Christian God to check their unruly natural passions.
Carnes Lord, Machiavelli’s Realism, in NICCOLO MACHIAVELLI, THE PRINCE 114, 120
(Angelo M. Codevilla ed., 1997). Locke seems to advance that argument in Two Treatises.
366
See supra notes 244–48 and accompanying text.
367
1 Timothy 6:17 (King James).
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the views of classical philosophy and the religious tradition that built
upon it.
A. Locke’s Departure from the Traditional View
The Lockean state of nature resembles the Hobbesian one in
368
that man, exposed to continual dangers, cannot enjoy property. Yet
from this premise Hobbes concludes, in contrast to the Lockean idea
of natural rights, that property is a product of social convention; it
does not exist without a government that creates property interests
369
and protects those interests. Aquinas similarly insists upon the conventional character of private property, holding that “the ownership
of possessions is . . . an addition [to the natural law] devised by hu370
man reason.”
That is, man does not own possessions by nature;
there is only a conventional rather than a natural right to property.
Hobbes, moreover, invokes the authority of Greek antiquity for the
idea that justice concerns the proper distribution of property by the
371
sovereign authority.
Classical debates about justice addressed the
372
arrangement of property interests.
In order to promote public
peace, many ancient laws enforced a particular distribution of prop373
erty and constrained the transfer of possessions.
368

See supra Part III.A.
HOBBES, supra note 116, at 186 (“[W]here there is no commonwealth, there is
. . . a perpetual war of every man against his neighbour; and therefore every thing is
his that getteth it, and keepeth it by force; which is neither propriety, nor community;
but uncertainty.”).
370
AQUINAS, supra note 134, pt. II–II, q. 66, art. 2. Accordingly, “the division and
appropriation of things which are based on human law” does not withstand the fact
that “whatever certain people have in superabundance is due, by natural law, to the
purpose of succoring the poor.” Id. pt. II–II, q. 66, art. 7.
371
HOBBES, supra note 116, at 186 (“[E]ven Cicero, a passionate defender of liberty, in a public pleading, attribueth all propriety to the law civil. . . . Seeing therefore
the introduction of propriety is an effect of commonwealth, which can do nothing but
by the person that represents it, it is the act only of the sovereign; and consisteth in
the laws, which none can make that have not the sovereign power. And this they well
knew of old, who called that [Nomos], that is to say, distribution, which we call law; and
defined justice, by distributing to every man his own.”).
372
“Some,” Aristotle observes, “hold that a fine arrangement concerning property
is the greatest thing: it is about this, they assert, that all factional conflicts arise.”
ARISTOTLE, THE POLITICS 1266a36–38, at 67 (Carnes Lord trans., Univ. of Chi. Press
1984) (350 B.C.E.).
373
See id. 1266b14–21, at 67–68 (“[T]he leveling of property does indeed have a
certain power to affect the political partnership. This was plainly recognized by some
of former times, as in the legislation of Solon, and others have a law which forbids
the acquisition of land in whatever amount one wishes. Similarly, some laws forbid
the sale of property, for example among the Locrians, where there is a law against
sale unless he has suffered manifest misfortune; and some attempt to preserve original allotments [of land in colonies].”).
369
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In the classical view, property is conventional and the city controls its accumulation and distribution in order to promote social
good or justice. Plato, for example, suggests that the ideal republic
374
would have no private property.
In Plato’s Laws, the Athenian
Stranger says that to avoid civil war a city must place an upper and a
375
lower bound on each citizen’s property holdings.
For citizens to
live happily, self-interest must be tempered by community ties. Accordingly, no private citizen should be allowed to hold gold or silver,
but only the coin which depends for its value upon the society in
376
which it is traded. The city ought to discourage “big profits made
through vulgar occupations, or usury, or other sorts of shameful
breeding” and instead rely upon “just the things that farming gives
and yields, and only as much of that as will not compel one because
of money-making to neglect those things which money is by nature
377
intended to serve—namely, the soul and the body.”
Plato argues
that property should be understood as held in common so that citi378
zens will make use of it for the common good.
Aristotle suggests
that property should be held privately but used in common in order
379
to avoid resentment and to build community ties.
374
In The Laws, the Athenian Stranger advocates common ownership as part of
the view that the best city would approach unity. See PLATO, THE LAWS OF PLATO 739c,
at 126 (Thomas L. Pangle trans., 1988) (360 B.C.E.). But see ARISTOTLE, supra note
372, 1261a16–18, at 56 (“[Y]et it is evident that that as it becomes increasingly one it
will no longer be a city. For the city is in its nature a sort of multitude.”).
375
See PLATO, supra note 374, 744d–e, at 132 (“We assert that if (as we presume)
the city must avoid the greatest illness, which has been more correctly termed ‘civil
war’ than ‘faction,’ then neither harsh poverty nor wealth should exist among any of
the citizens. For both these conditions breed both civil war and faction. It follows,
therefore, that the lawgiver must announce a limit for both conditions.”).
376
Id. 741e–742a, at 129.
377
Id. 743d, at 131.
378
Id. 740a, at 127 (“[T]he division of lands is to be understood in something like
the following way: each shareholder must consider his share to be at the same time
the common property of the whole city, and must cherish his land, as a part of the
fatherland, more than children cherish their mother.”).
379
ARISTOTLE, supra note 372, 1263a32–39, at 61 (“[I]n finely administered cities . . . . everyone has his own possessions, but he makes some of them useful to his
friends, and some he uses as common things. . . . It is evident, then, that it is better
for possessions to be private, but to make them common in use.”). Aquinas concurs
in this view:
Two things are competent to man in respect of exterior things. One is
the power to procure and dispense them, and in this regard it is lawful
for man to possess property. . . . The second thing that is competent to
man with regard to external things is their use. On this respect man
ought to possess external things, not as his own, but as common, so
that, to wit, he is ready to communicate them to others in their need.
AQUINAS, supra note 134, pt. II–II, q. 66, art. 2.
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Like the Athenian Stranger, Aristotle counsels that wealth
should be based on agriculture rather than commercial exchange, so
380
as to achieve sustenance but not luxury. “[A]ll who engage in business increase their money without limit,” Aristotle warns, “and since
that desire of theirs is without limit, they also desire what is produc381
tive of unlimited things.” Such unchecked desire threatens political
life because the other virtues—Aristotle mentions courage and military valor—are made “forms of expertise in business, as if this were
382
the end and everything else had to march toward it.”
In this way,
commerce may supplant the civic virtues and the life of the city.
Desires must be limited for the city to be stable and happy.
“[O]ne ought to level desires sooner than property,” writes Aristotle,
“but this is impossible for those not adequately educated by the
383
laws.”
Accordingly, Aristotle’s system of property requires “the
384
adornment of character and an arrangement of correct laws.” Similarly, Plato’s Athenian Stranger argues that a healthy society would
discourage the accumulation and exchange of property through a religious teaching that it is impious to “dishonor the well-measured
height and magnitude of property that you were allotted at the be385
ginning, by buying and selling it among yourselves.” The teaching
would be enforced through the prayers of priests and the penalties of
386
law.
Controlling material desire is necessary also to maintain the
387
proper attitude toward nature, Aristotle suggests.
Excessive economic activity promotes the idea that men cannot rely upon nature
for sustenance but must transform nature in order to produce wealth.
Aristotle analogizes economic activity to political rule: “just as politi380
Waller R. Newell, Oligarchy and Oikonomia: Aristotle’s Ambivalent Assessment
of Private Property 9 (paper delivered at the Western Political Science Association
annual meeting, April 1–3, 2010) (on file with author).
381
ARISTOTLE, supra note 372, 1257b34–1258a2, at 48.
382
Id. 1258a13–14, at 49. If “expertise in business” does not supply the desired
excess, Aristotle explains, men “attempt this in some other fashion, using each sort of
capacity in a way not according to nature. For it belongs to courage to produce not
goods but confidence; nor does this belong to military or medical expertise.” Id.
1258a9–12, at 48; see Newell, supra note 380, at 9 (describing Aristotle’s view that if
“household management were synonymous with open-ended acquisition, then all the
virtues . . . would have to be viewed as means to money-making and material pleasures”).
383
ARISTOTLE, supra note 372, 1266b30–31, at 68.
384
Id. 1263a22–23, at 60.
385
PLATO, supra note 374, 741b, at 128.
386
Id. 741c, at 128.
387
See Newell, supra note 380, at 10–12.
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cal expertise does not create human beings but makes use of them
after receiving them from nature,” so too does proper economic activity make use of what nature provides without attempting to alter
388
nature through human industry.
“[A]ccording to Aristotle,” explains Waller Newell, “we need to envision nature as providing for
our basic needs without an excessive emphasis on transforming na389
ture through human productive techniques.”
If nature were seen as lacking sufficient wealth to maintain human life, then human industry would need to intervene in nature to
bring it forth. This attitude, Aristotle suggests, has implications for
the political regime. If nature is deficient with respect to our material needs, human nature may be deficient with respect to our capacity
for political order. If men by nature lack sufficient virtue to achieve
self-government, then perhaps political leaders need to apply coer390
cive force to suppress human nature and achieve social peace.
It is better, argues Aristotle, to respect nature as the standard for
economic as well as political life. When nature provides sustenance,
the city can stress “the good life over mere life and need not be
391
preoccupied with scarcity and survival.”
When nature endows human beings with the capacity for virtue, the city can rely on institutions that foster citizenship instead of a sovereign power that employs
392
political terror to impose order.
In the Aristotlean view, excessive emphasis upon economic production promotes unchecked desire, crowding out civic life, and invites tyrannical government. Accordingly, the laws must set limits
upon the acquisition of property and foster such virtues as temper393
ance and liberality. Property arrangements were part of a system of
social conventions that aimed to harmonize the character of citizens
388
ARISTOTLE, supra note 372, 1258b22–25, at 49. “Expertise in business relative
to crops and animals is thus natural for all” while “expertise in exchange is justly
blamed since it is not according to nature but involves taking from others.” Id.
1258a37–1258b2, at 49. Moneylending is objectionable because “one’s possessions
derive from money itself and not from that for which it was supplied.” Id. 1258b3–4,
at 49.
389
Newell, supra note 380, at 10.
390
Id. at 11 (“If nature at large is too poor, we will have to stress economic productivity over purposeful use. If human nature is too vicious from the outset, if its
material is too poor or intractable, statecraft will have to stress compulsion based on
fear over relying on people to be capable of virtue if properly educated in an environment where the laws support virtue.”).
391
Id.
392
Id. at 11–12.
393
See ARISTOTLE, supra note 372, 1263a39–40, at 61 (“That [the citizens] become
such [as to use possessions in common]—this is a task peculiar to the legislator.”).
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394

with the good of the community.
In this way, the classical city
would exhibit a holistic way of life, what the Greeks called the politeia,
395
the particular regime of the society. “[L]aws should be enacted—
and all are in fact enacted—with a view to the regimes” of each politi396
cal community, according to Aristotle.
A democratic society, for
example, will arrange its laws differently than an aristocratic or oligarchic society. The regime finds expression in formal institutions
and procedures of government, which direct social activity toward its
397
distinctive way of life. The laws governing property are part of this
system and therefore aim to maintain a community and to shape the
398
character of the citizens who live according to that way of life.

394

See Stanley Ingber, Liberty and Authority: Two Facets of the Inculcation of Virtue, 69
ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 421, 431–32 (1995).
[The ancient Greeks] perceived people as gaining an understanding of
their lives from participation and interaction with others in a social
world that they jointly created. Consequently, the assumption was that
people were shaped by the institutions in which they functioned; the
central theme was connection rather than autonomy. Society preceded
the individual, for self-knowledge was possible only with reference to
the social matrix within which individuals found themselves. Institutions of social life, therefore, were important because they forged the
character of citizens. . . . A virtuous citizenry was one that had learned
from its institutions that the public good differed from the aggregate of
private preferences.
Id.
395
“[T]he Greek politeia . . . . is a term which comprises all the innumerable characteristics which determine [the] state’s peculiar nature, and these include its whole
economic and social texture as well as matters governmental in our narrower modern sense.” CHARLES HOWARD MCILWAIN, CONSTITUTIONALISM ANCIENT AND MODERN
26 (rev. ed. 1947). “Each constitution embodied a scheme of life, and tended, consciously or not, to bring the lives of those living under it into harmony with its particular scheme.” Id. at 27 (quoting 1 W.L. NEWMAN, THE POLITICS OF ARISTOTLE 210
(1887)); cf. STRAUSS, supra note 92, at 193 (identifying “regimes” as politeiai).
396
ARISTOTLE, supra note 372, 1289a14, at 119; id. 1289a9–14, at 119 (“[T]he varieties of the regimes—how many there are and in how many ways they are combined—should not be overlooked. And it is with this same prudence that one should
try to see both what laws are best and what are fitting for each of the regimes.”); id.
1282b8–11, at 103 (“Laws are necessarily poor or excellent and just or unjust in a
manner similar to the regimes [to which they belong].”).
397
Id. 1289a14–19, at 119 (“For a regime is an arrangement in cities connected
with the offices, [establishing] the manner in which they have been distributed, what
the authoritative element of the regime is, and what the end of the partnership is in
each case; and there are distinct laws among the things that are indicative of the regime—those in accordance with which the rulers must rule and guard against those
transgressing them.”).
398
Cf. Nomi Maya Stolzenberg, “He Drew a Circle That Shut Me Out”: Assimilation,
Indoctrination, and the Paradox of a Liberal Education, 106 HARV. L. REV. 581, 645 (1993)
(describing the classical view that “because the polity, to which all are subordinate, is
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“[V]irtue must be a care for every city,” according to Aristotle, because the city exists “not only for the sake of living but rather primari400
ly for the sake of living well” and “for the sake of noble actions, not
401
[only] for the sake of living together.”
Aristotle rejects the idea that the city exists merely in order to
protect property and to prevent each person from suffering injustice.
“[I]f it were for the sake of possessions that they participated and
joined together, they would share in the city just to the extent that
402
they shared in possessions.” If it were “for the sake of an alliance to
prevent their suffering injustice from anyone” or “for purposes of exchange and of use of one another,” political life would be reduced to
403
a defense pact and trade alliance. In such a polity, “law becomes a
compact and . . . a guarantor among one another of the just things,
404
but not the sort of thing to make the citizens good and just.” Each
citizen would be indifferent to the character of his fellows, insisting
only that fellow citizens “should not act unjustly toward one anoth405
er.” This may be a precondition for the city to flourish, but it is an
impoverished view of political life. “It is evident,” Aristotle concludes,
“that the city is not a partnership . . . for the sake of not committing
406
injustice against each other and of transacting business.”
Yet this
idea—that society is a compact for preventing harm and protecting
property—closely resembles the social contractarian views of Hobbes
407
and Locke.
And Aristotle’s view that nature provides for human
needs contradicts the Hobbesian and Lockean views of man’s natural
408
state.

governed by its citizens, the polity has a strong interest in the character of its citizens,
which can be maintained only through moral education”).
399
ARISTOTLE, supra note 372, 1280b7, at 98.
400
Id. 1280a31–32, at 98.
401
Id. 1281a3–4, at 99.
402
Id. 1280a25–27, at 98.
403
Id. 1281a34–35, at 98; cf. Newell, supra note 380, at 23 (“To foment, as do
Madison and the other founders, the limitless expansion of commerce over a limitless geographical extent would, for Aristotle, reduce politics to economics, with the
common good diluted and distended into something akin to a trade alliance.”).
404
ARISTOTLE, supra note 372, 1280b11–13, at 98.
405
Id. 1280b4, at 98.
406
Id. 1280b30–32, at 99.
407
See supra Part III.
408
See supra Part IV.
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B. An Antecedent and Paramount Right
What intervened between Plato and Aristotle, on the one hand,
and Hobbes and Locke, on the other, was the development of biblical
religion, culminating the Christian claim to universal religious
409
truth. A universal religion entailed the claim that there was “a right
410
antecedent and paramount to all government.”
The classical regime, by contrast, defined justice by reference to its own needs and
way of life without an antecedent standard of abstract right. Instead,
the classics recognized “a kind of natural right in the noble, wise, and
411
virtuous, to govern” in the interest of the polity.
As Locke puts it, “[T]he first beginners of commonwealths generally put the rule into one man’s hand, without any other express
limitation or restraint, but what the nature of the thing, and the end
412
of government required.” Locke describes a “golden age” that “had
more virtue, and consequently better governors” before “vain ambition, and amor sceleratus habendi, evil concupiscence, had corrupted
men’s minds into a mistake of true power and honour” and then
“ambition and luxury in future ages . . . taught princes to have dis413
tinct and separate interests from their people.” At that point, “men

409
Cf. Lord, supra note 365, at 119 (noting Machiavelli’s understanding that “the
political and military realities of the world had been decisively affected by the victory
of Christianity over paganism”).
410
LOCKE, TWO TREATISES, supra note 48, bk. I, ch. XI, § 126.
411
1 HOOKER, supra note 135, at 51 (citing ARISTOTLE, supra note 372, bks. III–IV).
412
LOCKE, TWO TREATISES, supra note 48, bk. II, ch. VIII, § 110.
413
Id. bk. II, ch. VIII, § 111. The Latin phrase amor sceleratus habendi is from Ovid’s Metamorphoses. See OVID, METAMORPHOSES 20 (Charles Martin trans., W.W. Norton & Co. 2005) (8 C.E.) (“shameful lusting after acquisitions”). Paul condemns
“evil concupiscence” in the Epistle to the Colossians. Colossians 3:5 (King James)
(“Mortify therefore your members which are upon the earth; fornication, uncleanness, inordinate affection, evil concupiscence, and covetousness, which is idolatry.”).
In Ovid’s account, amor sceleratus habendi is a corruption that emerges in the iron age,
late in mankind’s development, when “modesty, fidelity, and truth departed.” OVID,
supra, at 20. For Paul, evil concupiscence is a worldly trait that the faithful must discard in favor of “mercies, kindness, humbleness of mind, meekness, longsuffering.”
Colossians 3:12 (King James); see also id. 3:2 (“Set your affection on things above, not
on things on the earth.”). Locke’s “golden age” corresponds neither to that of Ovid
nor to the biblical time before the Fall because Locke indicates that there was government. LOCKE, TWO TREATISES, supra note 48, bk. II, ch. VIII, § 111 (noting “better
governors”). Indeed, Locke’s golden age contrasts sharply with that described by Ovid. Compare, e.g., OVID, supra, at 18–19 (noting that in the golden age men were
“[c]ontent with food acquired without effort”), with LOCKE, TWO TREATISES, supra
note 48, bk. II, ch. V, § 32 (arguing that God commanded mankind to labor). Locke
does not condemn worldly cravings as such but argues that the “desire of having
more than man needed,” when governed by reason and channeled toward industry,
promotes peace and comfort. See supra Part IV.B.

MENASHI.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2012]

CAIN AS HIS BROTHER’S KEEPER

2/7/2012 3:04 PM

257

found it necessary to examine more carefully the original and rights
414
of government” in order to “prevent the abuses of that power.”
In support of this chronology, Locke quotes a passage from Richard Hooker’s Of the Laws of Ecclesiastical Polity in which Hooker invokes Cicero to describe the older regime under which rulers were
415
“permitted unto their wisdom and discretion.”
Classical polities,
according to Cicero, selected as their rulers those men who were
“conspicuous for [their] virtue” and “whose reputation for justice was
416
high in the eyes of the people.” By Locke’s time, such natural leaders had been taught “to have distinct and separate interests from
their people” because they identified justice not with the needs of
417
their particular polity but with a universal religious teaching. From
the Christian perspective, justice cannot vary with the needs of the
418
regime but takes on the character of a fixed, eternal law.
Outside of public view, Locke was candid about his disapproval
of prevailing Christian beliefs and his distrust of religious authority.
He thought universal religion distorted and disrupted political life.
“[H]ad man kinde noe concernments but in this world [and] noe
apprehension of any being after this life,” Locke wrote in his journal,
people would “trouble their heads” with only “an enquiry into the
qualitys of the things in this mansion of the universe which hath fallen to their lott” and “direct[] their thoughts to the improvement of
such arts and inventions . . . as might best contribute to their contin419
uation in it with conveniency and delight.”
In an early, unpublished work, Locke observed that “those flames that have made such
havoc and desolation in Europe, and have not been quenched but
with the blood of so many millions, have been at first kindled with
414

LOCKE, TWO TREATISES, supra note 48, bk. II, ch. VIII, § 111.
1 HOOKER, supra note 135, at 52 n.3.
416
CICERO, DE OFFICIIS 211 (Walter Miller trans., McMillan Co. 1913) (44 B.C.E.),
available at http://books.google.com/books?id=H4u1pu9GpUUC (“If the people secured their end at the hands of one just and good man, they were satisfied with that;
but when such was not their good fortune, laws were invented, to speak to all men at
all times in one and the same voice.”).
417
LOCKE, TWO TREATISES, supra note 48, bk. II, ch. VIII, § 111.
418
“[O]n account of the uncertainty of human judgment . . . different people
form different judgments on human acts; whence also different and contrary laws
result,” writes Aquinas. AQUINAS, supra note 134, pt. II-I, q. 91, art. 4. “In order,
therefore, that man may know without any doubt what he ought to do and what he
ought to avoid, it was necessary for man to be directed in his proper acts by a law given by God, for it is certain that such a law cannot err.” Id.
419
JOHN LOCKE, Understanding, in AN EARLY DRAFT OF LOCKE’S ESSAY TOGETHER
WITH EXCERPTS FROM HIS JOURNALS 84, 85–86 (R.I. Aaron & Jocelyn Gibb eds., Clarendon Press 1936) (1677).
415
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coals from the altar”; he speculated “how much it might conduce to
the peace and security of mankind if religion were banished the
camp and forbid to take arms . . . [and] if men would suffer one
420
another to go to heaven every one his own way.” He left the reader
to judge “how much I say if such a temper and tenderness were
wrought in the hearts of men our author’s doctrine of toleration
421
might promote a quiet in the world.”
When claims to moral truth transcend the needs of the polity,
religious loyalties may undermine the social order. Against Aristotle’s
advice, justice will be measured according to supernatural standards
422
rather than according to nature.
Citizens will follow and become
dependent upon those authorities with privileged access to religious
423
teaching. Before universal religion, writes Hobbes:
420

JOHN LOCKE, From: ‘Question: Whether the Civil Magistrate May Lawfully Impose and
Determine the Use of Indifferent Things in Reference to Religious Worship. Answer: Yes’ (First
Tract on Government, 1660), in POLITICAL WRITINGS 141, 144–45 (David Wootton ed.,
2003).
421
Id. at 145. The full passage reads:
All those flames that have made such havoc and desolation in Europe,
and have not been quenched but with the blood of so many millions,
have been at first kindled with coals from the altar, and too much
blown with the breath of those that attend the altar, who, forgetting
their calling, which is to promote peace and meekness, have proved the
trumpeters of strife and sounded a charge with a ‘curse ye Meros’. I
know not therefore how much it might conduce to the peace and security of mankind if religion were banished the camp and forbid to take
arms, at least to use no other sword but that of the word and spirit, if
ambition and revenge were disrobed of that so specious outside of reformation and the cause of God, were forced to appear in their own
native ugliness and lie open to the eyes and contempt of all the world,
if the believer and unbeliever could be content as Paul advises to live
together, and use no other weapons to conquer each other’s opinions
but pity and persuasion (i Cor. 7), if men would suffer one another to
go to heaven every one his own way, and not out of a fond conceit of
themselves pretend to a greater knowledge and care of another’s soul
and eternal concernments than he himself, how much I say if such a
temper and tenderness were wrought in the hearts of men our author’s
doctrine of toleration might promote a quiet in the world, and at last
bring those glorious days that men have a great while sought after the
wrong way, I shall leave everyone to judge.
Id. at 144–45.
422
See supra notes 389–92 and accompanying text.
423
Carnes Lord describes the Machiavellian critique of Christianity:
For Machiavelli, Christianity is the extreme and therefore paradigmatic
case of successful fraud in politics. The Christian religion attempts to
hold men to impossible standards of behavior through the promise of
rewards and punishments that are (he assumes) impossible of delivery.
Yet the promise is highly effective—up to a point—in attaching men’s
loyalties to the princes of the Church and the secular rulers who de-
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[S]ubjects did not measure what was just by the sayings and
judgments of private men, but by the laws of the realm; nor were
they kept in peace by disputations, but by power and authority.
Yea, they reverenced the supreme power . . . . Therefore they little used, as in our days, to join themselves with ambitious and hellish spirits, to the utter ruin of their state. For they could not entertain so strange a fancy, as not to desire the preservation of that
424
by which they were preserved.
425

According to Hobbes, the classical regime is no longer possible. Instead, Hobbes advocates the sort of government from which Aristotle
recoils. He installs an absolute sovereign to coerce citizens and suppress human nature. He conceives of society as a compact, the sort of
polity that Aristotle describes as an alliance rather than a city: where
people do not “take thought that the others should be of a certain
quality, or that none of those coming under the compacts should be
unjust or depraved in any way, but only that they should not act un426
justly toward one another.”
Hobbes does not want to encourage
427
laws that “make the citizens good and just” because he wants to liberate both the government and its citizens from the prevailing religious standards of goodness and of justice. Accordingly, the Hobbesian sovereign enjoys absolute power unconstrained by Christian
ethics; the citizen pursues his individual self-interest freed from the
428
“dejection of mind” that Hobbes believes Christian teaching fosters.
What results are more assertive citizens and a more commanding
government, with correspondingly less influence for religious author-

pend on them. But the inevitable failure—or, better, the lack of evident success—in delivering heavenly goods and sanctions is in the end
doubly corrupting, and hence destructive, of sensible politics.
Lord, supra note 365, at 119.
424
THOMAS HOBBES, The Citizen: Philosophical Rudiments Concerning Government and
Society, in MAN AND CITIZEN (DE HOMINE AND DE CIVE) 87, 97 (Bernard Gert ed., Hackett
1991) (1651).
425
Indeed, Hobbes almost ridicules it. He writes of Cato, for example, that “animosity should so prevail instead of judgement, and partiality instead of reason, that
the very same thing which he thought equal in his popular state, he should censure
as unjust in a monarchical; other men perhaps may have leisure to admire.” Id. at
90.
426
ARISTOTLE, supra note 372, 1280b1–4, at 98; see supra notes 402–06 and accompanying text. According to Hobbes, men join society for the purpose of “getting
themselves out from [the] miserable condition of war.” HOBBES, supra note 116, at
129.
427
ARISTOTLE, supra note 372, 1280b11–13, at 98; see supra note 404 and accompanying text.
428
HOBBES, supra note 116, at 63; see supra note 244 and accompanying text.
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429

ity. Hobbes approximates the particularity of the classical polity, in
a way, because the sovereign enjoys supreme authority over his own
particular society and does not serve a larger religious mission. As “a
430
right antecedent and paramount to all government,” Hobbes replaces religious truth with a social contract that constitutes society and
the enforcement of which is the government’s paramount aim. Yet to
those who believe in universal moral truth, the Hobbesian system appears unacceptably relativistic.
Locke retains the eternal law as “a right antecedent and paramount to all government,” though he conflates the law of God with
the law of nature, the law of reason, and ultimately a scheme of natu431
ral rights to property. Antecedent to government is a contract that
aims not simply at self-preservation but at the vindication of property
rights that are given to man by nature and that all men are bound by
natural law to respect. Those rights remain paramount to all government: “[T]he law of nature stands as an eternal rule to all men,
legislators as well as others. The rules that they make for other men’s
actions, must, as well as their own and other men’s actions, be con432
formable to the law of nature . . . .”
The sovereign, therefore, still
defines justice by reference to an eternal law beyond his particular
society, but that law now commands attention to the well-being of his
people and prohibits their expropriation or abuse.
433
Locke provides some discretion to the legislator, but because
his system responds to the Christian demand for an antecedent and
paramount right, the laws correspond to a prepolitical moral code rather than the particular, present needs of the polity. Locke indicates
this shift when he distinguishes the “form of government” from the

429
Hobbes explains the derivation of his system from the connection between justice and ownership:
[W]hen I applied my thoughts to the investigation of natural justice, I
was presently advertised from the very word justice (which signifies a
steady will of giving every one his own), that my first enquiry was to be,
from whence it proceeded that any man should call anything rather his
own, than another man’s. . . . I found that this proceeded not from nature, but consent (for what nature at first laid forth in common, men
did afterwards distribute into several impropriations).
HOBBES, supra note 424, at 92–93.
430
LOCKE, TWO TREATISES, supra note 48, bk. I, ch. XI, § 126.
431
See supra notes 66–73 and accompanying text.
432
LOCKE, TWO TREATISES, supra note 48, bk. II, ch. XI, § 135.
433
See, e.g., id. bk. II, ch. V, § 50 (noting that “in governments, the laws regulate
the right of property, and the possession of land is determined by positive constitutions”).
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434

larger “commonwealth”—a distinction alien to the classical city.
For Locke, the term “commonwealth” signifies “not a democracy, or
any form of government; but any independent community, which the
435
Latines signified by the word civitas.” To “avoid ambiguity,” Locke
writes, “I crave leave to use the word common-wealth in that sense, in
which I find it used by king James the first; and I take it to be its ge436
nuine signification.” Locke’s reference to the usage of King James I
points toward the King James Bible, in which the word “common437
wealth” is a translation from the original Greek politeia. Moreover,
the Latin civitas, to which Locke also refers, expresses the meaning of
438
politeia.
When Locke uses “commonwealth,” therefore, he means to indicate the regime and to distinguish it from the government. The
commonwealth is the political community that is prior to and above
439
any established government.
The commonwealth, by the decision
of a majority of its members, may proceed to establish whatever “form
of government” it prefers. As examples of possible forms, Locke
440
mentions democracy, oligarchy, and monarchy.
According to

434

See supra notes 394–401 and accompanying text.
LOCKE, TWO TREATISES, supra note 48, bk. II, ch. X, § 133.
436
Id.
437
The word appears twice: in the Epistle to the Ephesians and in the apocryphal
Second Book of Maccabees.
See Ephesians 2:12 (King James), available at
http://bit.ly/scq7cS (“That at that time ye were without Christ, being aliens from the
commonwealth of Israel, and strangers from the covenants of promise, having no
hope, and without God in the world.”); 2 Maccabees 13:14 (King James), available at
http://bit.ly/ucsWpB (“So when he had committed all to the Creator of the world,
and exhorted his soldiers to fight manfully, even unto death, for the laws, the temple,
the city, the country, and the commonwealth, he camped by Modin.”).
438
H.G. LIDDELL & R. SCOTT, GREEK-ENGLISH LEXICON 1240 (9th ed. 1996).
439
LOCKE, TWO TREATISES, supra note 48, bk. II, ch. XIX, § 211 (“That which
makes the community, and brings men out of the loose state of nature, into one politic society, is the agreement which every one has with the rest to incorporate, and
act as one body, and so be one distinct common-wealth.”). Locke distinguishes between “the dissolution of the society and the dissolution of the government” in a recognizably modern way. Id. But that distinction is an innovation on the ancient regime in which
there is no remedy for an unconstitutional act short of actual revolution. . . . [S]uch revolution, when it occurs, is . . . a complete overturn
of the state’s institutions, a change in its whole way of life. . . . Aristotle
refers to such revolutions as a dissolution of the polities in which they
occur.
MCILWAIN, supra note 395, at 38.
440
LOCKE, TWO TREATISES, supra note 48, bk. II, ch. X, § 132. Locke identifies the
three basic regime types described by Aristotle—democracy, oligarchy, and monarchy—as “form[s] of government.” Id. In contrast to the Aristotlean view, Locke
435
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Locke, a society precedes the formation of a government and wields
political authority over whatever form of government it chooses to es441
tablish. This society delegates its legislative power to a government,
but if that power is ever forfeited “by the miscarriages of those in authority . . . it reverts to the society, and the people have a right to act
as supreme, and continue the legislative in themselves; or erect a new
442
form, or under the old form place it in new hands.” The commonwealth does not forfeit its authority; its purpose is to provide a com443
mon life for persons united by agreement and affection. It is separate from the particular forms of rule.
The distinction between “form of government” and “commonwealth” is recognizable as the modern liberal division between state
and society, and it is characteristic of liberal constitutionalism in
which the fundamental constitution of society constrains the authority of the government. This feature distinguishes the Lockean commonwealth from the classical regime, which viewed the city as a
444
whole.
But the commonwealth is not indifferent to the character of the
citizen. That character is shaped not by positive laws but by the natural law, the prepolitical social ethos that defines the distinctive virtues

maintains that the forms of government are subject to a superior authority: “the
whole power of the community,” which reposes in the majority. Id.
441
Id.; see also Jeremy Rabkin, Grotius, Vattel, and Locke: An Older View of Liberalism
and Nationality, 59 REV. POL. 293, 317 (1997) (“It is not a political constitution that
makes a nation, in Locke’s account, but the prior existence of a nation that makes it
possible to have a liberal constitution.”).
442
LOCKE, TWO TREATISES, supra note 48, bk. II, ch. XIX, § 243.
443
Id. (“The power that every individual gave the society, when he entered into it,
can never revert to the individuals again, as long as the society lasts, but will always
remain in the community; because without this there can be no community, no
common-wealth, which is contrary to the original agreement.”). The commonwealth
is formed not simply by political compact but by underlying social bonds. See id. bk.
II, ch. VIII, § 107 (“[T]hose, who liked one another so well as to join into society,
cannot but be supposed to have some acquaintance and friendship together, and
some trust one in another.”); see also Rabkin, supra note 441, at 306 (“Locke takes for
granted that a political society does rest on social affinities, which are prior to, and
deeper in some ways, than political consent to a particular government.”). The aim
of a commonwealth is “to be preserved one intire, free, independent society, to be
governed by its own laws.” LOCKE, TWO TREATISES, supra note 48, bk. II, ch. XIX,
§ 217. It dissolves only when it can no longer exist as an independent body, as when
a society is conquered and dispersed by a foreign power. Id. bk. II, ch. XIX, § 211.
444
See Keith Werhan, The Classical Athenian Ancestry of American Freedom of Speech,
2009 SUP. CT. REV. 293, 340 (noting that the “social compact theory of John Locke . . .
posits a strict separation between the state and its citizens” and therefore “projects a
mirror image of the ancient Greek relationship between the individual and the
state”).
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445

of the liberal regime. Commerce and property rights play a central
446
role in acculturating citizens toward the liberal virtues. In a Lockean society, citizens embrace norms of equality and consent, and they
447
celebrate industriousness, innovation, and material production.
These norms, based on a prepolitical natural law, provide a new stan448
dard of justice to govern social and political life.
C. Liberalism and the Social Virtues
The liberal regime is not indifferent to the character of its citi449
zens, as some have suggested, though its government may be. In

445

See generally PETER BERKOWITZ, VIRTUE AND THE MAKING OF MODERN LIBERALISM
(2000); Ronald Beiner, The Liberal Regime, 66 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 73 (1990).
Liberalism, no less than socialism, feudalism, or any other social order,
is a global dispensation, that is, a way of life that excludes other ways of
life. It does no good for the liberal to say that the liberal state is neutral
between the diverse life-choices of individuals. Is it neutral about continual growth and higher productivity? Is it neutral about scientific
progress? Is it neutral about the market as a means of maximizing consumer choices? The fact that all of this supposedly enhances the prerogatives of individuals in the design of their life-options is what actually defines this dispensation rather than showing that there is none.
Id. at 84–85.
446
See Suzanna Sherry, Without Virtue There Can Be No Liberty, 78 MINN. L. REV. 61,
71 (1993) (“[T]he right to property, which we would consider a paradigmatic individual right against the community, was viewed differently by the founding generation. . . .Land ownership both allowed citizens to cultivate virtue and independence,
and tied them to their communities.”); David Lewis Schaefer, Locke’s Troubling Legacy,
51 REV. POL. 125, 126 (1989) (book review).
[T]he Founders’ thought embodies a radically new conception of the
sort of virtue that good government requires, as compared with the
classical, and traditional Christian, views. While deemphasizing aristocratic pride, military courage, and Christian meditation or asceticism,
[the American Founders] . . . sought to encourage “moderation,” . . . .
Central to this goal was the promotion of commerce and of practically
oriented scientific innovation, not only for their effect in raising the
general standard of living, but, more importantly, as a means of encouraging a sober and rational patriotism, based on what Tocqueville
was later to term “the principle of self-interest rightly understood.”
Id.
447
See supra Part IV.
448
Locke’s “constitutionalism is not merely materialistic, for it does respect the
form of man in the state of nature. It is based on an original, perfect democracy of
men equal in the state of nature.” Mansfield, supra note 364, at 17; cf. LOCKE, TWO
TREATISES, supra note 48, bk. II, ch. II, § 12 (“[T]he municipal laws of countries . . .
are only so far right, as they are founded on the law of nature.”).
449
See, e.g., JOHN DIGGINS, THE LOST SOUL OF AMERICAN POLITICS: VIRTUE, SELFINTEREST, AND THE FOUNDATIONS OF LIBERALISM 16 (1984) (“Between Machiavelli and
Locke lies the dilemma of American politics. Classical political philosophy aims to
discipline man’s desires and raise him far above his vulgar wants; liberalism promises
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Locke’s view, norms and social attitudes are a greater constraint on
human behavior than positive laws or even religious teaching. In An
Essay Concerning Human Understanding, Locke contrasts three alternative “moral rules” that may lead men to keep their compacts: the
Christian, based upon divine command; the Hobbist, based upon the
civil law; and that of “the old heathen philosophers,” based upon vir450
tue.
Locke argues that the Christian and Hobbist alternatives are
unreliable. Men outwardly profess allegiance to rules that are “sacred,” Locke writes, but their actions demonstrate that such rules do
451
little to govern them.
Civil law is also unreliable: “Ignorance or
doubt of the law, hopes to escape the knowledge or power of the
lawmaker, or the like, may make men give way to a present appe452
tite.”
Locke’s discussion supports the classical alternative: the view that
each society must cultivate its own necessary virtues and shape individual conscience. Men may “come to assent to several moral rules,
and be convinced of their obligation,” Locke writes, “from their education, company, and customs of their country; which persuasion,
however got, will serve to set conscience on work, which is nothing
else but our own opinion or judgment of the moral rectitude or prav453
ity of our own actions.”
Even those who are not so persuaded remain subject to social pressure: “men may sometimes own rules of
morality which, in their private thoughts, they do not believe to be
true, only to keep themselves in reputation and esteem amongst

to realize desires and satisfy wants. The first is more noble, the second more attainable.”); MICHAEL J. SANDEL, DEMOCRACY’S DISCONTENT: AMERICA IN SEARCH OF A PUBLIC
PHILOSOPHY 262 (1996) (“[B]y abandoning the ambition of inculcating certain habits
and dispositions, [liberalism] denied government a stake in the moral character of
its citizens and affirmed the notion of persons as free and independent selves.”);
Linda R. Hirshman, The Virtue of Liberality in American Communal Life, 88 MICH. L. REV.
983, 1002 (1990) (noting that Locke “is considered the most influential thinker to
have separated issues of personal virtue from political philosophy” such that for
Locke the character of the citizen “loses its status as an integrated part of a whole
concept of justice” in contrast to the classical view that “the virtues are all encompassed in the broad justice of obedience to the laws of a good state”). But see LOCKE,
HUMAN UNDERSTANDING, supra note 92, at 29 (“God ha[s], by an inseparable connexion, joined virtue and public happiness together, and made the practice thereof necessary to the preservation of society . . . .”).
450
LOCKE, HUMAN UNDERSTANDING, supra note 92, at 29.
451
Id. (noting that “self-interest and the conveniences of this life make many men
own an outward profession” of sacred rules, but their “actions sufficiently prove that
they very little consider the Law-giver that prescribed these rules”).
452
Id. at 33.
453
Id. at 30.
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454

those who are persuaded of their obligation.” Men will not disown
a law “where fear of shame, censure, or punishment carries the mark
455
of some awe it has upon them.” Different societies exert different
456
pressures and encourage different moral rules and virtues.
Locke later makes his view of morality more explicit when he
contrasts three types of law: the divine law, the civil law, and the “law
of reputation or opinion,” which Locke also calls “[p]hilosophical
457
law, the measure of virtue and vice.” In explaining the philosophical law, Locke discounts the religious conception of virtue and vice;
he argues that virtue varies with the needs and mores of each society:
“Virtue” and “vice” are names pretended and supposed everywhere to stand for actions in their own nature right and wrong
. . . . But yet, whatever is pretended, this is visible, that these
names, “virtue” and “vice,” in the particular instances of their application, through the several nations and societies of men in the
world, are constantly attributed only to such actions as in each
country and society are in reputation or discredit. . . . Thus the
measure of what is everywhere called and esteemed “virtue” and
“vice,” is this approbation or dislike, praise or blame, which, by a
secret and tacit consent establishes itself in the several societies,
tribes, and clubs of men in the world, whereby several actions
come to find credit or disgrace amongst them, according to the
458
judgment, maxims, or fashions of that place.

Locke addresses the criticism that private censure cannot properly be
termed a “law.” According to Locke, man’s sociality, his desire for social acceptance and esteem, is stronger than the dictates of otherworldly religion or positive law:
[H]e who imagines commendation and disgrace not to be strong
motives to men to accommodate themselves to the opinions and
rules of those with whom they converse, seems little skilled in the
nature or history of mankind: the greatest part whereof he shall
454

Id. at 32.
Id.
456
LOCKE, HUMAN UNDERSTANDING, supra note 92, at 29 (“[T]he great variety of
opinions concerning the moral rules . . . are to be found among men according to
the different sorts of happiness they have a prospect of, or propose to themselves.”).
Locke writes that “there is scarce that principle of morality to be named, or rule of
virtue to be thought on . . . which is not, somewhere or other, slighted and condemned by the general fashion of whole societies of men, governed by practical opinions and rules of living quite opposite to others.” Id. at 32.
457
Id. at 280.
458
Id. at 280–81; see also id. at 281 (“Virtue is everywhere that which is thought
praiseworthy; and nothing else but that which has the allowance of public esteem is
called ‘virtue.’ . . . This is the language of the heathen philosophers, who well understood wherein their notions of virtue and vice consisted.”).
455
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find to govern themselves chiefly, if not solely, by this law of fashion; and, so they do that which keeps them in reputation with
their company, little regard the laws of God or the magistrate. . . .
He must be of a strange and unusual constitution, who can content himself to live in constant disgrace and disrepute with his
own particular society. Solitude many men have sought, and been
reconciled to: but nobody that has the least thought or sense of a
man about him, can live in society under the constant dislike and
ill opinion of his familiars, and those he converses with. This is a
burden too heavy for human sufferance: and he must be made up
of irreconcilable contradictions, who can take pleasure in company, and yet be insensible of contempt and disgrace from his com459
panions.

To Locke, credit and reputation represent no less than “[t]he principal spring from which the actions of men take their rise, the rule
460
they conduct them by, and the end to which they direct them.”
For Locke, it is the law of reputation or opinion that determines
the character of society: “this makes merchants in one country and
soldiers in another; this puts men upon school divinity in one country, and physic or mathematics in another; this cuts out the dresses
for the women, and makes the fashions for the men; and makes them
461
endure the inconveniences of all.”
Thus, despite his insistence in
Two Treatises that government must be by “established standing
462
laws,” Locke recognizes that he who “would govern the world well,
had need consider rather what fashions he makes than what laws; and
463
to bring anything into use he need only give it reputation.”
In Two Treatises, Locke follows his own advice. By bringing industry into social repute, and sanctifying property with natural law,
Locke establishes a new commercial regime in place of traditional society. Through his theory of property, he obliges cities and palaces to
459
Id. at 282–83. Locke’s argument recalls Aristotle’s observation that “man is by
nature a political animal.” ARISTOTLE, supra note 372, 1253a2–3, at 37; see also LOCKE,
HUMAN UNDERSTANDING, supra note 92, at 282–83 (“[N]o man escapes the punishment of their censure and dislike who offends against the fashion and opinion of the
company he keeps, and would recommend himself to.”).
460
JOHN LOCKE, Credit, Disgrace, in POLITICAL WRITINGS, supra note 420, at 236, 236
(1678)[hereinafter LOCKE, Disgrace].
461
Id.; see also id. at 237 (“Where power, and not the good exercise of it, gives reputation, all the injustice, falsehood, violence and oppression that attains that [i.e.
power] goes for wisdom and ability. Where love of one’s country is the thing in credit, there we shall see a race of brave Romans; and when being a favourite at court
was the only thing in fashion, one may observe the same race of Romans all turned
flatterers and informers.”).
462
LOCKE, TWO TREATISES, supra note 48, bk. II, ch. IX, § 131; id. ch. XI, § 137.
463
LOCKE, Disgrace, supra note 460, at 237.
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464

“keep right by following nature.”
He establishes a civil religion,
based upon his own creation myth and couched in the language of
Christian natural law, that will unite the interests of governors and
465
citizens and that will liberate minds from subservience to priests.
Locke’s new law of reputation or opinion, however, is antecedent to
government and therefore governs the lawgivers as well as citizens.
In this way, Locke applies a classical understanding of politics modified to meet the challenge posed by Christianity.
VI. CONCLUSION: LOCKE AND LIBERAL CONSTITUTIONALISM
The Greek politeia is often called the “constitution” of the clas466
sical city because it constitutes the polity. “For Aristotle, the constitution is more fundamental than the laws, not as a higher law that
can be appealed to against the laws but as the fundamental political
467
fact that shapes the laws.”
The ancient constitution encompassed
the whole social regime, including social bonds and mores as well as
468
the form of government. By separating the regime from the form
of government—making the regime prior to the government—Locke
introduces the recognizably modern idea of “constitutionalism” as a
469
constraint on government.
Locke’s constitutionalism identifies a
fundamental law, a scheme of prepolitical natural rights, that constrains government action and ordinary legislation. But Locke also
appreciates the emphasis upon social mores and character formation
470
that characterized the classical regime. The Lockean idea of prop464

LOCKE, TWO TREATISES, supra note 48, bk. I, ch. VI, § 58.
Cf. Lord, supra note 365, at 119–20 (arguing that Machiavelli offered a “countertheology” that “is intended to improve on and eventually supplant the Christian
message”). Lord argues that Machiavelli’s rhetoric “served the serious purpose of
preparing the ground for the emergence of a public philosophy or ideology that
could contend with Christianity as the basis of modern politics,” but he suggests that
more “direct historical impact” was achieved by “John Locke, who couched an arguably Machiavellian teaching in the language of Christian natural law.” Id. at 120–22.
466
See MCILWAIN, supra note 395, at 26 (“Of all the varied meanings of which our
word ‘constitution’ is susceptible, the Greek politeia conforms to one of the most ancient. . . . It is a purely descriptive term, and as inclusive in its meaning as our own
use when we speak generally of a man’s constitution or of the constitution of matter.”).
467
Nathan Tarcov, Ideas of Constitutionalism Ancient and Modern, in THE SUPREME
COURT AND THE IDEA OF CONSTITUTIONALISM 11, 17 (Steven Kautz et al. eds., 2009).
468
See supra notes 394–401 and accompanying text.
469
See WARD, supra note 86, at 115 (“Locke appears to have envisioned something
like the liberal principle of constitutional supremacy over ordinary legislative power.”).
470
See supra Part V.C.; cf. Tarcov, supra note 467, at 14 (“Insofar as Platonic constitutionalism depends on character and education as well as on countervailing institu465
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erty rights undergirds not only a legal regime but also a sort of social
471
ethos.
The connection between property and political liberty is a signif472
icant aspect of the American legal tradition. Property rights protect
not only the person of the individual against the state, but also his
conscience against established orthodoxy. “Can it be reasonable that
he that cannot compel me to buy a house should force me his way to
473
venture the purchase of heaven?” asks Locke. “That he that cannot
in justice prescribe me rules of preserving my health should enjoin
474
me methods of saving my soul?” The right to control objects in the
external world is the formal embodiment of the individual’s sovereignty over his own person and mind. By creating a fence around
each individual, property “serves as a metaphor for liberalism—a political regime organized around rights, to keep off-limits from the
government the power to compel citizens to follow any one contesta475
ble theory of virtue.” Madison illustrates the connection in Federalist 10 when he argues that “the first object of government” is the protection of the “diversity in the faculties of men, from which the rights
476
of property originate.” Protecting property is ultimately about pro-

tions to preserve rule of law and prevent tyranny, it thereby depends on cultural character-formation.”).
471
As legal scholars have recognized, “[T]he recognition of legal rights in property structures social relations.” JOSEPH WILLIAM SINGER, ENTITLEMENT: THE PARADOXES
OF PROPERTY 14 (2000). See generally Jane B. Baron, The Contested Commitments of Property, 61 HASTINGS L.J. 917 (2010).
472
See, e.g., Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 176 (1979) (describing
“one of the most essential sticks in the bundle of rights that are commonly characterized as property—the right to exclude others”); Lynch v. Household Finance Corp.,
405 U.S. 538, 552 (1972) (“[A] fundamental interdependence exists between the
personal right to liberty and the personal right in property. Neither could have
meaning without the other. That rights in property are basic civil rights has long
been recognized.”); United States v. Perkins, 163 U.S. 625, 627 (1896) (“[T]he laws
of all civilized States recognize in every citizen the absolute right to his own earnings,
and to the enjoyment of his own property, and the increase thereof, during his life,
except so far as the State may require him to contribute his share for public expenses.”). See generally JAMES W. ELY, THE GUARDIAN OF EVERY OTHER RIGHT: A
CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF PROPERTY RIGHTS 26 (1998) (“[T]he protection of property ownership was an integral part of the American effort to fashion constitutional
limits on governmental authority.”).
473
JOHN LOCKE, An Essay Concerning Toleration (1667), in POLITICAL WRITINGS, supra
note 420, at 186, 188–89 [hereinafter LOCKE, Toleration].
474
Id.
475
Eric R. Claeys, Virtue and Rights in American Property Law, 94 CORNELL L. REV.
889, 892 (2009).
476
THE FEDERALIST No. 10 (James Madison).
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tecting the faculties of mind that allow one to acquire it. As Margaret Jane Radin has observed, “[T]o achieve proper selfdevelopment—to be a person—an individual needs some control over
resources in the external environment. The necessary assurances of
478
control take the form of property rights.”
While certain “object relations,” as Radin puts it, are necessary to
479
“self-constitution,” the institution of property itself and the cultural
480
norms it fosters shape the character of citizens on a social scale.
When Tocqueville visited America, he concluded that “[t]here is no
country in the world where the sentiment for property shows itself
more active and more restive than in the United States,” and the jealousy with which Americans held their property made them resist political upheaval that would “threaten to alter the constitution of
481
goods.”
In this way, Lockean rights of property conduce to social
477

Kenneth Minogue notes “a significant continuity between property understood
as ownership of productive capital and property understood as personal characteristics, a point that haunts the literature and is recognized in Locke’s famous remark
that ‘Every man has a property in his own person.’” Minogue, supra note 358, at 12;
see also E.J. Hundert, The Making of Homo Faber: John Locke Between Ideology and History, 33 J. HIST. IDEAS 3, 9 (1972) (describing Locke’s view that “[o]ne’s property was
the extension of self by virtue of the injection of personality into nature through
work”).
478
Margaret Jane Radin, Property and Personhood, 34 STAN. L. REV. 957, 957 (1982).
479
Id. at 967.
480
See William M. Sullivan, Institutions as the Infrastructure of Democracy, in NEW
COMMUNITARIAN THINKING: PERSONS, VIRTUES, INSTITUTIONS, AND COMMUNITIES 170,
173–74 (Amitai Etzioni ed., 1995).
As Tocqueville saw it, it was the institutional order, the patterns of
normative, sanctioned interaction themselves, which worked through
daily life to shape the imagination and character of the citizens. That
is, institutionalized mores linked market, state, and civil society into the
mutually reinforcing whole Tocqueville identified as American democracy. Besides individual consciousness and social interaction, human
life also entails shared, socially sanctioned patterns of purpose. These
are the institutional forms of family, school, religious congregation,
business firm, and club, which structure the patterns of everyday life.
Id. Like Locke, Tocqueville emphasized social attitudes. In a democratic society,
“public favor seems as necessary as the air that one breathes, and to be in disagreement with the mass is, so to speak, not to live,” he writes. ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE,
DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 615 (Harvey C. Mansfield & Delba Winthrop eds., Univ. of
Chi. Press 2000) (1835). “[The mass] does not need to use the laws to bend those
who do not think like it. It is enough for it to disapprove of them.” Id.; see supra Part
V.C.
481
TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 480, at 610. “[T]heories that are revolutionary by
their nature, in that they cannot be realized except by a complete and sometimes
sudden change in the state of property and of persons, are infinitely less in favor in
the United States than in the great monarchies of Europe,” Tocqueville observes. Id.
“If a few men profess them, the mass repels them with a sort of instinctive horror.”
Id.
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peace because people view politics in terms of their material wellbeing. This political culture developed from the Lockean story about
the origins of property and the pre-political nature of property rights.
The idea of property in American life began “not with Locke the philosopher or Locke the political theorist, but with Locke the story482
teller,” as Mary Ann Glendon has written.
“Property acquired its
near-mythic status in our legal tradition, in part, because the language and images of John Locke played such a key role in American
483
thinking about government.”
While a Lockean conception of property helps to entrench political liberalism and to prevent authoritarianism or theocracy, it may
also undermine the spirit of community that was central to the clas484
sical regime.
The idea of the Lockean social contract “underplays
the significance of belonging to a community,” writes Hanoch Da485
gan. The social vision it inspires “perceives our membership [in a
political community] in purely instrumental terms, and insists that
our mutual obligations as members of such a community should be
derived either from our consent or from their being to our advan486
tage.”
This is not quite Locke’s position; Locke recognizes and relies
487
He places the inculcation of “moral virupon human sociability.
tues and vices” beyond the state because the property-rights regime
fosters the necessary virtues through acculturation and by linking social arrangements to self-interest. Lawmakers may safely “leave the
practice of them entirely to the discretion and consciences of his
people” because the moral virtues and vices are “a means to settle or
disturb men’s peace and properties” and, through the formal institu488
tions of property, to promote “the weal of the public.”
But the
property-rights regime promotes certain social norms at the expense
of others, such as an orientation toward commerce and individualism
489
rather than religious piety and community.
As Glendon argues,
482

GLENDON, supra note 356, at 20–21.
Id.
484
See supra Part V.A.
485
Hanoch Dagan, Takings and Distributive Justice, 85 VA. L. REV. 741, 771 (1999).
486
Id. at 771–72.
487
See supra Part V.C.
488
LOCKE, Toleration, supra note 473, at 195; cf. TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 480, at
509 (“The particular taste that men of democratic centuries conceive for material
enjoyments is not . . . . the enemy of regular mores; for good mores are useful to
public tranquility and favor industry.”).
489
See supra Part IV.B. Social scientists have long explained the emergence of capitalist society in the West in terms of acculturation. Max Weber, for example, ar483
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American society conceives of its principles and interests in terms of
490
individual rights.
In her account, the dominance of “rights talk”
491
undermines community, responsibility, and public deliberation.
The moral virtues associated with liberal capitalist society, Daniel
Bell has argued, have been eroded by the working of capitalism it492
self.
The “acquisitive impulses” unleashed by consumer culture
undermined the moral character marked by “the sober, prudential,
493
delayed gratification of the Protestant ethic.”
The “prudential
494
bourgeois culture” surrendered to “cultural modernism.” Whereas
religious tradition emphasized the need to restrain human desires
495
and provided continuity with the past, capitalist culture unleashed a
496
ceaseless quest for new satisfactions.

gued that Protestantism promoted capitalism indirectly: “[not] by encouraging, let
alone inventing, the pursuit of wealth, but by defining and sanctioning an ethic of
everyday behavior that conduced to economic success.” David Landes, Culture Makes
Almost All the Difference, in CULTURE MATTERS: HOW VALUES SHAPE HUMAN PROGRESS 2,
11 (Lawrence E. Harrison & Samuel P. Huntington eds., 2000); see also DANIEL BELL,
THE CULTURAL CONTRADICTIONS OF CAPITALISM 287–88 (rev. ed. 1996) (1976) (“The
impulse to profit and gain is found in all societies, but only in the West did capitalism, as a rational organization of production and the calculable balance sheet of
costs, take hold and develop in the extraordinary way that it did.”).
490
GLENDON, supra note 356, at 31 (“In America, when we want to protect something, we try to get it characterized as a right. . . . [W]hen we specially want to hold
on to something (welfare benefits, a job), we try to get the object of our concern
characterized as a property right.”); id. at 40 (“Remarkably, the property paradigm,
including the old language of absoluteness, broods over this developing jurisprudence of personal rights.”).
491
See id. at 76–171. According to Tocqueville, modern democracy “suggests to
men very dangerous instincts . . . it tends to isolate them from one another and to
bring each of them to be occupied with himself alone.” TOCQUEVILLE, supra note
480, at 419; id. at 484 (“Thus not only does democracy make each man forget his ancestors, but it hides his descendants from him and separates him from his contemporaries; it constantly leads him back toward himself alone and threatens finally to confine him wholly in the solitude of his own heart.”).
492
BELL, supra note 489, at 21 (“[T]he Protestant ethic was undermined . . . by capitalism itself.”).
493
Id. at 295. Capitalism as it developed “continued to demand a Protestant ethic
in the area of production—that is, in the realm of work—but to stimulate a demand
for pleasure and play in the area of consumption. The disjunction was bound to widen.” Id. at 75.
494
Id. at 295.
495
Id. at 157.
496
Id. at 34 (“[S]ociety . . . has provided a market which eagerly gobbles up the
new, because it believes it to be superior in value to all older forms. Thus, our culture has an unprecedented mission: it is an official, ceaseless quest for new sensibility.”). According to Bell, “The cultural, if not moral, justification of capitalism has
become hedonism, the idea of pleasure as a way of life.” Id. at 21–22.
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Given Locke’s presentation of property as an alternative to religious devotion and social control, it should not be surprising that a
Lockean regime would erode religious commitments and undermine
social ties. Yet Bell points to a possible flaw in the Lockean design.
The formal institutions of property and economic exchange call forth
particular norms and character traits, but individuals participate in
the system because of the rewards they expect to receive, namely, “the
enjoyment of life and liberty, with the means of acquiring and pos497
sessing property, and pursuing and obtaining happiness and safety.”
Because society is a means to achieving these individual ends, the end
of society is separate from the social good or respect for social institutions and forms. “The trouble with modern constitutionalism,” explains Harvey Mansfield, “is that civil liberties and manmade constitutional forms are made subordinate to the natural end that comprises
life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. They are means to that end,
not united with it; the form is not united with the end, as in Aris498
totle’s constitutionalism.” As Tocqueville noted, people in modern
democracies tend to mistrust institutional formalities and “throw
499
themselves impetuously toward the object of each of their desires.”
If the citizen of the Lockean regime promotes social peace, he does
so in pursuit of the rights of man, not in performing the duties of a
citizen. His society is organized above all for industry rather than po500
litical life.
These effects were not unforeseen. Locke displaced religious orthodoxy with human industry, and the paramount law with fundamental rights. The erosion of community ties that this change effected was also a liberation from established authority. Locke did not
497

Virginia Declaration of Rights (1776).
Mansfield, supra note 364, at 18.
499
TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 480, at 669 (“Men who live in democratic centuries
do not readily comprehend the utility of forms; they feel an instinctive disdain for
them.”). By way of illustration, Edward Banfield observes that Americans pay homage to doctrines of limited government, but “they are also accustomed to thinking
that government ought to serve the people in whatever ways they want.” EDWARD C.
BANFIELD, Federalism and the Dilemma of Popular Government, in HERE THE PEOPLE RULE
23, 24 (2d ed. 1991). See generally Irving Kristol, The Disaffection from Capitalism, in
CAPITALISM AND SOCIALISM: A THEOLOGICAL INQUIRY 15, 16 (Michael Novak ed., 1979)
(“No previous society or civilization—and certainly no church . . . had ever said that
commercial transactions should shape the society. They believed rather that society
should regulate and shape commercial transactions.”).
500
See 1 KARL MARX, CAPITAL 358 n.3 (Frederick Engels ed., Samuel Moore & Edward Aveling trans., Charles H. Kerr 1921) (1867) (“Strictly, Aristotle’s definition is
that man is by nature a town-citizen. This is quite as characteristic of ancient classical
society as Franklin’s definition of man, as a tool-making animal, is characteristic of
Yankeedom.”).
498
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explicitly reject Christian teaching, to be sure. He wanted his readers
to accept his arguments as an interpretation of authoritative religious
teaching in order to achieve social change without sparking a religious backlash. Some readers might note his carefully expressed objections, but others, disposed to accept what appear to be conventional religious views, would adopt Locke’s argument and it would
become, as it eventually did, the mainstream view. This is how a civic
religion develops, Locke recognized. “The greatest part cannot
501
know, and therefore they must believe,” he writes.
Accordingly,
Locke aimed not to overthrow the prevailing faith, but to change it in
the direction of a more humane ethics. “[C]ertainly propriety of
speech is necessary in a discourse of this nature,” Locke writes in Two
502
Treatises.
The author seeks to appear as consistent with accepted
views as possible. If contemporary readers find in Locke a bland reflection of conventional religious doctrine, he would appear to have
succeeded.
He succeeded so much, in fact, that the oncecontroversial and revolutionary foundation of modern constitutionalism now appears to be an unremarkable presupposition of the Western tradition.

501

JOHN LOCKE, THE REASONABLENESS OF CHRISTIANITY 157–58 (John C. HigginsBiddle ed., Oxford Univ. Press 1999) (1695).
502
LOCKE, TWO TREATISES, supra note 48, bk. II, ch. VIII, § 109.

